anti
75ff0ede1f
Three bug classes uncovered by the 2026-05-02 ship-time audit: * AbuseIPDB code/name mismatch in v1: cat 10 was treated as DDoS (it's Web Spam — DDoS is cat 4, intentionally unmapped per A.10) and cat 17 as VPN IP (it's Spoofing — VPN IP is cat 13). Both typos mirrored in code AND the design doc Appendix A.10. Code now matches the AbuseIPDB taxonomy exactly; cat 17 retargets to T1566 (email-spoofing as a phishing precursor), and cats 7 (Phishing) and 16 (SQL Injection) pick up T1566 / T1190 emissions that v1 didn't cover. * ThreatFox dispatch keyed on `ioc_type` in v1, but `ioc_type` is the indicator format (url / domain / hash variants) and carries no ATT&CK signal. The canonical taxonomy field per ThreatFox's API is `threat_type` (botnet_cc / payload_delivery / payload / cc_skimming). Repoint dispatch through the new `threatfox_threat_types` payload field; `ioc_type` rides as evidence only. Also adds the missing cc_skimming -> T1056 (Input Capture) mapping and registers T1056 in attack_catalog.py. * GreyNoise bare-malicious lane: a `classification == "malicious"` row with no recognised tag used to emit nothing. Now lights T1071 at a half multiplier, suppressed when a tag already fires T1071 to avoid double-stamping at conflicting confidence levels.
117 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
117 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
"""ATT&CK technique-id → display-name catalogue.
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Pinned to the same ATT&CK release the rule engine emits on
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(``v15.1`` per ``decnet/ttp/impl/rule_engine.py:_ATTACK_RELEASE``). The
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operator UI uses these names to render "T1595 — Active Scanning"
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instead of just "T1595" in the TTPs-observed rollup and the per-tag
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inspector. Names are the canonical MITRE labels, not author-supplied
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strings on rules — keeping them here means a rule author can't typo a
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technique name and the entire fleet sees the typo.
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Bumping ``_ATTACK_RELEASE`` requires reviewing this file: any
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techniques that were renamed need their entries updated in the same
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commit. See TTP_TAGGING.md §"Hard parts §8 ATT&CK matrix drift".
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Coverage policy: every technique_id / sub_technique_id appearing in
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``rules/ttp/`` MUST have an entry here. The
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``tests/ttp/test_attack_catalog.py`` coverage test enforces this so a
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rule author who adds a new technique gets a loud failure rather than
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a silent UI fallback.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Final
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# Top-level techniques + sub-techniques referenced by `rules/ttp/`
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# (R0001..R0058). Names from MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15.1.
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TECHNIQUE_NAMES: Final[dict[str, str]] = {
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# ── Top-level techniques ─────────────────────────────────────────
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"T1003": "OS Credential Dumping",
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"T1016": "System Network Configuration Discovery",
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"T1027": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
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"T1029": "Scheduled Transfer",
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"T1033": "System Owner/User Discovery",
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"T1036": "Masquerading",
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"T1046": "Network Service Discovery",
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"T1049": "System Network Connections Discovery",
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"T1053": "Scheduled Task/Job",
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"T1056": "Input Capture",
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"T1059": "Command and Scripting Interpreter",
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"T1070": "Indicator Removal",
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"T1071": "Application Layer Protocol",
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"T1078": "Valid Accounts",
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"T1082": "System Information Discovery",
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"T1083": "File and Directory Discovery",
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"T1087": "Account Discovery",
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"T1090": "Proxy",
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"T1098": "Account Manipulation",
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"T1105": "Ingress Tool Transfer",
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"T1110": "Brute Force",
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"T1135": "Network Share Discovery",
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"T1136": "Create Account",
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"T1190": "Exploit Public-Facing Application",
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"T1204": "User Execution",
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"T1213": "Data from Information Repositories",
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"T1482": "Domain Trust Discovery",
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"T1485": "Data Destruction",
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"T1486": "Data Encrypted for Impact",
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"T1496": "Resource Hijacking",
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"T1505": "Server Software Component",
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"T1548": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism",
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"T1552": "Unsecured Credentials",
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"T1557": "Adversary-in-the-Middle",
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"T1566": "Phishing",
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"T1567": "Exfiltration Over Web Service",
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"T1586": "Compromise Accounts",
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"T1588": "Obtain Capabilities",
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"T1595": "Active Scanning",
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"T1602": "Data from Configuration Repository",
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"T1611": "Escape to Host",
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# ── Sub-techniques ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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"T1003.008": "OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow",
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"T1036.005": "Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location",
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"T1053.003": "Scheduled Task/Job: Cron",
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"T1059.004": "Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell",
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"T1070.003": "Indicator Removal: Clear Command History",
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"T1071.001": "Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols",
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"T1071.003": "Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols",
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"T1078.001": "Valid Accounts: Default Accounts",
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"T1087.002": "Account Discovery: Domain Account",
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"T1098.004": "Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys",
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"T1110.001": "Brute Force: Password Guessing",
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"T1110.003": "Brute Force: Password Spraying",
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"T1110.004": "Brute Force: Credential Stuffing",
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"T1136.001": "Create Account: Local Account",
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"T1204.002": "User Execution: Malicious File",
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"T1505.003": "Server Software Component: Web Shell",
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"T1548.001": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid",
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"T1548.003": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching",
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"T1552.001": "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files",
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"T1552.007": "Unsecured Credentials: Container API",
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"T1557.001": "Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay",
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"T1566.001": "Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment",
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"T1566.002": "Phishing: Spearphishing Link",
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"T1566.003": "Phishing: Spearphishing via Service",
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"T1586.002": "Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts",
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"T1588.001": "Obtain Capabilities: Malware",
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"T1588.002": "Obtain Capabilities: Tool",
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"T1595.002": "Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning",
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"T1602.002": "Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump",
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}
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def technique_name(technique_id: str | None) -> str | None:
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"""Return the canonical ATT&CK display name for *technique_id*.
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``None`` for unknown IDs — the UI falls back to showing the bare
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ID. Adding a rule that emits an unknown technique should be a
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deploy-time loud failure (see ``tests/ttp/test_attack_catalog.py``)
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rather than a silent UI fallback in production.
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"""
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if not technique_id:
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return None
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return TECHNIQUE_NAMES.get(technique_id)
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__all__ = ["TECHNIQUE_NAMES", "technique_name"]
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