The named pipe at /run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay had two problems beyond its argv leak: any root-in-container process could (a) `cat` the pipe and watch the live SIEM feed, and (b) write to it and inject forged log lines. Since an attacker with a shell is already root inside the honeypot, file permissions can't fix it. Point rsyslog's auth/user actions directly at /proc/1/fd/1 — the container-stdout fd Docker attached to PID 1 — and delete the mkfifo + cat relay from the entrypoint. No pipe on disk, nothing to read, nothing to inject, and one fewer cloaked process in `ps`.
53 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
53 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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set -e
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# Configure root password (default: admin)
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ROOT_PASSWORD="${SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD:-admin}"
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echo "root:${ROOT_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
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# Optional: override hostname inside container
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if [ -n "$SSH_HOSTNAME" ]; then
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echo "$SSH_HOSTNAME" > /etc/hostname
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hostname "$SSH_HOSTNAME"
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fi
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# Generate host keys if missing (first boot)
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ssh-keygen -A
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# Fake bash history so the box looks used
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if [ ! -f /root/.bash_history ]; then
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cat > /root/.bash_history <<'HIST'
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apt update && apt upgrade -y
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systemctl status nginx
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tail -f /var/log/syslog
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df -h
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htop
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ps aux | grep python
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git pull origin main
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cd /root/projects
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vim notes.txt
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crontab -e
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ls /var/www/html
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HIST
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fi
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# Logging pipeline: rsyslogd (RFC 5424) → /proc/1/fd/1 → Docker log capture.
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# No intermediate pipe/relay — a named FIFO would be readable AND writable
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# by any root-in-container process, letting an attacker either eavesdrop on
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# the SIEM feed or inject forged log lines.
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rsyslogd
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# File-catcher: mirror attacker drops into host-mounted quarantine with attribution.
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# Script lives at /usr/libexec/udev/journal-relay so `ps aux` shows a
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# plausible udev helper. See Dockerfile for the rename rationale.
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# LD_PRELOAD + ARGV_ZAP_COMM blank bash's argv[1..] so /proc/PID/cmdline
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# shows only "journal-relay" (no script path leak) and /proc/PID/comm
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# matches.
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CAPTURE_DIR=/var/lib/systemd/coredump \
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LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/argv_zap.so \
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ARGV_ZAP_COMM=journal-relay \
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bash -c 'exec -a "journal-relay" bash /usr/libexec/udev/journal-relay' &
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# sshd logs via syslog — no -e flag, so auth events flow through rsyslog → pipe → stdout
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exec /usr/sbin/sshd -D
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