feat(ssh,telnet): add non-root user account for privesc + enum lure

Real Linux deployments (especially Ubuntu cloud images) ship a non-
root admin user; honeypots that only accept root logins are a tell.
Add a second account on both SSH and Telnet decoys, configurable
via service_cfg keys `user` / `user_password`, defaulting to
`ubuntu` / `admin` so the lure is live on every fresh deploy.

* `decnet/services/{ssh,telnet}.py` — two new ServiceConfigFields
  (`user` string, `user_password` secret) and matching env vars
  (`SSH_USER` / `SSH_USER_PASSWORD`, mirror for telnet) propagated
  via the compose fragment.
* `decnet/templates/ssh/entrypoint.sh` — runtime `useradd -m -s
  /usr/libexec/login-session -G sudo "$SSH_USER"` so the new user
  inherits the same sessrec pty-recording shell as root and lands
  in the sudo group. Privesc attempts (`sudo`) flow through the
  existing sudo-log capture; network-enum from the user's shell
  rides the recorded transcript.
* `decnet/templates/telnet/entrypoint.sh` — same useradd pattern
  (no sudo group — busybox+login telnet image has no sudo
  package; privesc rides `su -` which itself flows through the
  existing PAM auth-helper at /etc/pam.d/login).
* New tests for default + custom user / password + independence
  from root password. Updated the schema-keys assertion to match
  the four-field shape.

The new account is ALSO the natural home for the body-aware
predicates that were previously gated on root-only sessions —
attackers who land on `ubuntu@host` and run network-recon /
privesc commands now generate the same structured TTP-rule
events as root sessions did, captured via the same auth-helper
+ sessrec + sudo-log pipes.
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-02 19:48:03 -04:00
parent c675bd26cf
commit 3e9c4c29b9
6 changed files with 167 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@ class SSHService(BaseService):
RFC 5424 via the rsyslog bridge baked into the image.
service_cfg keys:
password Root password (default: "admin")
hostname Override container hostname
password Root password (default: "admin")
user Non-root user name (default: "ubuntu") for
realistic "ssh user@host" lures + privesc capture
user_password Non-root user's password (default: "admin")
hostname Override container hostname
"""
name = "ssh"
@@ -34,6 +37,33 @@ class SSHService(BaseService):
secret=True,
help="Plaintext root password for the in-container sshd.",
),
ServiceConfigField(
key="user",
label="Non-root user",
type="string",
default="ubuntu",
help=(
"Username for the second account on the decoy. Real Linux "
"boxes (especially Ubuntu cloud images) ship a non-root "
"admin user — having one makes the decoy more lifelike, "
"captures attackers who try `ssh user@host` for network "
"enumeration, and surfaces sudo/privesc behaviour the root-"
"only path misses."
),
),
ServiceConfigField(
key="user_password",
label="Non-root user password",
type="password",
default="admin",
secret=True,
help=(
"Password for the non-root user. Captured at PAM auth time "
"via the same auth-helper that handles root logins. The "
"user is in the `sudo` group; subsequent privesc attempts "
"fan out through the existing sudo-log capture."
),
),
ServiceConfigField(
key="hostname",
label="Container hostname",
@@ -55,6 +85,13 @@ class SSHService(BaseService):
cfg = service_cfg or {}
env: dict = {
"SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD": cfg.get("password", "admin"),
# Non-root user account — created at runtime by the entrypoint
# iff SSH_USER is non-empty. Defaults to "ubuntu"/"admin" so
# `ssh ubuntu@<decky>` works out of the box (the conventional
# cloud-init account on Ubuntu cloud images, very low-friction
# for attackers running ssh enumeration scripts).
"SSH_USER": cfg.get("user", "ubuntu"),
"SSH_USER_PASSWORD": cfg.get("user_password", "admin"),
# NODE_NAME is the authoritative decky identifier for log
# attribution — matches the host path used for the artifacts
# bind mount below. The container hostname (optionally overridden

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@ class TelnetService(BaseService):
are logged as RFC 5424 via the same rsyslog bridge used by the SSH service.
service_cfg keys:
password Root password (default: "admin")
hostname Override container hostname
password Root password (default: "admin")
user Non-root user name (default: "ubuntu") for
realistic "telnet user@host" lures + privesc capture
user_password Non-root user's password (default: "admin")
hostname Override container hostname
"""
name = "telnet"
@@ -33,6 +36,33 @@ class TelnetService(BaseService):
secret=True,
help="Plaintext root password for the in-container telnetd.",
),
ServiceConfigField(
key="user",
label="Non-root user",
type="string",
default="ubuntu",
help=(
"Username for the second account on the decoy. The telnet "
"image is busybox + real /bin/login (PAM-aware), so a "
"non-root user widens the attack surface — captures "
"enumeration scripts that only try common usernames "
"(`telnet ubuntu@host`) and post-login `su -` privesc "
"attempts via the existing PAM auth-helper."
),
),
ServiceConfigField(
key="user_password",
label="Non-root user password",
type="password",
default="admin",
secret=True,
help=(
"Password for the non-root user. Captured at PAM auth "
"time via the same auth-helper that handles root logins. "
"Telnet has no sudo (busybox+login image); privesc rides "
"`su -` which itself flows through PAM."
),
),
ServiceConfigField(
key="hostname",
label="Container hostname",
@@ -54,6 +84,13 @@ class TelnetService(BaseService):
cfg = service_cfg or {}
env: dict = {
"TELNET_ROOT_PASSWORD": cfg.get("password", "admin"),
# Non-root user account — created at runtime by the
# entrypoint iff TELNET_USER is non-empty. Defaults to
# "ubuntu"/"admin" to mirror the SSH service shape and
# match the Ubuntu-flavoured motd already baked into the
# telnet image.
"TELNET_USER": cfg.get("user", "ubuntu"),
"TELNET_USER_PASSWORD": cfg.get("user_password", "admin"),
# NODE_NAME is the authoritative decky identifier for log
# attribution — matches the host path used for the artifacts
# bind mount below.

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,26 @@ set -e
ROOT_PASSWORD="${SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD:-admin}"
echo "root:${ROOT_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
# Non-root user — gives the decoy a realistic "ssh user@host" surface
# so attackers running enumeration scripts find a plausible second
# account, AND so post-login privesc (sudo) flows through the
# existing sudo-log capture pipe. SSH_USER blank means "no second
# user" (legacy single-account behaviour); the compose fragment
# defaults SSH_USER to "ubuntu" so this branch is the live path on
# fresh deploys.
SSH_USER="${SSH_USER:-}"
SSH_USER_PASSWORD="${SSH_USER_PASSWORD:-admin}"
if [ -n "${SSH_USER}" ] && [ "${SSH_USER}" != "root" ]; then
if ! id -u "${SSH_USER}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# Login shell points at the same sessrec wrapper root uses,
# so the new user's pty session is recorded — privesc and
# network-enum behaviour ride the existing capture pipe
# without a parallel implementation.
useradd -m -s /usr/libexec/login-session -G sudo "${SSH_USER}"
fi
echo "${SSH_USER}:${SSH_USER_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
fi
# Optional: override hostname inside container
if [ -n "$SSH_HOSTNAME" ]; then
echo "$SSH_HOSTNAME" > /etc/hostname

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,23 @@ set -e
ROOT_PASSWORD="${TELNET_ROOT_PASSWORD:-admin}"
echo "root:${ROOT_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
# Non-root user — gives the decoy a realistic "telnet user@host"
# surface so enumeration scripts that only try common usernames find
# a plausible second account, AND so post-login `su -` privesc flows
# through the existing PAM auth-helper. Login shell is the sessrec
# wrapper so the user's pty session is recorded in the same shape
# as root's. TELNET_USER blank disables the second account; the
# compose fragment defaults TELNET_USER to "ubuntu" so this branch
# is the live path on fresh deploys.
TELNET_USER="${TELNET_USER:-}"
TELNET_USER_PASSWORD="${TELNET_USER_PASSWORD:-admin}"
if [ -n "${TELNET_USER}" ] && [ "${TELNET_USER}" != "root" ]; then
if ! id -u "${TELNET_USER}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -m -s /usr/libexec/login-session "${TELNET_USER}"
fi
echo "${TELNET_USER}:${TELNET_USER_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
fi
# Optional: override hostname inside container
if [ -n "$TELNET_HOSTNAME" ]; then
echo "$TELNET_HOSTNAME" > /etc/hostname

View File

@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ def test_field_to_json_omits_unused_enum():
def test_ssh_schema_keys_match_compose_reads():
# SSHService.compose_fragment reads cfg.get("password") and cfg.get("hostname")
# — the schema must expose exactly those.
# SSHService.compose_fragment reads password / user / user_password /
# hostname — the schema must expose exactly those.
keys = {f.key for f in SSHService.config_schema}
assert keys == {"password", "hostname"}
assert keys == {"password", "user", "user_password", "hostname"}
def test_ssh_compose_round_trip_through_validator():
@@ -144,16 +144,33 @@ def test_https_schema_includes_tls_fields():
def test_telnet_schema_keys_match_compose_reads():
assert {f.key for f in TelnetService.config_schema} == {"password", "hostname"}
assert {f.key for f in TelnetService.config_schema} == {
"password", "user", "user_password", "hostname",
}
def test_telnet_compose_round_trip():
svc = TelnetService()
cfg = svc.validate_cfg({"password": "hunter2", "hostname": "mail-01"})
cfg = svc.validate_cfg({
"password": "hunter2", "hostname": "mail-01",
"user": "deploy", "user_password": "Tr0ub4dor",
})
frag = svc.compose_fragment("decky-test", service_cfg=cfg)
env = frag["environment"]
assert env["TELNET_ROOT_PASSWORD"] == "hunter2"
assert env["TELNET_HOSTNAME"] == "mail-01"
assert env["TELNET_USER"] == "deploy"
assert env["TELNET_USER_PASSWORD"] == "Tr0ub4dor"
def test_telnet_default_non_root_user():
"""Defaults to ubuntu/admin so a fresh decoy lures `telnet
ubuntu@host` enumeration scripts without operator setup."""
svc = TelnetService()
frag = svc.compose_fragment("decky-test", service_cfg={})
env = frag["environment"]
assert env["TELNET_USER"] == "ubuntu"
assert env["TELNET_USER_PASSWORD"] == "admin"
def test_rdp_schema_matches_and_bool_coerces():

View File

@@ -123,6 +123,36 @@ def test_no_log_target_in_env():
assert "LOG_TARGET" not in _fragment(log_target="10.0.0.1:5140").get("environment", {})
def test_default_non_root_user_and_password():
"""The compose fragment defaults SSH_USER to "ubuntu" and
SSH_USER_PASSWORD to "admin" — privesc + network-enum lure on
every fresh deploy without an operator intervention."""
env = _fragment()["environment"]
assert env["SSH_USER"] == "ubuntu"
assert env["SSH_USER_PASSWORD"] == "admin"
def test_custom_non_root_user_and_password():
env = _fragment(service_cfg={
"user": "deploy",
"user_password": "Tr0ub4dor",
})["environment"]
assert env["SSH_USER"] == "deploy"
assert env["SSH_USER_PASSWORD"] == "Tr0ub4dor"
def test_non_root_user_independent_of_root_password():
"""User account password must be a distinct knob from the root
password — operators routinely set them to different values to
exercise multi-credential capture."""
env = _fragment(service_cfg={
"password": "rootpw",
"user_password": "userpw",
})["environment"]
assert env["SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD"] == "rootpw"
assert env["SSH_USER_PASSWORD"] == "userpw"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Logging pipeline wiring (Dockerfile + entrypoint)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------