The fingerprint canaries' obfuscator shells out to a Node helper that
require()s javascript-obfuscator. Without this commit, a fresh
pip install decnet would land the .py modules but not the .js helper /
package.json, and there'd be no documented way to provision Node side.
* pyproject.toml - extend tool.setuptools.package-data to ship
canary/_obfuscate_helper.js, canary/fingerprint_payload.js, and
canary/package.json with the wheel.
* decnet/cli/canary.py - new "decnet canary-install-toolchain"
subcommand. Resolves decnet.canary.__file__'s dir, runs
npm install --omit=dev there, exits non-zero with a clear message
if npm is missing or install fails. Idempotent - safe to call
every API service start.
* deploy/decnet-api.service.j2 - non-fatal ExecStartPre that calls
the new subcommand. Leading '-' so a missing Node toolchain only
degrades fingerprint canaries (loud at mint time) without keeping
the API from booting.
* tests/canary/test_cli.py - registration smoke test, missing-npm
exit path, and a mocked-subprocess test asserting the right argv
and cwd land on npm.
Realism cultivator already has a broad except Exception around
cultivate() in scheduler.py:195-211, so a missing toolchain on a
host running the realism tick degrades to an inert noise file with
no extra plumbing.
The two new fingerprint canary generators existed at the API level
since f64e78f but weren't visible to the realism engine or the
operator-facing dashboard. Threads them through every place that
enumerates canary content classes.
Backend:
* realism/taxonomy.py - two new ContentClass members
(CANARY_FINGERPRINT_HTML, CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SVG); enum is
wire-visible (synthetic_files.content_class column + bus discrim)
so we add at the bottom, never reorder.
* canary/cultivator.py - class-to-generator dispatch, kind mapping
(both http), and default placement paths
(~/Documents/asset_directory.html and network_topology.svg).
* realism/naming.py + bodies.py - _name_canary / _body_canary entries.
* realism/planner.py - added to _DEFAULT_CANARY_CLASS_WEIGHTS and
the _CANARY_CLASSES classification set.
Frontend:
* decnet_web/src/realism/labels.ts - display labels.
* decnet_web/src/components/RealismConfig/RealismConfig.tsx - default
canary weight rows so operators see them in the realism config UI.
* decnet_web/src/components/SyntheticFiles/SyntheticFiles.tsx - added
to the CONTENT_CLASSES allow-list so filter dropdowns show them.
Also: re-applied the nosec B404/B603 markers on canary/obfuscator.py;
the first commit's pre-commit autoformatter stripped them.
Tests: extended tests/realism/test_taxonomy.py's stability assertion
to include the two new values. Full canary + realism suites pass
(362 / 2 skipped).
The fingerprint payload beacons fingerprint data as base64url JSON in
GET query params: ?o=1 for the bare-open beacon, ?d=<blob> for a
single-shot dump, or ?s/i/n/d=<chunk> for chunked dumps. Until now
those params were buried inside request_path; consumers had to parse
the URL themselves.
Worker now extracts them in _extract_fingerprint and merges into
raw_headers under reserved _fp* keys:
* _fp_open — bare-open marker
* _fp — decoded fingerprint dict (single-shot path)
* _fp_sid/idx/total/chunk — chunked metadata + raw base64 (reassembly
is a downstream concern, not the worker's job)
* _fp_decode_error / _fp_oversize — failure markers for trash dumps
Per-chunk size capped at 8KB so an attacker spamming /c/<known_slug>
can't inflate trigger rows indefinitely. Decode failures degrade
gracefully — the trigger row still records the hit, just with a
_fp_decode_error flag instead of structured fingerprint data.
Tests cover the single-shot decode, bare-open flag, chunked metadata,
malformed input, and oversize drop paths.
Two new synthesised-artifact generators that bake the obfuscated
fingerprint payload into plausible-looking decoy files:
* fingerprint_html — a mundane "Internal Asset Directory" page with a
small table of fake hosts; the obfuscated payload is inlined at the
bottom of <body>. Visible content (row pool slice, sync timestamp)
also varies per mint via SHA-256-derived stable ints, so two
extracted canaries don't diff to zero even on the rendered surface.
* fingerprint_svg — standalone SVG with an embedded <script> CDATA
block. SVG <script> only fires for top-level loads / <object> /
<iframe>; <img>-referenced renders are safely inert.
Both derive the mint UUID via uuid.uuid5 from the callback token, so
re-mints are byte-identical (preserving the generator determinism
contract) AND the same token produces the same mint UUID across HTML
and SVG variants — the worker can correlate beacons across artifact
shapes.
Wired into the factory + KNOWN_GENERATORS, default placement paths
under ~/Documents/asset_directory.html and ~/Documents/network_topology.svg
for both linux and windows personas. Tests cover determinism, per-token
divergence, structural validity (DOCTYPE/SVG headers), and that the
beacon URL stays inside the obfuscated string array (not in plaintext).
The two new entries skip in test_generators.py when Node toolchain is
absent so bare CI checkouts still pass.
Adds the load-bearing primitives for obfuscated browser-fingerprinting
canaries. Step 3 (HTML/SVG generators) and step 4 (worker-side
fingerprint ingestion) build on top of these.
* decnet/canary/obfuscator.py - javascript-obfuscator wrapper. Seed
and polymorphic config bits both derive from the callback token, so
output is byte-identical for the same mint (preserving the generator
determinism contract from base.py) and structurally distinct across
mints.
* decnet/canary/fingerprint_payload.js - port of canary-self-test.html
with the rendering UI stripped. Two placeholders (BEACON_URL,
MINT_UUID) substituted before obfuscation. MVP beacon strategy:
bare-open GET pixel first, then base64url-encoded fingerprint as
query params on subsequent GETs (chunked above ~6KB) so the existing
worker records hits before step-4 lands.
* decnet/canary/_obfuscate_helper.js - Node subprocess helper that
reads code+options JSON from stdin and writes obfuscated JS to
stdout. Vendored javascript-obfuscator under decnet/canary/.
* tests/canary/test_obfuscator.py - determinism, per-mint divergence,
template substitution, Node syntax check, error path.
Add/remove/update_config on a fleet decky living on a swarm worker — and on
an agent-pinned topology — used to run the master's local docker-compose only,
which has no containers for the remote decky. The mutation persisted on master
and silently no-op'd on the worker.
- Fleet swarm: lookup DeckyShard.host_uuid; if found, rebuild a single-host
shard from master state and call dispatch_decnet_config — same proven path
as POST /swarm/deploy. Skip local _compose (no containers to touch).
- Topology agent-pinned: call decnet.engine.deployer.resync_agent_topology
(existing helper) to push the latest hydrated blob to the worker.
- Local-only deckies: behaviour unchanged.
- Tests: 5 new in tests/engine/test_services_live_swarm.py covering all
three mutations on a swarm fleet decky (no local _compose, dispatch fires
with the right host's deckies), plus apply=False save-only path (no
dispatch), plus regression that local-only fleet add still runs local compose.
Bus signal `decky.{name}.service_config_changed` keeps publishing as an
audit trail; it is not the propagation trigger.
- DeckyServiceAddRequest gains an optional `config: dict` field, validated
against the service's config_schema before any state mutation (400 on
bad type, no half-written rows).
- Engine: add_service threads `config` into _add_topology_service /
_add_fleet_service, persisting validated cfg to decky_config.service_config
BEFORE compose regen so the first `up -d --build` materialises the env on
the new container. No follow-up apply needed.
- Frontend: shared AddServiceConfigModal — same wizard accordion shape, used by:
* DeckyCard's ADD SERVICE picker (Fleet & MazeNET inspectors via shared component)
* MazeNET Inspector's ADD SERVICE picker
* MazeNET palette drag-drop onto a deployed decky
Empty-schema services short-circuit to a one-click add (no modal flash).
Operator can cancel; errors surface in the modal.
- Tests: add_service config plumbing — persist, drop unknown keys, 400-equivalent
on bad types, back-compat empty-config.
- Drive-by: fix stale repo-method names in test_services_live.py
(create_topology_decky → add_topology_decky, get_topology_decky → list+pick helper,
service.added → service_added topic).
- Declarative config_schema on RDP, Telnet, MySQL, Redis, SMTP, SMTP_Relay
matching the keys each service already reads at compose time.
- TODO marker on the 19 services that accept service_cfg but never read it,
so future contributors know where to plug schemas in.
- Wizard base64-wraps all textarea values at INI emit (DeckyFleet
buildIni); validate_cfg detects the b64: sentinel and decodes back to
UTF-8. Plain raw strings still pass through for direct API submitters.
- HTTPS image entrypoint accepts PEM content or path in TLS_CERT/TLS_KEY:
detects a BEGIN header, writes content to /opt/tls/, and re-exports
the on-disk path so server.py keeps reading paths.
- Tests cover schema/compose alignment for each new service plus
textarea base64 round-trip (incl. UTF-8) and HTTPS PEM end-to-end.
The systemd unit grants AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN so the API
service can program host-side macvlan/ipvlan interfaces without
running as root, but setup_host_macvlan/_ipvlan rejected with euid!=0
before even trying — making web-driven 'decnet deploy' impossible
under the privilege model the unit advertises.
Replace _require_root with _require_net_admin, which reads CapEff
from /proc/self/status and accepts the cap (bit 12) as well as
euid==0. No libcap dep — pure /proc parse.
- GET /topologies/services/{name}/schema serves the declared ServiceConfigField
metadata so the Inspector can auto-render forms.
- PUT /(topologies/{id}/)deckies/{decky}/services/{svc}/config persists the
validated dict (DB + compose); container untouched (Save).
- POST /(topologies/{id}/)deckies/{decky}/services/{svc}/apply persists then
force-recreates <decky>-<svc> so the new env takes effect (Apply, destructive).
- New engine helper update_service_config wires both fleet and topology paths
through the existing _persist_fleet_change / _rerender_topology_compose
machinery; emits decky.<name>.service_config_changed on the bus.
ServiceConfigField dataclass + BaseService.validate_cfg coerce/drop submitted
service_cfg dicts against per-service typed schemas. SSH/HTTP/HTTPS now declare
the keys they already read in compose_fragment, so the upcoming Inspector form
has metadata to render from instead of hardcoded inputs per service.
Dashboard's ACTIVE DECKIES (active_deckies in get_stats_summary) counts
TopologyDecky rows where state='running'. No code path was flipping
that state away from the default 'pending', so the count read 0/N
even when every container was running fine — the dashboard was lying.
Two complementary fixes:
1. deploy_topology — after the post-deploy compose ps verification,
reconcile each TopologyDecky.state from the corresponding base
container's docker state. running → 'running'; anything else →
'failed'. Reuses the ps_rows already gathered for the
ACTIVE-vs-DEGRADED status decision; no extra docker hit.
2. apply_add_decky — _materialise_decky_spawn now returns True/False;
on True the row is updated to state='running' before
_assert_valid_after. Catches the case where a decky added via the
live mutator queue stays at 'pending' indefinitely (the deployer's
reconcile only runs on a fresh deploy_topology pass).
Existing topology deckies in active topologies will still read as
'pending' until the next deploy_topology runs, since this is
forward-only. An operator-side fix is to teardown + redeploy or run
the (forthcoming) reconcile-on-startup pass.
apply_add_decky's compose-up was hard-failing whenever the operator's
~/.docker/buildx/activity/ landed on a read-only mount — the wedge
detection in _compose_with_retry correctly refuses to retry (would
just leak more mounts), but for live materialisation we don't want a
wedged buildx state to abort an admin's mutation. ANTI hit it on
adding decky-a977: 'failed to update builder last activity time: ...
read-only file system → buildx wedge detected → returned non-zero'.
_compose_up_with_buildkit_fallback wraps _compose_with_retry: on a
CalledProcessError whose stderr matches both wedge signatures
(_BUILDX_WEDGE_SIGNATURE + _BUILDX_EROFS_SIGNATURE), it logs a
warning with the manual recovery steps + retries once with
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 set. The legacy non-buildx builder doesn't use
the activity dir and isn't affected.
Wired into the two paths that pass --build:
* _materialise_decky_spawn (apply_add_decky)
* _materialise_decky_services_diff (apply_update_decky service add)
_materialise_decky_recreate_base doesn't build — it just recreates a
container from an existing image — so it's not affected.
Operator-facing log message points at the manual fix
(rm -rf ~/.docker/buildx/activity + docker buildx create) so they
can recover at their leisure; we don't ATTEMPT the recovery because
the activity dir might be RO for a reason (zfs/btrfs snapshot, etc.)
that an automated rm would be wrong to fight.
apply_update_decky's flip path now refuses to promote a decky to
gateway unless its home LAN is a DMZ. The compose generator publishes
host ports for forwards_l3=True; a non-DMZ gateway would shadow the
host's port space without anything legitimately able to reach the
service. Same posture as the existing 'forwards_l3 flip on live
requires force=true' guard — refused before any DB write so a bad
mutation leaves zero side-effects.
The check is intentionally NOT a standing _RULES invariant — the
codebase uses forwards_l3 for two semantics:
1. Generic L3 forwarding (internal bridge deckies routing between
their multi-home LANs). The generator writes this on internal
bridges via bridge_forward_probability; legitimately non-DMZ.
2. DMZ gateway (host-port publisher). Only meaningful on DMZ.
Standing validation can't enforce DMZ-homing without breaking case 1.
The guard fires only on the explicit user-driven flip path where the
operator's intent is unambiguously case 2. Generator output and
internal-bridge attachments bypass the check.
check_gateway_homed_in_dmz lives in validate.py for callers that want
the explicit form (and for the test surface), but is not a standing
rule — comment in _RULES explains the asymmetry.
Two related fixes that came out of running the W5 tests locally:
1. tests/__init__.py — empty file, makes 'tests/' a package so pytest
stops inserting it into sys.path. Without it, 'tests/docker/'
(the docker-image test category) shadowed the installed docker SDK
on every engine-touching test in the repo:
module 'docker' has no attribute 'DockerClient'
Pytest's default --import-mode=prepend was the culprit; making
tests/ a package is the cheapest fix and doesn't change
--import-mode for the whole tree.
2. delete_topology_decky / delete_topology_edge / delete_lan grow an
'enforce_pending: bool = True' kwarg. Default preserves the HTTP
CRUD guard (api_decky_crud / api_edge_crud / api_lan_crud get the
409 for free). apply_remove_decky / apply_detach_decky /
apply_remove_lan now pass enforce_pending=False — the mutator
queue is the live-editing surface and has its own active-topology
gating; the repo's pending-only guard was for design-time CRUD
that mustn't bypass it. Without this, apply_remove_decky was
silently broken on active topologies pre-W5; W5's new test
surfaced it on first run.
10/10 new W5 tests pass; 58/58 across mutator + topology suites.
apply_update_decky now discriminates three sub-cases:
* services list changed → diff old vs new and call
_materialise_decky_services_diff (compose up -d for added,
stop + rm -f for removed). Mirrors services_live's pattern but
doesn't import it — mutator-routed mutations carry a different bus
surface (mutation.applied) than the direct API path
(decky.<name>.service_added).
* forwards_l3 flipped → port publishing changes, which docker can
only apply at container-create time. Gated on payload['force'] is
true; default raises MutationError so a half-thinking operator
can't stomp a live decky. When force=true,
_materialise_decky_recreate_base does compose up -d --no-deps
--force-recreate. Pre-checked BEFORE the DB write so a refused
mutation leaves zero side-effects.
* coord-only (x/y) → DB only, no docker work.
Ships tests/mutator/test_ops_materialisation.py with focused coverage
for every new helper: add_decky/remove_decky/attach_decky/
detach_decky/update_decky/update_lan paths against an active
topology, with compose primitives + docker SDK mocked at the source
modules so the helpers' lazy imports pick up the stubs. Also covers
the pending-topology skip and the force-flag gating.
decnet.engine.services_live exposes add_service / remove_service for
both fleet and topology decky scopes. The host's _compose() wrapper
already supported per-service targeting (up --no-deps -d <svc>,
stop, rm -f); what was missing was the orchestration around it:
* add: validate against decnet.services.registry (rejects unknown +
fleet_singleton); persist the new services list; re-render the
per-scope compose file (so future redeploys reflect the change);
run docker compose up -d --no-deps --build <decky>-<svc>.
* remove: stop + rm -f the service container; persist; re-render
compose so a future up -d doesn't bring it back.
Both publish decky.<name>.service.added / .removed on the bus, with
the post-mutation services list. Topic constants added to
decnet.bus.topics; the matching wiki entry in wiki-checkout/Service-Bus.md
ships in a separate commit on the wiki repo (wiki-checkout/ is gitignored).
Four new admin endpoints:
* POST/DELETE /api/v1/deckies/{name}/services{,/svc}
* POST/DELETE /api/v1/topologies/{id}/deckies/{name}/services{,/svc}
ServiceMutationError messages are mapped at the API boundary to 404
(decky/topology missing), 409 (idempotency violation), 422 (unknown
or fleet_singleton service).
Extracts the docker-exec-with-base64-stdin pattern out of canary/planter
and orchestrator/drivers/ssh into a shared decnet.decky_io package.
Both consumers now delegate; the canary planter test still proves the
contract end-to-end.
Adds POST/DELETE /api/v1/deckies/files for arbitrary file drops.
Container resolution is shared with the canary path: topology_id absent
means fleet (<name>-ssh), present routes through resolve_decky_container
which picks <name>-ssh when the topology decky exposes ssh, else the
topology base container decnet_t_<id8>_<name>.
Path validation rejects relative paths and '..' traversal at the request
model layer. Bad base64 → 400; unknown topology → 404; decky not in
topology → 422; docker exec failure → 409.
POST /api/v1/canary/tokens grows an optional topology_id field. When
present, the server hydrates the topology, validates the named decky is
in it, and resolves the docker container via
planter.resolve_topology_container — <name>-ssh if the decky exposes ssh,
else the topology base container. Absent ⇒ fleet semantics, unchanged.
The token row gets a nullable topology_id column (no migration helper
per pre-v1 policy). GET /api/v1/canary/tokens accepts ?topology_id= as
a filter. DELETE re-resolves the container at revoke time so a
redeployed topology is still reachable.
422 when the named decky isn't in the topology; 404 when the topology
itself doesn't exist.
Topology deploys now plant the configured canary baseline set on every
decky in the topology, mirroring the fleet-deploy hook. Containers are
resolved via resolve_topology_container — <decky>-ssh when the decky
exposes an ssh service, else the topology base container
decnet_t_<id8>_<decky>.
The planter's plant/revoke/seed_baseline grow an optional container=
kwarg; default preserves the fleet <name>-ssh resolution.
The Bounty Vault page only read from the Bounty table, but
inotifywait-captured file drops (event_type=file_captured) and SMTP
quarantined messages (event_type=message_stored) were only landing in
the Logs table. AttackerDetail's tabs queried logs directly, so they
showed up per-attacker but were invisible on the global Vault page.
Mirror both events into Bounty as bounty_type=artifact with
payload.kind ∈ {file, mail} so the existing dedup
(bounty_type, attacker_ip, payload) collapses repeats by sha256. Add an
ARTIFACTS segment to the Vault filter row, plus dedicated render
branches: file drops show orig_path + size + writer attribution; mail
shows subject + From + attachment count + size, with the Mail icon
distinguishing them from FileText for file drops.
Forward-only — existing logs stay where they are. A backfill pass would
be straightforward (read Log WHERE event_type IN ('file_captured',
'message_stored') and feed each row through _extract_bounty) but is out
of scope here.
sshd, pam_unix, sudo, CRON, systemd, kernel, rsyslogd, and dbus-daemon
all share the SSH/telnet decky containers and write to the same syslog
socket as DECNET's own emitters. Their output was being parsed and
ingested into the JSON stream, the dashboard, and the profiler — pure
noise: sshd's "Failed password for root from X" duplicates the
auth-helper's structured auth_attempt event, pam_unix repeats it again,
CRON/systemd say nothing about attacker behavior.
Drop these APP-NAMEs in _should_ingest before the JSON write and bus
publish. Raw .log file still captures everything for forensics. The
denylist is overridable with DECNET_COLLECTOR_DROP_APPS so operators
can extend it without code changes.
SSH/telnet decky containers emit shell commands via `logger -t bash "CMD …"`
which produces RFC 5424 lines with MSGID=NIL. Both parsers were leaving
event_type="-", so the behavioral profiler's `_COMMAND_EVENT_TYPES` filter
silently dropped them — the IP profile existed but no command transcripts
or artifacts. Confirmed in the wild: 44/48 events from one attacker were
event_type="-".
Rewrite event_type to "command" in both parsers when MSGID=NIL and the
msg starts with "CMD ". Correlation parser also extracts the cmd= payload
into fields["command"] so the profiler can build the transcript; collector
parser leaves fields={} to avoid duplicate pills in the dashboard.
- Fixed CLI tests by patching local imports at source (psutil, os, Path).
- Fixed Collector tests by globalizing docker.from_env mock.
- Stabilized SSE stream tests via AsyncMock and immediate generator termination to prevent hangs.
- Achieved >80% coverage on CLI (84%), Collector (97%), and DB Repository (100%).
- Implemented SMTP Relay service tests (100%).
Spins up each service's server.py in a real subprocess via a free ephemeral
port (PORT env var), connects with real protocol clients, and asserts both
correct protocol behavior and RFC 5424 log output.
- 44 live tests across 10 services: http, ftp, smtp, redis, mqtt,
mysql, postgres, mongodb, pop3, imap
- Shared conftest.py: _ServiceProcess (bg reader thread + queue),
free_port, live_service fixture, assert_rfc5424 helper
- PORT env var added to all 10 targeted server.py templates
- New pytest marker `live`; excluded from default addopts run
- requirements-live-tests.txt: flask, twisted + protocol clients
MongoDB had the same infinite-loop bug as MSSQL (msg_len=0 → buffer never
shrinks in while loop). Postgres, MySQL, and MQTT had related length-field
issues (stuck state, resource exhaustion, overlong remaining-length).
Also fixes an existing MongoDB _op_reply struct.pack format bug (extra 'q'
specifier caused struct.error on any OP_QUERY response).
Adds 53 regression + protocol boundary tests across MSSQL, MongoDB,
Postgres, MySQL, and MQTT, including a _run_with_timeout threading harness
to catch infinite loops and @pytest.mark.fuzz hypothesis tests for each.
Cowrie was exposing an SSH daemon on port 22 alongside the telnet service
even when COWRIE_SSH_ENABLED=false, contaminating deployments that did not
request an SSH service.
New implementation mirrors the SSH service pattern:
- busybox telnetd in foreground mode on port 23
- /bin/login for real PAM authentication (brute-force attempts logged)
- rsyslog RFC 5424 bridge piped to stdout for Docker log capture
- Configurable root password and hostname via env vars
- No Cowrie dependency
real_ssh was a separate service name pointing to the same template and
behaviour as ssh. Merged them: ssh is now the single real-OpenSSH service.
- Rename templates/real_ssh/ → templates/ssh/
- Remove decnet/services/real_ssh.py
- Deaddeck archetype updated: services=["ssh"]
- Merge test_real_ssh.py into test_ssh.py (includes deaddeck + logging tests)
- Drop decnet.services.real_ssh from test_build module list
Collector and mutator watcher subprocesses were spawned without
start_new_session=True, leaving them in the parent's process group.
SIGHUP (sent when the controlling terminal closes) killed both
processes silently — stdout/stderr were DEVNULL so the crash was
invisible.
Also update test_services and test_composer to reflect the ssh plugin
no longer using Cowrie env vars (replaced with SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD /
SSH_HOSTNAME matching the real_ssh plugin).
Scraps the Cowrie emulation layer. The real_ssh template now runs a
genuine sshd backed by a three-layer logging stack forwarded to stdout
as RFC 5424 for the DECNET collector:
auth,authpriv.* → rsyslogd → named pipe → stdout (logins/failures)
user.* → rsyslogd → named pipe → stdout (PROMPT_COMMAND cmds)
sudo syslog=auth → rsyslogd → named pipe → stdout (privilege escalation)
sudo logfile → /var/log/sudo.log (local backup with I/O)
The ssh.py service plugin now points to templates/real_ssh and drops all
COWRIE_* / NODE_NAME env vars, sharing the same compose fragment shape as
real_ssh.py.
_load_service_container_names() reads decnet-state.json and builds the
exact set of expected container names ({decky}-{service}). is_service_container()
and is_service_event() do a direct set lookup — no regex, no label
inspection, no heuristics.
Two bugs caused the log file to never be written:
1. is_service_container() used regex '^decky-\d+-\w' which only matched
the old decky-01-smtp naming style. Actual containers are named
omega-decky-smtp, relay-decky-smtp, etc. Fixed by using Docker Compose
labels instead: com.docker.compose.project=decnet + non-empty
depends_on discriminates service containers from base (sleep infinity)
containers reliably regardless of decky naming convention.
Added is_service_event() for the Docker events path.
2. The collector was only started when --api was used. Added a 'collect'
CLI subcommand (decnet collect --log-file <path>) and wired it into
deploy as an auto-started background process when --api is not in use.
Default log path: /var/log/decnet/decnet.log
Windows: both 0 (no ICMP rate limiting — matches real Windows behavior)
Linux: 1000ms / mask 6168 (kernel defaults)
BSD: 250ms / mask 6168 (FreeBSD default is faster than Linux)
Embedded/Cisco: both 0 (most firmware doesn't rate-limit ICMP)
These affect nmap's IE and U1 probe groups which measure ICMP error
response timing to closed UDP ports. Windows responds to all probes
instantly while Linux throttles to ~1/sec.
Tests: 10 new cases (5 per sysctl). Suite: 822 passed.
ip_no_pmtu_disc controls PMTU discovery for UDP/ICMP paths only.
TI=Z originates from ip_select_ident() in the kernel TCP stack setting
IP ID=0 for DF=1 TCP packets — a namespace-scoped sysctl cannot change this.
The previous commit was based on incorrect root-cause analysis.
When ip_no_pmtu_disc=0 the Linux kernel sets DF=1 on TCP packets and uses
IP ID=0 (RFC 6864). nmap's TI=Z fingerprint has no Windows match in its DB,
causing 91% confidence guesses of 'Linux 2.4/2.6 embedded' regardless of
TTL being 128. Setting ip_no_pmtu_disc=1 allows non-zero IP ID generation.
Trade-off: DF bit is not set on outgoing packets (slightly wrong for Windows)
but TI=Z is far more damaging to the spoof than losing DF accuracy.
Add tcp_timestamps, tcp_window_scaling, tcp_sack, tcp_ecn, ip_no_pmtu_disc,
and tcp_fin_timeout to every OS profile in OS_SYSCTLS.
All 6 are network-namespace-scoped and safe to set per-container without
--privileged. They directly influence nmap's OPS, WIN, ECN, and T2-T6
probe groups, making OS family detection significantly more convincing.
Key changes:
- tcp_timestamps=0 for windows/embedded/cisco (strongest Windows discriminator)
- tcp_ecn=2 for linux (ECN offer), 0 for all others
- tcp_sack=0 / tcp_window_scaling=0 for embedded/cisco
- ip_no_pmtu_disc=1 for embedded/cisco (DF bit ICMP behaviour)
- Expose _REQUIRED_SYSCTLS frozenset for completeness assertions
Tests: 88 new test cases across all OS families and composer integration.
Total suite: 812 passed.
- Add dynamic challenge nonces to Postgres, VNC, and SIP.
- Add basic keyspace lookup and mock data to Redis.
- Correct MSSQL TDS pre-login offset bounds.
- Support MongoDB OP_MSG handshake version checking.
- Suppress Werkzeug HTTP server headers and normalize FTPAnonymousShell response.
- Add tracking for Dynamic Bait Store (DEBT-027) via DEBT.md.
- decnet/services/smtp_relay.py: open relay variant of smtp, same template
with SMTP_OPEN_RELAY=1 baked into the environment
- tests/service_testing/__init__.py: init so pytest discovers the subdirectory
