Stateless JWTs had no revocation path: a stolen token stayed valid for
its full 24h even after the victim changed their password, and there was
no logout. This lays the foundation for revoking them.
- User.tokens_valid_from: per-user bulk-revocation cutoff (compared against
the token's iat). RevokedToken(jti PK, exp): single-token denylist, pruned
opportunistically on insert so it never outgrows live-but-revoked tokens.
- login() now mints a jti; create_access_token already stamps iat/exp.
- repo.revoke_token / is_token_revoked / set_tokens_valid_from (abstract +
shared sqlmodel impl + DummyRepo coverage stubs).
- Centralized validate path in dependencies.py: every auth dependency now
resolves the user and fails closed on (1) missing jti (legacy/pre-deploy
token -> one forced re-login), (2) iat before the cutoff, (3) a denylisted
jti. Denylist lookups ride a 10s membership cache mirroring the user cache.
- Contract/fuzz harness seeds its fixed-uuid principal under
DECNET_CONTRACT_TEST so its minted token resolves to a live admin user.
Replaces LICENSE (GPLv3 -> AGPLv3) and prepends
`SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later` to every source file
across decnet/, decnet_web/, tests/, scripts/, and tools/.
Rationale: closes the GPLv3 ASP loophole so any party operating a
modified DECNET as a network service must offer their modified
source. Personal copyright (Samuel Paschuan) + inbound=outbound
contributions make a future unilateral relicense infeasible.
- LICENSE: full AGPL-3.0 text (gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.txt)
- COPYRIGHT: project copyright notice
- tools/add_spdx_headers.py: idempotent header injector
(shebang- and PEP 263-aware)
Touches 1565 source files (.py, .ts, .tsx, .js, .jsx, .css, .sh).
No behavior change; comments only.
Adds slowapi two-bucket rate limit on /auth/login — 10 attempts per
5 minutes per-IP AND per-username, tripping either → 429. Per-IP
catches botnets hitting one account; per-username catches distributed
credential stuffing against one account. In-memory storage: dashboard
API is single-process, Redis is disproportionate for v1.
X-Forwarded-For is deliberately NOT trusted (spoofable); reverse-proxy
deployments get one shared bucket per proxy IP. Logged in the threat
model as accepted risk DA-08, to be revisited when a verified-proxy
config lands.
Also scaffolds development/THREAT_MODEL.md with STRIDE-per-element
methodology, system-context DFD, and Dashboard↔API as the first fully
worked component (7 sub-flows, ~50 threat entries). F1 Authn ships
with 3 threats mitigated: rate limit (new), uniform 401 (verified
already in place), bcrypt length clamp (verified already in place via
Pydantic max_length=72).
Locust @task(2) hammers /auth/login in steady state on top of the
on_start burst. After caching the uuid-keyed user lookup and every
other read endpoint, login alone accounted for 47% of total
_execute at 500c/u — pure DB queueing on SELECT users WHERE
username=?.
5s TTL, positive hits only (misses bypass so a freshly-created
user can log in immediately). Password verify still runs against
the cached hash, so security is unchanged — the only staleness
window is: a changed password accepts the old password for up to
5s until invalidate_user_cache fires (it's called on every write).
verify_password / get_password_hash are CPU-bound and take ~250ms each
at rounds=12. Called directly from async endpoints, they stall every
other coroutine for that window — the single biggest single-worker
bottleneck on the login path.
Adds averify_password / ahash_password that wrap the sync versions in
asyncio.to_thread. Sync versions stay put because _ensure_admin_user and
tests still use them.
5 call sites updated: login, change-password, create-user, reset-password.
tests/test_auth_async.py asserts parallel averify runs concurrently (~1x
of a single verify, not 2x).
Extends tracing to every remaining module: all 23 API route handlers,
correlation engine, sniffer (fingerprint/p0f/syslog), prober (jarm/hassh/tcpfp),
profiler behavioral analysis, logging subsystem, engine, and mutator.
Bridges the ingester→SSE trace gap by persisting trace_id/span_id columns on
the logs table and creating OTEL span links in the SSE endpoint. Adds log-trace
correlation via _TraceContextFilter injecting otel_trace_id into Python LogRecords.
Includes development/docs/TRACING.md with full span reference (76 spans),
pipeline propagation architecture, quick start guide, and troubleshooting.
