The swarm controller (port 8770) exposed 9 routes with zero app-layer auth, and swarmctl --tls defaulted off — anyone able to reach the port could enroll workers (minting CA-signed certs + private keys), deploy, or tear down the fleet. Two fail-closed layers: - require_operator_cert gates every operator route (enroll/deploy/ teardown/hosts/check/deckies). When mTLS is on, the peer cert's CN must be an operator identity (decnet-master/swarmctl); worker and updater@* certs are rejected. Plaintext loopback (single-host master) is accepted as the local operator — the docker.sock boundary. - swarmctl refuses to bind a routable interface without --tls, so a network-exposed plaintext control plane can never start. /heartbeat keeps its worker fingerprint pinning. Closes the two ASVS criticals (control-plane no-auth, unauthenticated cert minting).
6.7 KiB
6.7 KiB