Swap Werkzeug for Caddy as the protocol layer for http and https decoy
services. Flask keeps owning app logic (fake_app, custom_body, headers,
syslog) on 127.0.0.1:8080; Caddy terminates h1/h2/h2c/h3 on the wire
with real-world TLS/QUIC fingerprints.
- Add `multi_enum` FieldType to ServiceConfigField + _coerce
- Add `http_versions` field to HTTPService (h1/h2c) and HTTPSService
(h1/h2/h3); selecting h3 emits UDP/443 port mapping in compose
- Rewrite both Dockerfiles with multi-stage Caddy binary copy +
setcap for port binding as the logrelay user
- Entrypoints parse HTTP_VERSIONS JSON, render a Caddyfile, start
Flask in background, wait for it, then exec Caddy
- https/server.py drops direct TLS handling; Caddy owns the cert
- Add ProxyFix to both server.py so Flask sees real attacker IPs
- Frontend: multi_enum checkbox-group renderer in ServiceConfigFields;
FormValue union extended to string[]; compactPayload skips []
- Fix stale test_smtp_relay_schema_matches_smtp: relay schema is a
superset of smtp, not equal; update assertions accordingly
All base images (debian:bookworm-slim, ubuntu:22.04, ubuntu:20.04,
rockylinux:9-minimal, centos:7, alpine:3.19, fedora:39,
kalilinux/kali-rolling, archlinux:latest, honeynet/conpot:latest)
now carry their resolved sha256 digest so 'docker pull' is
deterministic. :tag retained for human readability; @sha256 is what
Docker actually resolves. Refresh procedure documented at the top of
decnet/distros.py.
When service_cfg["email_seed"] is absent, compose_fragment now falls
back to $PROJROOT/bait/ if that directory exists on the host. Lets
operators drop a deployment-wide bait corpus into one place without
threading email_seed through every decky's config. Missing dir keeps
old no-op behavior.
IMAP_EMAIL_SEED / POP3_EMAIL_SEED accept a directory (rglob *.eml +
*.json) or a single .json/.eml. Loaded entries CONCATENATE with the
hardcoded _BAIT_EMAILS — additive to the realism-engine emailgen
output rather than replacing it. JSON dicts require from_addr /
to_addr / subject / body; bare bodies are wrapped into RFC 5322 on
load. compose_fragment reads service_cfg["email_seed"] and bind-mounts
the host path read-only at /var/spool/decnet-emails/seed.
Real Linux deployments (especially Ubuntu cloud images) ship a non-
root admin user; honeypots that only accept root logins are a tell.
Add a second account on both SSH and Telnet decoys, configurable
via service_cfg keys `user` / `user_password`, defaulting to
`ubuntu` / `admin` so the lure is live on every fresh deploy.
* `decnet/services/{ssh,telnet}.py` — two new ServiceConfigFields
(`user` string, `user_password` secret) and matching env vars
(`SSH_USER` / `SSH_USER_PASSWORD`, mirror for telnet) propagated
via the compose fragment.
* `decnet/templates/ssh/entrypoint.sh` — runtime `useradd -m -s
/usr/libexec/login-session -G sudo "$SSH_USER"` so the new user
inherits the same sessrec pty-recording shell as root and lands
in the sudo group. Privesc attempts (`sudo`) flow through the
existing sudo-log capture; network-enum from the user's shell
rides the recorded transcript.
* `decnet/templates/telnet/entrypoint.sh` — same useradd pattern
(no sudo group — busybox+login telnet image has no sudo
package; privesc rides `su -` which itself flows through the
existing PAM auth-helper at /etc/pam.d/login).
* New tests for default + custom user / password + independence
from root password. Updated the schema-keys assertion to match
the four-field shape.
The new account is ALSO the natural home for the body-aware
predicates that were previously gated on root-only sessions —
attackers who land on `ubuntu@host` and run network-recon /
privesc commands now generate the same structured TTP-rule
events as root sessions did, captured via the same auth-helper
+ sessrec + sudo-log pipes.
SERVICE_NAME was hardcoded to 'smtp' in server.py; the ingester's probe
publish guard checked service == 'smtp_relay' and never matched.
Read SMTP_SERVICE_NAME from env (default 'smtp'); smtp_relay compose
fragment sets it to 'smtp_relay' so the two services are distinguishable.
Attacker probe emails are now forwarded by the master (realism worker)
rather than inside the MACVLAN container, which has no internet gateway.
- New smtp.probe.pending bus topic: ingester publishes when smtp_relay
message_stored fires; worker subscribes and does the actual delivery
- decnet/orchestrator/drivers/smtp_relay.py: pure-sync forward_probe()
reads the .eml from disk and sends via smtplib on a thread executor
- worker.py: _run_smtp_probe_listener + _handle_probe_pending subtask;
limit enforced via count_probe_relays() (DB-backed, restart-safe)
- bounties.py: count_probe_relays() query on probe_relay bounty type
- fleet.py: get_fleet_decky_by_name() to pull service config from DB
- services/smtp_relay.py: upstream_* and probe_limit fields defined in
config_schema but NOT injected into container env (credentials stay
out of docker env vars)
- ingester.py: stripped of smtplib; publishes probe.pending and exits
- tests: assert upstream keys absent from container environment
Override the envelope MAIL FROM with a domain we own when talking to the
upstream relay. SPF passes at the recipient; the attacker's From: header
inside the message body is untouched so they see their own address in their
inbox and believe the relay is real.
First SMTP_PROBE_LIMIT messages per source IP are forwarded via a real
upstream relay (SMTP_UPSTREAM_HOST/PORT/USER/PASS) so the attacker's
test email actually lands in their inbox. All subsequent messages from
the same IP get 250 Ok but only hit the quarantine — campaign content
captured, nothing delivered.
- Declarative config_schema on RDP, Telnet, MySQL, Redis, SMTP, SMTP_Relay
matching the keys each service already reads at compose time.
- TODO marker on the 19 services that accept service_cfg but never read it,
so future contributors know where to plug schemas in.
- Wizard base64-wraps all textarea values at INI emit (DeckyFleet
buildIni); validate_cfg detects the b64: sentinel and decodes back to
UTF-8. Plain raw strings still pass through for direct API submitters.
- HTTPS image entrypoint accepts PEM content or path in TLS_CERT/TLS_KEY:
detects a BEGIN header, writes content to /opt/tls/, and re-exports
the on-disk path so server.py keeps reading paths.
- Tests cover schema/compose alignment for each new service plus
textarea base64 round-trip (incl. UTF-8) and HTTPS PEM end-to-end.
ServiceConfigField dataclass + BaseService.validate_cfg coerce/drop submitted
service_cfg dicts against per-service typed schemas. SSH/HTTP/HTTPS now declare
the keys they already read in compose_fragment, so the upcoming Inspector form
has metadata to render from instead of hardcoded inputs per service.
Cowrie was exposing an SSH daemon on port 22 alongside the telnet service
even when COWRIE_SSH_ENABLED=false, contaminating deployments that did not
request an SSH service.
New implementation mirrors the SSH service pattern:
- busybox telnetd in foreground mode on port 23
- /bin/login for real PAM authentication (brute-force attempts logged)
- rsyslog RFC 5424 bridge piped to stdout for Docker log capture
- Configurable root password and hostname via env vars
- No Cowrie dependency
real_ssh was a separate service name pointing to the same template and
behaviour as ssh. Merged them: ssh is now the single real-OpenSSH service.
- Rename templates/real_ssh/ → templates/ssh/
- Remove decnet/services/real_ssh.py
- Deaddeck archetype updated: services=["ssh"]
- Merge test_real_ssh.py into test_ssh.py (includes deaddeck + logging tests)
- Drop decnet.services.real_ssh from test_build module list
Scraps the Cowrie emulation layer. The real_ssh template now runs a
genuine sshd backed by a three-layer logging stack forwarded to stdout
as RFC 5424 for the DECNET collector:
auth,authpriv.* → rsyslogd → named pipe → stdout (logins/failures)
user.* → rsyslogd → named pipe → stdout (PROMPT_COMMAND cmds)
sudo syslog=auth → rsyslogd → named pipe → stdout (privilege escalation)
sudo logfile → /var/log/sudo.log (local backup with I/O)
The ssh.py service plugin now points to templates/real_ssh and drops all
COWRIE_* / NODE_NAME env vars, sharing the same compose fragment shape as
real_ssh.py.
The BASE_IMAGE build arg was being unconditionally overwritten by
composer.py with the decky's distro build_base (debian:bookworm-slim),
turning the conpot container into a bare Debian image with no conpot
installation — hence the silent restart loop.
Two fixes:
1. composer.py: use args.setdefault() so services that pre-declare
BASE_IMAGE in their compose_fragment() win over the distro default.
2. conpot.py: pre-declare BASE_IMAGE=honeynet/conpot:latest in build
args so it always uses the upstream image regardless of decky distro.
Also removed the USER decnet switch from the conpot Dockerfile. The
upstream image already runs as the non-root 'conpot' user; switching to
'decnet' broke pkg_resources because conpot's eggs live under
/home/conpot/.local and are only on sys.path for that user.
- decnet/services/smtp_relay.py: open relay variant of smtp, same template
with SMTP_OPEN_RELAY=1 baked into the environment
- tests/service_testing/__init__.py: init so pytest discovers the subdirectory
Introduces the 'real_ssh' service plugin backed by a genuine OpenSSH
server (not cowrie), and the 'deaddeck' archetype that uses it. The
container ships with a lived-in Linux environment and a deliberately
weak root:admin credential to invite exploitation.
- templates/real_ssh/: Dockerfile + entrypoint (configurable via env)
- decnet/services/real_ssh.py: BaseService plugin, service_cfg supports
password and hostname overrides
- decnet/archetypes.py: deaddeck archetype added
- tests/test_real_ssh.py: 17 tests covering registration, compose
fragment structure, overrides, and archetype
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- HTTP: configurable server_header, response_code, fake_app presets
(apache/nginx/wordpress/phpmyadmin/iis), extra_headers, custom_body,
static files directory mount
- SSH/Cowrie: configurable kernel_version, hardware_platform, ssh_banner,
and users/passwords via COWRIE_USERDB_ENTRIES; switched to build mode
so cowrie.cfg.j2 persona fields and userdb.txt generation work
- SMTP: configurable banner and MTA hostname
- MySQL: configurable version string in protocol greeting
- Redis: configurable redis_version and os string in INFO response
- BYOS: [custom-*] INI sections define bring-your-own Docker services
- Stealth: rename all *_honeypot.py → server.py; replace HONEYPOT_NAME
env var with NODE_NAME across all 22+ service templates and plugins;
strip "honeypot" from all in-container file content
- Config: DeckyConfig.service_config dict; INI [decky-N.svc] subsections;
composer passes service_cfg to compose_fragment
- 350 tests passing (100%)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dtagdevsec/mailoney and dtagdevsec/elasticpot are unavailable on Docker Hub
("manifest unknown"), causing the entire deployment to abort and cascade-
interrupt all other image pulls.
- Convert smtp and elasticsearch to build services with custom Python
honeypots: smtp emulates Postfix ESMTP (EHLO/AUTH/MAIL/RCPT logging),
elasticsearch emulates ES 7.17 HTTP API (logs recon probes like /_cat/,
/_cluster/, /_nodes/, /_security/)
- Both use ARG BASE_IMAGE so they participate in per-decky distro variation
- Add _compose_with_retry() to deployer: 3 attempts with exponential backoff
(5s → 10s → 20s) for transient network failures; permanent errors
("manifest unknown", "pull access denied") are detected and not retried
- Update test_services.py and test_composer.py: smtp/elasticsearch moved
from UPSTREAM_SERVICES to BUILD_SERVICES (314 tests passing)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
