sessrec.c emits the session_recorded SD blob with sid/service/src_ip/
duration_s/bytes/truncated — it never emitted shard_path. The web
handler still asked for fields.shard_path, got "", tripped the
sessions-YYYY-MM-DD.jsonl basename regex and returned
400 "invalid shard name" for every legitimate transcript request.
Handler now:
- Fast-paths when fields.shard_path IS present and validates
(for any future emitter or ingester that backfills it).
- Otherwise enumerates sessions-YYYY-MM-DD.jsonl shards under
ARTIFACTS_ROOT/{decky}/{service}/transcripts/ (newest first) and
returns the first one whose per-sid index contains our sid.
- Security invariant preserved: only files whose basename matches the
_SHARD_BASENAME_RE are ever opened, and they always resolve inside
ARTIFACTS_ROOT. A forged fields.shard_path is silently ignored.
- Soft-fails OSError/PermissionError on the transcripts dir (decky
containers often write it with a uid the API can't read) — returns
404 instead of a 500 traceback.
test_forged_shard_path_blocked updated to match the new semantics:
forgery is ignored, the real shard is served via fallback. The
invariant (no /etc/passwd access) is still asserted by the fact
that status is 200 with data from the test shard.
8.7 KiB
8.7 KiB