anti
d80e6aa6d1
Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1): - Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced. - Change-password now requires min_length=12. - SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream. Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper. Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3): - Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/ metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE. - UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now defaults True. Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2): - Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter. - Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy trust. Correctness (BUG-7..11): - BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling); BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities; BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC. Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review.
44 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
44 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Any, Optional
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
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from decnet.telemetry import traced as _traced
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from decnet.web.auth import ahash_password, averify_password
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from decnet.web.dependencies import get_current_user_unchecked, invalidate_user_cache, repo
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from decnet.web.db.models import ChangePasswordRequest, MessageResponse
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from decnet.web.limiter import limiter
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router = APIRouter()
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@router.post(
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"/auth/change-password",
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tags=["Authentication"],
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response_model=MessageResponse,
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responses={
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400: {"description": "Bad Request (e.g. malformed JSON)"},
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401: {"description": "Could not validate credentials"},
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422: {"description": "Validation error"},
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429: {"description": "Too many password-change attempts — retry after the window resets"},
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},
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)
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@limiter.limit("5/minute")
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@_traced("api.change_password")
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async def change_password(request: Request, body: ChangePasswordRequest, current_user: str = Depends(get_current_user_unchecked)) -> dict[str, str]:
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_user: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = await repo.get_user_by_uuid(current_user)
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if not _user or not await averify_password(body.old_password, _user["password_hash"]):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Incorrect old password",
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)
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_new_hash: str = await ahash_password(body.new_password)
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await repo.update_user_password(current_user, _new_hash, must_change_password=False)
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# Changing a password revokes every existing session for this user (incl.
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# the current one): the caller's next request 401s and re-authenticates.
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await repo.set_tokens_valid_from(current_user, datetime.now(timezone.utc))
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invalidate_user_cache(current_user)
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return {"message": "Password updated successfully"}
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