Files
DECNET/decnet/web/ingester.py
anti a10aee282f perf(ingester): batch log writes into bulk commits
The ingester now accumulates up to DECNET_BATCH_SIZE rows (default 100)
or DECNET_BATCH_MAX_WAIT_MS (default 250ms) before flushing through
repo.add_logs — one transaction, one COMMIT per batch instead of per
row. Under attacker traffic this collapses N commits into ⌈N/100⌉ and
takes most of the SQLite writer-lock contention off the hot path.

Flush semantics are cancel-safe: _position only advances after a batch
commits successfully, and the flush helper bails without touching the
DB if the enclosing task is being cancelled (lifespan teardown).
Un-flushed lines stay in the file and are re-read on next startup.

Tests updated to assert on add_logs (bulk) instead of the per-row
add_log that the ingester no longer uses, plus a new test that 250
lines flush in ≤5 calls.
2026-04-17 16:37:34 -04:00

346 lines
14 KiB
Python

import asyncio
import os
import json
import time
from typing import Any
from pathlib import Path
from decnet.env import DECNET_BATCH_SIZE, DECNET_BATCH_MAX_WAIT_MS
from decnet.logging import get_logger
from decnet.telemetry import (
traced as _traced,
get_tracer as _get_tracer,
extract_context as _extract_ctx,
start_span_with_context as _start_span,
)
from decnet.web.db.repository import BaseRepository
logger = get_logger("api")
_INGEST_STATE_KEY = "ingest_worker_position"
async def log_ingestion_worker(repo: BaseRepository) -> None:
"""
Background task that tails the DECNET_INGEST_LOG_FILE.json and
inserts structured JSON logs into the SQLite repository.
"""
_base_log_file: str | None = os.environ.get("DECNET_INGEST_LOG_FILE")
if not _base_log_file:
logger.warning("DECNET_INGEST_LOG_FILE not set. Log ingestion disabled.")
return
_json_log_path: Path = Path(_base_log_file).with_suffix(".json")
_saved = await repo.get_state(_INGEST_STATE_KEY)
_position: int = _saved.get("position", 0) if _saved else 0
logger.info("ingest worker started path=%s position=%d", _json_log_path, _position)
while True:
try:
if not _json_log_path.exists():
await asyncio.sleep(2)
continue
_stat: os.stat_result = _json_log_path.stat()
if _stat.st_size < _position:
# File rotated or truncated
_position = 0
await repo.set_state(_INGEST_STATE_KEY, {"position": 0})
if _stat.st_size == _position:
# No new data
await asyncio.sleep(1)
continue
# Accumulate parsed rows and the file offset they end at. We
# only advance _position after the batch is successfully
# committed — if we get cancelled mid-flush, the next run
# re-reads the un-committed lines rather than losing them.
_batch: list[tuple[dict[str, Any], int]] = []
_batch_started: float = time.monotonic()
_max_wait_s: float = DECNET_BATCH_MAX_WAIT_MS / 1000.0
with open(_json_log_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as _f:
_f.seek(_position)
while True:
_line: str = _f.readline()
if not _line or not _line.endswith('\n'):
# EOF or partial line — flush what we have and stop
break
try:
_log_data: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(_line.strip())
# Collector injects trace context so the ingester span
# chains off the collector's — full event journey in Jaeger.
_parent_ctx = _extract_ctx(_log_data)
_tracer = _get_tracer("ingester")
with _start_span(_tracer, "ingester.process_record", context=_parent_ctx) as _span:
_span.set_attribute("decky", _log_data.get("decky", ""))
_span.set_attribute("service", _log_data.get("service", ""))
_span.set_attribute("event_type", _log_data.get("event_type", ""))
_span.set_attribute("attacker_ip", _log_data.get("attacker_ip", ""))
_sctx = getattr(_span, "get_span_context", None)
if _sctx:
_ctx = _sctx()
if _ctx and getattr(_ctx, "trace_id", 0):
_log_data["trace_id"] = format(_ctx.trace_id, "032x")
_log_data["span_id"] = format(_ctx.span_id, "016x")
_batch.append((_log_data, _f.tell()))
except json.JSONDecodeError:
logger.error("ingest: failed to decode JSON log line: %s", _line.strip())
# Skip past bad line so we don't loop forever on it.
_position = _f.tell()
continue
if len(_batch) >= DECNET_BATCH_SIZE or (
time.monotonic() - _batch_started >= _max_wait_s
):
_position = await _flush_batch(repo, _batch, _position)
_batch.clear()
_batch_started = time.monotonic()
# Flush any remainder collected before EOF / partial-line break.
if _batch:
_position = await _flush_batch(repo, _batch, _position)
except Exception as _e:
_err_str = str(_e).lower()
if "no such table" in _err_str or "no active connection" in _err_str or "connection closed" in _err_str:
logger.error("ingest: post-shutdown or fatal DB error: %s", _e)
break # Exit worker — DB is gone or uninitialized
logger.error("ingest: error in worker: %s", _e)
await asyncio.sleep(5)
await asyncio.sleep(1)
async def _flush_batch(
repo: BaseRepository,
batch: list[tuple[dict[str, Any], int]],
current_position: int,
) -> int:
"""Commit a batch of log rows and return the new file position.
If the enclosing task is being cancelled, bail out without touching
the DB — the session factory may already be disposed during lifespan
teardown, and awaiting it would stall the worker. The un-flushed
lines stay uncommitted; the next startup re-reads them from
``current_position``.
"""
_task = asyncio.current_task()
if _task is not None and _task.cancelling():
raise asyncio.CancelledError()
_entries = [_entry for _entry, _ in batch]
_new_position = batch[-1][1]
await repo.add_logs(_entries)
for _entry in _entries:
await _extract_bounty(repo, _entry)
await repo.set_state(_INGEST_STATE_KEY, {"position": _new_position})
return _new_position
@_traced("ingester.extract_bounty")
async def _extract_bounty(repo: BaseRepository, log_data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Detect and extract valuable artifacts (bounties) from log entries."""
_fields = log_data.get("fields")
if not isinstance(_fields, dict):
return
# 1. Credentials (User/Pass)
_user = _fields.get("username")
_pass = _fields.get("password")
if _user and _pass:
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": log_data.get("service"),
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "credential",
"payload": {
"username": _user,
"password": _pass
}
})
# 2. HTTP User-Agent fingerprint
_h_raw = _fields.get("headers")
if isinstance(_h_raw, dict):
_headers = _h_raw
elif isinstance(_h_raw, str):
try:
_parsed = json.loads(_h_raw)
_headers = _parsed if isinstance(_parsed, dict) else {}
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
_headers = {}
else:
_headers = {}
_ua = _headers.get("User-Agent") or _headers.get("user-agent")
if _ua:
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": log_data.get("service"),
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "http_useragent",
"value": _ua,
"method": _fields.get("method"),
"path": _fields.get("path"),
}
})
# 3. VNC client version fingerprint
_vnc_ver = _fields.get("client_version")
if _vnc_ver and log_data.get("event_type") == "version":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": log_data.get("service"),
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "vnc_client_version",
"value": _vnc_ver,
}
})
# 4. SSH client banner fingerprint (deferred — requires asyncssh server)
# Fires on: service=ssh, event_type=client_banner, fields.client_banner
# 5. JA3/JA3S TLS fingerprint from sniffer container
_ja3 = _fields.get("ja3")
if _ja3 and log_data.get("service") == "sniffer":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "sniffer",
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "ja3",
"ja3": _ja3,
"ja3s": _fields.get("ja3s"),
"ja4": _fields.get("ja4"),
"ja4s": _fields.get("ja4s"),
"tls_version": _fields.get("tls_version"),
"sni": _fields.get("sni") or None,
"alpn": _fields.get("alpn") or None,
"dst_port": _fields.get("dst_port"),
"raw_ciphers": _fields.get("raw_ciphers"),
"raw_extensions": _fields.get("raw_extensions"),
},
})
# 6. JA4L latency fingerprint from sniffer
_ja4l_rtt = _fields.get("ja4l_rtt_ms")
if _ja4l_rtt and log_data.get("service") == "sniffer":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "sniffer",
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "ja4l",
"rtt_ms": _ja4l_rtt,
"client_ttl": _fields.get("ja4l_client_ttl"),
},
})
# 7. TLS session resumption behavior
_resumption = _fields.get("resumption")
if _resumption and log_data.get("service") == "sniffer":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "sniffer",
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "tls_resumption",
"mechanisms": _resumption,
},
})
# 8. TLS certificate details (TLS 1.2 only — passive extraction)
_subject_cn = _fields.get("subject_cn")
if _subject_cn and log_data.get("service") == "sniffer":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "sniffer",
"attacker_ip": log_data.get("attacker_ip"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "tls_certificate",
"subject_cn": _subject_cn,
"issuer": _fields.get("issuer"),
"self_signed": _fields.get("self_signed"),
"not_before": _fields.get("not_before"),
"not_after": _fields.get("not_after"),
"sans": _fields.get("sans"),
"sni": _fields.get("sni") or None,
},
})
# 9. JARM fingerprint from active prober
_jarm = _fields.get("jarm_hash")
if _jarm and log_data.get("service") == "prober":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "prober",
"attacker_ip": _fields.get("target_ip", "Unknown"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "jarm",
"hash": _jarm,
"target_ip": _fields.get("target_ip"),
"target_port": _fields.get("target_port"),
},
})
# 10. HASSHServer fingerprint from active prober
_hassh = _fields.get("hassh_server_hash")
if _hassh and log_data.get("service") == "prober":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "prober",
"attacker_ip": _fields.get("target_ip", "Unknown"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "hassh_server",
"hash": _hassh,
"target_ip": _fields.get("target_ip"),
"target_port": _fields.get("target_port"),
"ssh_banner": _fields.get("ssh_banner"),
"kex_algorithms": _fields.get("kex_algorithms"),
"encryption_s2c": _fields.get("encryption_s2c"),
"mac_s2c": _fields.get("mac_s2c"),
"compression_s2c": _fields.get("compression_s2c"),
},
})
# 11. TCP/IP stack fingerprint from active prober
_tcpfp = _fields.get("tcpfp_hash")
if _tcpfp and log_data.get("service") == "prober":
await repo.add_bounty({
"decky": log_data.get("decky"),
"service": "prober",
"attacker_ip": _fields.get("target_ip", "Unknown"),
"bounty_type": "fingerprint",
"payload": {
"fingerprint_type": "tcpfp",
"hash": _tcpfp,
"raw": _fields.get("tcpfp_raw"),
"target_ip": _fields.get("target_ip"),
"target_port": _fields.get("target_port"),
"ttl": _fields.get("ttl"),
"window_size": _fields.get("window_size"),
"df_bit": _fields.get("df_bit"),
"mss": _fields.get("mss"),
"window_scale": _fields.get("window_scale"),
"sack_ok": _fields.get("sack_ok"),
"timestamp": _fields.get("timestamp"),
"options_order": _fields.get("options_order"),
},
})