GET /api/v1/attackers/{uuid}/attribution
Returns the merger output for an attacker's identity:
{
"identity_uuid": "abc..." | null,
"primitives": [
{primitive, current_value, state, confidence,
observation_count, last_change_ts, last_observation_ts},
...
]
}
Pre-attribution-worker: identity_uuid=null, primitives=[]. Surfacing
identity_uuid keeps the cross-attacker rollup story visible to the
frontend ahead of v1's clusterer landing.
api_events SSE relay also subscribes to attribution.> and forwards
to the AttackerDetail page filtered on payload.identity_uuid (the
identity is resolved at stream open from the URL's attacker_uuid;
attribution payloads are identity-keyed, not attacker-keyed). New
SSE event names: attribution.state_changed,
attribution.multi_actor_suspected.
Frontend (AttackerDetail.tsx badge rendering, useAttackerStream
consumer) deferred — there's already WIP on AttackerDetail.tsx in
the working tree; merging the badge logic is a separate commit
once that lands.
Tests: 4 endpoint scenarios — 401 unauth, 404 unknown attacker,
200 empty (no stub), 200 with primitive-ordered rows.
GET /api/v1/attackers/{uuid}/events streams behavioural events for
one attacker. Mirrors decnet/web/router/topology/api_events.py
end-to-end: ?token= auth, require_stream_viewer gate,
sse_connection_slot per-user cap, snapshot-on-connect, three bus
subscriptions (attacker.observation.>, attacker.fingerprint_rotated,
attacker.scored) merged through asyncio.Queue, 15s keepalive,
request.is_disconnected() exit, finally task cancellation.
Per-attacker filter keys on payload['attacker_uuid'] which the
profiler worker stamps onto every published payload (Phase 5 P5.0
amendment) — O(1) drop without a repo round-trip per event.
_sse_name_for derives SSE event names:
attacker.observation.<primitive> → observation.<primitive>
attacker.fingerprint_rotated → fingerprint.rotated
attacker.scored → attacker.scored
10 tests cover snapshot, live forward, per-attacker filter (drops
other attackers' events), fingerprint.rotated forward, 404, 401, and
the sse-name derivation across all four cases. Topology events
regression green.
New GET /api/v1/orchestrator/events/stats?since=1h&success=false&kind=...
backed by repo.count_orchestrator_failures(since_ts, kind), which
counts failed rows across both orchestrator_events and
orchestrator_emails since the cutoff.
Window parser accepts ^\d+[smhd]$, capped at 7d. Today only
success=false is accepted on this surface so the endpoint isn't
accidentally repurposed before the next consumer is properly
designed.
Orchestrator.tsx polls the endpoint on mount + every 30 s and
renders the authoritative DB-derived count instead of deriving from
the in-memory SSE buffer + one paginated page (which silently
excluded failures older than the local window).
The TTPsObservedSection rollup tells the operator "we saw T1059" but
not why. Click any technique row → side drawer opens listing every
ttp_tag row in scope with the persisted evidence JSON, firing
rule_id / rule_version, source_kind / source_id, confidence, and
created_at. Mirrors the CredentialReuseInspector / BountyInspector
pattern (drawer-backdrop + bd-head/bd-body + kvs grid).
Backend:
- New `GET /api/v1/ttp/tags/by-{scope}/{uuid}/{technique_id}`
(`scope ∈ {identity, attacker, session}`, optional
`?sub_technique_id=`, `?limit=` capped to 1000). Returns raw
TTPTag rows newest-first.
- New `TTPTagDetailRow` Pydantic model + re-export.
- New repo method `list_tags_by_scope_and_technique` on
TTPMixin (+ abstract on BaseRepository) — single query branched
on scope; identity scope projects through `Attacker.identity_id`
the same way `list_techniques_by_identity` does.
- Tests: evidence round-trips, sub_technique filter, JWT-required,
empty scope, unknown scope rejected.
Frontend:
- New `TTPInspector.tsx` + `TTPInspector.css` (violet accent, slide
animation, focus-trapped panel matching the existing inspector
family).
- `TTPsObservedSection`'s TechniqueBar is now click+keyboard
activatable; clicking opens the inspector for that
(technique, sub_technique) tuple.
mypy clean. 532 passed in the targeted sweep.
Mounts /api/v1/ttp/* with empty-list / empty-Navigator responses.
GET endpoints viewer-gated; POST/DELETE /rules/{rule_id}/state
admin-gated server-side. POST parses JSON manually so a malformed
body returns the documented 400 (per feedback_schemathesis_400).
Drops xfail-strict markers from E.2.8 tests now that the router is
mounted; 26 tests pass against the contract handlers.
Extracts the docker-exec-with-base64-stdin pattern out of canary/planter
and orchestrator/drivers/ssh into a shared decnet.decky_io package.
Both consumers now delegate; the canary planter test still proves the
contract end-to-end.
Adds POST/DELETE /api/v1/deckies/files for arbitrary file drops.
Container resolution is shared with the canary path: topology_id absent
means fleet (<name>-ssh), present routes through resolve_decky_container
which picks <name>-ssh when the topology decky exposes ssh, else the
topology base container decnet_t_<id8>_<name>.
Path validation rejects relative paths and '..' traversal at the request
model layer. Bad base64 → 400; unknown topology → 404; decky not in
topology → 422; docker exec failure → 409.
