feat(api): rate-limit /auth/login + scaffold threat model
Adds slowapi two-bucket rate limit on /auth/login — 10 attempts per 5 minutes per-IP AND per-username, tripping either → 429. Per-IP catches botnets hitting one account; per-username catches distributed credential stuffing against one account. In-memory storage: dashboard API is single-process, Redis is disproportionate for v1. X-Forwarded-For is deliberately NOT trusted (spoofable); reverse-proxy deployments get one shared bucket per proxy IP. Logged in the threat model as accepted risk DA-08, to be revisited when a verified-proxy config lands. Also scaffolds development/THREAT_MODEL.md with STRIDE-per-element methodology, system-context DFD, and Dashboard↔API as the first fully worked component (7 sub-flows, ~50 threat entries). F1 Authn ships with 3 threats mitigated: rate limit (new), uniform 401 (verified already in place), bcrypt length clamp (verified already in place via Pydantic max_length=72).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@ from decnet.web.dependencies import repo
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from decnet.collector import log_collector_worker
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from decnet.web.ingester import log_ingestion_worker
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from decnet.profiler import attacker_profile_worker
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from decnet.web.limiter import limiter
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from decnet.web.router import api_router
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from slowapi import _rate_limit_exceeded_handler
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from slowapi.errors import RateLimitExceeded
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from slowapi.middleware import SlowAPIMiddleware
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log = get_logger("api")
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ingestion_task: Optional[asyncio.Task[Any]] = None
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@@ -169,6 +173,10 @@ app: FastAPI = FastAPI(
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openapi_url="/openapi.json" if DECNET_DEVELOPER else None
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)
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app.state.limiter = limiter
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app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler)
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app.add_middleware(SlowAPIMiddleware)
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app.add_middleware(
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CORSMiddleware,
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allow_origins=DECNET_CORS_ORIGINS,
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73
decnet/web/limiter.py
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73
decnet/web/limiter.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
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"""Rate-limiting infra for the dashboard API.
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Uses slowapi (which wraps the `limits` library) with in-memory storage.
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In-memory is intentional for v1:
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- The dashboard API runs on a single process per host (the `decnet api`
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worker). Swarm agents do not serve the dashboard; there is no need for
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cross-process shared state.
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- Adding Redis as a hard dependency of the master for this one feature
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is disproportionate.
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Trust boundary note: `get_remote_address` uses `request.client.host`,
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i.e. the TCP peer's IP. We deliberately do NOT trust `X-Forwarded-For`
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because it is trivially spoofable by any client. Operators running
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DECNET behind a reverse proxy get one shared bucket for the whole proxy
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— that is an accepted limitation recorded in the threat model
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(see `development/THREAT_MODEL.md` §Dashboard↔API, DA-08). Revisit when
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we introduce a verified-proxy config.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable
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from fastapi import Request
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from slowapi import Limiter
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from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
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# Single process-wide limiter. Importing modules pull this instance to
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# apply `@limiter.limit(...)` decorators on their routes. Default
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# headers off: FastAPI response_model handlers return dicts, not
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# Starlette Response objects, and slowapi's header injection only
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# supports the latter. Legit clients can back off on their own from
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# the 429 body; attackers ignore Retry-After anyway.
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limiter: Limiter = Limiter(
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key_func=get_remote_address,
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storage_uri="memory://",
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)
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def login_ip_key(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Per-IP bucket key for the login endpoint.
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Thin wrapper around slowapi's default so tests can monkey-patch this
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module attribute without reaching into slowapi internals.
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"""
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return f"login-ip:{get_remote_address(request)}"
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async def login_username_key(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Per-username bucket key for the login endpoint.
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Reads the request body to extract the claimed username. The body is
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cached by Starlette, so FastAPI's subsequent Pydantic parsing still
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sees the same bytes. Malformed bodies all collapse to a single
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bucket — that is intentional; garbage traffic gets throttled as one
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bad actor rather than offered an escape hatch.
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"""
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try:
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body: bytes = await request.body()
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data: Any = json.loads(body or b"{}")
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username = data.get("username") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
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if isinstance(username, str) and username:
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return f"login-user:{username}"
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except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
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pass
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return "login-user:__unparseable__"
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# Exported so tests can monkey-patch a synchronous counterpart if they
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# need deterministic keys without parsing bodies.
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LoginKeyFunc = Callable[[Request], Awaitable[str] | str]
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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from datetime import timedelta
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from typing import Any, Optional
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from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status
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from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, status
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from decnet.telemetry import traced as _traced
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from decnet.web.auth import (
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@@ -11,10 +11,22 @@ from decnet.web.auth import (
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)
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from decnet.web.dependencies import get_user_by_username_cached
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from decnet.web.db.models import LoginRequest, Token
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from decnet.web.limiter import limiter, login_ip_key, login_username_key
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router = APIRouter()
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# Two independent buckets, tripping either → 429:
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#
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# - per-IP (login_ip_key): catches a botnet hitting one account.
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# - per-user (login_username_key): catches distributed credential
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# stuffing against one account.
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#
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# Limits: 10 attempts per 5 minutes per bucket. Buckets are process-local
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# (memory://); see decnet/web/limiter.py for the rationale. Buckets do
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# NOT reset on successful login — a legitimate user tripping the limit
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# via fat-fingering will need to wait the window out. 10 tries is
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# generous; a rolling window naturally drains.
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@router.post(
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"/auth/login",
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response_model=Token,
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@@ -22,13 +34,16 @@ router = APIRouter()
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responses={
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400: {"description": "Bad Request (e.g. malformed JSON)"},
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401: {"description": "Incorrect username or password"},
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422: {"description": "Validation error"}
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422: {"description": "Validation error"},
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429: {"description": "Too many login attempts — retry after the window resets"},
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},
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)
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@limiter.limit("10/5 minutes", key_func=login_ip_key)
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@limiter.limit("10/5 minutes", key_func=login_username_key)
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@_traced("api.login")
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async def login(request: LoginRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
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_user: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = await get_user_by_username_cached(request.username)
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if not _user or not await averify_password(request.password, _user["password_hash"]):
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async def login(request: Request, payload: LoginRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
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_user: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = await get_user_by_username_cached(payload.username)
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if not _user or not await averify_password(payload.password, _user["password_hash"]):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Incorrect username or password",
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359
development/THREAT_MODEL.md
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359
development/THREAT_MODEL.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
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# DECNET Threat Model
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## Purpose
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This document is the single source of truth for **what threats DECNET
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defends against, what it accepts, and what it considers out of scope.**
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Its role is to provide a **stop line** for design discussions: once a
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threat is recorded here with a status, it does not need to be
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re-litigated in every feature review. New threats get added; existing
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ones get re-classified if reality changes; nothing gets deleted without
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a note in the change log.
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## Methodology — STRIDE per-element
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We use STRIDE-per-element (threats-per-element variant), organized by
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**trust boundary**. Each major component gets:
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1. A **data-flow diagram (DFD)** showing external entities, processes,
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data stores, and the trust boundaries that separate them.
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2. A per-flow **STRIDE enumeration** — for each data flow crossing a
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trust boundary, identify threats in each of the six categories:
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| Code | Category | Violates |
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|------|----------|----------|
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| S | Spoofing | Authentication |
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| T | Tampering | Integrity |
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| R | Repudiation | Non-repudiation |
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| I | Information disclosure | Confidentiality |
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| D | Denial of service | Availability |
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| E | Elevation of privilege | Authorization |
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3. **Mitigation status** for each threat, chosen from:
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- **Mitigated** — defended in code; link to the mitigation.
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- **Accepted** — the risk is known and deliberately accepted; note
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the reason.
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- **Transferred** — responsibility lies elsewhere (OS, upstream
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library, operator deployment practice).
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- **Needs verification** — plausibly mitigated but the threat model
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author couldn't confirm in code; flag for review.
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- **Out of scope** — explicitly excluded (see the master
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out-of-scope register).
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## Risk-acceptance protocol
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Accepting a risk is a deliberate act with a written justification. An
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"accepted" entry must include:
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- **Why** the risk is accepted (cost/benefit, compensating control
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elsewhere, low likelihood × low impact).
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- **When** the acceptance should be revisited (e.g. "reassess when
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multi-tenant support lands" or "revisit pre-v1").
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- **Who** observed and accepted it (by git commit author on this file —
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no hand-waving).
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---
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## System context
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DECNET is a distributed honeypot platform. The top-level actors and
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trust boundaries:
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```
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┌─────────────────────────┐
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│ External Attacker │
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│ (internet, untrusted) │
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└─────────────┬───────────┘
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│ TCP/IP (MACVLAN)
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▼
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── TRUST BOUNDARY: attacker ↔ decoy ──────────────────────────────
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│
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┌─────────────▼───────────┐
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│ Decky (honeypot) │
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│ service containers │
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└─────────────┬───────────┘
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│ RFC 5424 syslog
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│ (local: UDP; cross-host: TLS 6514)
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▼
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── TRUST BOUNDARY: decky ↔ master (log ingest) ────────────────────
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│
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┌─────────────▼───────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
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│ Master host │◄────────┤ Swarm agent │
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│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ │ mTLS │ (remote host)│
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│ │ API │ │Workers│ │ 6514 └──────────────┘
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│ │ Web │ │ + Bus │ │
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│ └──▲───┘ └──┬───┘ │
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│ │ │ │
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│ ┌──┴───┐ ┌──▼───┐ │
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│ │ DB │ │ Logs │ │
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│ └──────┘ └──────┘ │
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└────▲────────────────────┘
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│ HTTPS + JWT
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── TRUST BOUNDARY: dashboard user ↔ API ──────────────────────────
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│
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┌─────────────┴───────────┐
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│ Dashboard user │
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│ (viewer / admin role) │
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└─────────────────────────┘
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```
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### Trust boundaries (top-level)
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| # | Boundary | Component doc |
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|---|----------|---------------|
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| 1 | Attacker ↔ Decky (the whole point: attackers cross this by design) | *not yet modeled* |
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| 2 | Decky ↔ Master (syslog path) | *not yet modeled* |
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| 3 | Swarm agent ↔ Master (mTLS API) | *partially — see* `feedback_mtls_pin_per_host.md` |
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| 4 | Dashboard user ↔ API | **[Component 1](#component-1--dashboard-user--api)** ← this doc |
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| 5 | Bus client ↔ Bus (local IPC) | *not yet modeled* |
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| 6 | Updater daemon ↔ Update source | *not yet modeled* |
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| 7 | Federation peer ↔ Federation peer (v2) | *see* `DEVELOPMENT_V2.md` §Federation |
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---
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## Component 1 — Dashboard user ↔ API
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**Status:** first component modeled; sets the template for the rest.
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**Scope:** everything the React dashboard sends to `/api/v1/*` and
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everything the API sends back. Out of scope for this component:
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master↔agent API, service-to-service calls within the master.
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### DFD
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```
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┌────────────────────────────────┐
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│ Dashboard user (browser) │
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│ React SPA, JWT in memory │
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└─────────────┬──────────────────┘
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│
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│ HTTPS (TLS to reverse proxy)
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│ JWT in Authorization header
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│ (exception: SSE uses ?token=<jwt>)
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│
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══ TRUST BOUNDARY ═══════════════│═══════════════════════════════════
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│
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┌─────────────▼──────────────────┐
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│ FastAPI app (decnet api) │
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│ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │
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│ │ Auth middleware / JWT │ │
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│ │ decode + role extract │ │
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│ └───────────┬─────────────┘ │
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│ │ authenticated │
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│ ┌───────────▼─────────────┐ │
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│ │ Dependencies: │ │
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│ │ require_viewer │ │
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│ │ require_admin │ │
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│ │ require_master_mode │ │
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│ └───────────┬─────────────┘ │
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│ │ authorized │
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│ ┌───────────▼─────────────┐ │
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│ │ Route handler │ │
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│ │ → repo (SQLModel) │ │
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│ │ → bus publish │ │
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│ │ → artifact filesystem │ │
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│ └─────────────────────────┘ │
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└────────────────────────────────┘
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```
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### Sub-flows in scope
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| ID | Flow | Examples |
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|----|------|----------|
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| F1 | Authn | `POST /auth/login`, JWT issuance, `POST /auth/change-password` |
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| F2 | Authz | every route's `require_*` decoration; role checks at dependency layer |
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| F3 | Data reads (non-query) | `GET /attackers/{uuid}`, `GET /deckies/{name}`, `GET /health` |
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| F4 | Queries (user-filtered) | `GET /logs?service=&severity=&q=`, `GET /attackers?…`, `GET /bounties?…`, `GET /attackers/{uuid}/commands?service=&limit=&offset=` |
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| F5 | Mutations | `PATCH /deckies/*`, `POST /config/*`, `POST /users`, `DELETE /users/{u}`, `POST /topologies`, `POST /topologies/{id}/mutations` |
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| F6 | Streaming / SSE | `GET /stream/events?token=`, `GET /topologies/{id}/events?token=` |
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| F7 | Downloads | `GET /artifacts/{decky}/{stored_as}?service=` (ssh / smtp), `GET /attackers/{uuid}/mail` |
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### STRIDE enumeration
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Each sub-flow below gets its own table. Status codes:
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**M** = mitigated · **A** = accepted · **T** = transferred ·
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**?** = needs verification · **X** = out of scope.
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#### F1 — Authn
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| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
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|-----|--------|--------|-------|
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| S | Credential stuffing / brute force on `/auth/login` | M | slowapi two-bucket rate limit at `decnet/web/router/auth/api_login.py`: 10/5min per-IP AND 10/5min per-username, tripping either → 429. In-memory storage (`decnet/web/limiter.py`). |
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| S | JWT forgery with weak/leaked secret | M | `DECNET_JWT_SECRET` required, 32+ chars; signing verified on every request. Operator deployment responsibility to rotate on suspected leak. |
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| S | Stolen JWT replayed from attacker's browser | A | JWT TTL is short; no server-side session revocation pre-v1. Accepted: revisit if customer demands immediate-revocation. |
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| T | Password hash tampering in DB | T | DB integrity is OS/filesystem scope. See boundary #2 for syslog-path tampering. |
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| R | User denies having performed an action | M | Every mutation logged with actor UUID; audit trail lives in `logs` table. |
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| I | Password reflected in login response on failure | M | Single uniform 401 for user-not-found and bad-password at `api_login.py`. No user-existence oracle. |
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| I | JWT secret leaked via error message / stack trace | **?** | Verify: production error handler doesn't return tracebacks. |
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| D | Bcrypt-cost DoS via long password submission | M | Pydantic `max_length=72` on all password fields in `decnet/web/db/models/auth.py` (matches bcrypt's internal truncation limit). |
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| E | `role=None` bypass (historical bug) | M | See memory `project_rbac_null_role.md`; fixed via centralized RBAC that treats `None` as unauthenticated. |
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#### F2 — Authz
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| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
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|-----|--------|--------|-------|
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| S | Forged role claim in JWT | M | Role read from DB by UUID on each authz, not trusted from token. (Verify — see `project_rbac_null_role.md`.) |
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| T | Client-side role flag tampering | M | Server-side gating required; client-side hide-only is UI polish. See `feedback_serverside_ui.md`. |
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| R | Admin denies granting a role | M | `update_user_role` calls logged. |
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| I | Route missing `require_*` accidentally exposes admin data to viewer | **?** | Verify: schemathesis / contract tests assert 401/403 on every protected route. Recommend a test that enumerates all routes and asserts gating. |
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| D | n/a (authz is a check, not a bottleneck) | — | |
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| E | Viewer crafts path traversal in URL to hit admin route | M | FastAPI path matching is exact; no dynamic include. |
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| E | Master-only CLI command reachable in agent mode | M | `MASTER_ONLY_COMMANDS` gating at CLI registration + `_require_master_mode()` guard in handler. |
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#### F3 — Data reads (non-query)
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| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
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|-----|--------|--------|-------|
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| S | (same as F2) | — | |
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| T | Response body tampered in transit | T | TLS to reverse proxy is operator-deployment scope. |
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| R | n/a (read-only) | — | |
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| I | Non-existent resource returns different status than forbidden | M | Attacker-not-found returns 404 after authz passes, consistent with other handlers. |
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| I | Sensitive fields bleed into viewer response (e.g. attacker PII) | **?** | Verify: field allow-listing on attacker serializer for viewer role. |
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| D | Heavy single-resource fetch (rare) | A | Unbounded fetch on a single row is bounded by row size. Accepted. |
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| E | n/a (no privilege change) | — | |
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#### F4 — Queries (densest threat surface)
|
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|
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| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
|
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|-----|--------|--------|-------|
|
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| S | (inherited from authn/authz) | — | |
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| T | SQL injection via filter params | M | SQLModel uses parameterized queries exclusively; no string-concatenation SQL in repo. Verify on each new query endpoint. |
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| T | ORM expression injection (e.g. sort-by-arbitrary-column) | **?** | Verify: sort/filter keys are allow-listed, not passed through raw. |
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| R | Query log does not record who queried what | A | Pre-v1: query audit log out of scope. Revisit if customer demands query-level audit. |
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| I | Filter-bypass exfiltration: viewer filters return admin-visible rows | **?** | Verify: repo methods take the caller's role and scope results, OR routes pre-filter, OR data is viewer-safe by schema. Currently assumed "viewer-safe by schema" — worth asserting in a test. |
|
||||
| I | Timing side channel reveals existence of filtered-out rows | A | Micro-timing attacks on SQLite not a realistic threat for this workload. Accepted. |
|
||||
| I | Error message (422 / 500) leaks column names or SQL fragments | M | FastAPI 422 is schema-shaped; 500 handler must not return tracebacks in prod. Verify handler config. |
|
||||
| I | Schema enumeration via schemathesis-style fuzzing | A | Schemathesis contract tests document 400/422 shape; an attacker learning the schema gains nothing beyond the public OpenAPI spec. See `feedback_schemathesis_400.md`. |
|
||||
| D | Unbounded result set via missing `limit` | **?** | Verify: every query endpoint has a hard server-side cap independent of the `limit` param. |
|
||||
| D | Deep-pagination scan via large `offset` | **?** | Verify: `offset` is capped, OR pagination is cursor-based, OR the table has an index that makes deep offsets cheap. |
|
||||
| D | Expensive `LIKE '%foo%'` on non-indexed column | **?** | Verify: free-text `q` params hit an FTS5 virtual table or indexed column, not `LIKE`-scan of a large table. |
|
||||
| D | Repeated expensive queries from single user | A | Per-user rate limiting is out of scope pre-v1. Operator-deployment mitigation: reverse-proxy rate limit. |
|
||||
| E | Filter params allow reading across tenants (future multi-tenant) | X | Multi-tenant is not in the v1 model; revisit when tenants exist. |
|
||||
|
||||
#### F5 — Mutations
|
||||
|
||||
| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
|
||||
|-----|--------|--------|-------|
|
||||
| S | Forged mutation from non-authenticated client | M | `require_admin` on all mutations; JWT enforced. |
|
||||
| T | Replay of a captured mutation request | A | No nonce/idempotency-key pre-v1. Accepted: admin role already has full mutation power; replay gains nothing a fresh request couldn't. Revisit if multi-admin audit becomes a requirement. |
|
||||
| T | Concurrent-write race corrupting state | **?** | Verify: SQLModel session scoping + DB-level constraints cover the likely races (user creation, topology CRUD). |
|
||||
| R | Admin denies having mutated | M | Actor UUID + timestamp logged on every mutation. |
|
||||
| I | Mutation response returns internal state not meant for client | **?** | Verify per-route response_model shape. |
|
||||
| D | Malformed body triggers expensive validation / oversized payload | M | FastAPI enforces content-length at ASGI layer; Pydantic short-circuits on type mismatch. |
|
||||
| D | Destructive mutation storm (e.g. delete-all-users) | A | Admin role is trusted; protecting admins from themselves is out of scope. |
|
||||
| E | Mutation bypasses role check via missing `require_admin` | **?** | Verify via schemathesis: every mutation route returns 403 for viewer. |
|
||||
|
||||
#### F6 — Streaming / SSE
|
||||
|
||||
| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
|
||||
|-----|--------|--------|-------|
|
||||
| S | Token-in-query-string logged by reverse proxy / browser history | A | SSE cannot use Authorization header; `?token=<jwt>` is the standard workaround. Mitigation: short JWT TTL, operator must scrub access logs if compliance requires. Document explicitly. |
|
||||
| T | Injected events into the stream from another client | M | Events are repo→bus→SSE one-way; no client-to-client. |
|
||||
| R | User denies having observed events | X | Passive read; non-repudiation n/a. |
|
||||
| I | SSE forwards events the user's role shouldn't see | **?** | Verify: per-connection role filter in the SSE handler. |
|
||||
| D | Connection exhaustion (hold many SSE connections open) | **?** | Verify: per-user concurrent-connection cap. |
|
||||
| E | n/a | — | |
|
||||
|
||||
#### F7 — Downloads
|
||||
|
||||
| Cat | Threat | Status | Notes |
|
||||
|-----|--------|--------|-------|
|
||||
| S | (inherited) | — | |
|
||||
| T | Path-traversal via `{decky}` or `{stored_as}` to read arbitrary files | M | Pattern-validated at FastAPI layer (`{service}` is `^[a-z]{1,16}$`; artifact names are UUID-shaped). Verify: resolved path is contained under the artifacts root. |
|
||||
| R | Admin denies having downloaded | M | Download endpoint emits an access log entry. |
|
||||
| I | Viewer accesses attacker-controlled bytes | M | Admin-gated (`require_admin`). Rationale: artifacts are phishing kits / malware droppers / attacker-controlled content — see `api_get_attacker_mail.py` docstring. |
|
||||
| I | MIME sniffing / content-type confusion executes attacker payload in browser | **?** | Verify: response sets `Content-Disposition: attachment` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`. |
|
||||
| D | Gigabyte-sized artifact download ties up workers | M | SMTP body cap is 10 MB (EHLO SIZE enforcement); SSH artifact sizes bounded by disk quota. |
|
||||
| E | Downloaded artifact escapes the browser sandbox | T | Browser security boundary is transferred to the browser vendor and operator's endpoint protection. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Accepted risks (Dashboard ↔ API)
|
||||
|
||||
Consolidated for easy reference:
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Threat | Why accepted | Revisit when |
|
||||
|----|--------|--------------|--------------|
|
||||
| DA-01 | Stolen JWT replayable until TTL expiry | Server-side revocation list is infra cost disproportionate to v1 threat model | Customer demands immediate revocation, OR swarm-scale deployment where JWT theft blast radius grows |
|
||||
| DA-02 | Query-level audit log absent | Admin-mutation audit is sufficient pre-v1 | Regulated-industry customer engagement |
|
||||
| DA-03 | Query-filter timing side channel | SQLite + single-tenant; impact is negligible | Multi-tenant support lands |
|
||||
| DA-04 | Per-user query rate limiting absent | Trusted operator deployment; reverse-proxy rate limit is the operator's responsibility | SaaS / multi-tenant hosting model |
|
||||
| DA-05 | Mutation replay within admin session | Replay grants no privilege a fresh request wouldn't | Multi-admin audit requirement |
|
||||
| DA-06 | Destructive admin mutations not protected against the admin | Trusted-admin assumption; protecting root from root is out of scope | Multi-admin RBAC with mutual-approval workflows |
|
||||
| DA-07 | SSE token in query string | No alternative in the SSE spec; operator must control access-log handling | Move to WebSocket with in-band auth |
|
||||
| DA-08 | Reverse-proxy deployments collapse per-IP rate-limit bucket to one shared bucket | `X-Forwarded-For` is spoofable by any client; trusting it defeats the rate limit. Operators behind a proxy get coarser granularity but no spoofing lane. | Verified-proxy config lands (allow-list of proxy IPs whose `X-Forwarded-For` we trust) |
|
||||
|
||||
### Needs-verification checklist (Dashboard ↔ API)
|
||||
|
||||
Drop-in TODO list — each entry resolves to either "mitigated, link to
|
||||
code" or "accepted, add to table above."
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] ~~Per-IP / per-user rate limit on `/auth/login`.~~ Shipped — see F1/S row.
|
||||
- [x] ~~Uniform "invalid credentials" on login failure (no user-existence oracle).~~ Verified — see F1/I row.
|
||||
- [ ] Production error handler suppresses tracebacks and internal details.
|
||||
- [x] ~~Password length clamp before bcrypt.~~ Verified — Pydantic `max_length=72`.
|
||||
- [ ] Contract test asserting every protected route returns 401 unauthenticated and 403 for under-roled.
|
||||
- [ ] Field allow-list on viewer responses for attacker / user / bounty serializers.
|
||||
- [ ] Sort/filter query keys are allow-listed, not passed through raw.
|
||||
- [ ] Role-scoped repo methods OR per-route pre-filter for viewer queries (pick one, document it).
|
||||
- [ ] Every query endpoint has a server-side hard cap independent of `limit`.
|
||||
- [ ] `offset` is capped OR pagination is cursor-based OR deep-offset is cheap.
|
||||
- [ ] Free-text `q` parameters hit an indexed/FTS5 column, never a full-table `LIKE` scan.
|
||||
- [ ] Per-route response_model shape audit on mutations.
|
||||
- [ ] Contract test asserting every mutation route returns 403 for viewer.
|
||||
- [ ] SSE handler applies per-connection role filter before forwarding events.
|
||||
- [ ] Per-user concurrent SSE connection cap.
|
||||
- [ ] Artifact download sets `Content-Disposition: attachment` + `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
|
||||
- [ ] Artifact path resolution asserts the resolved path is under the artifacts root (canonicalize + prefix check).
|
||||
|
||||
### Out of scope (this component)
|
||||
|
||||
- TLS termination correctness (operator's reverse proxy).
|
||||
- Browser-side XSS originating from user-controlled content rendered in the dashboard (that's a frontend threat model, separate document when we write one).
|
||||
- Physical access to the master host.
|
||||
- Supply-chain compromise of FastAPI / SQLModel / dependencies (upstream / OS scope).
|
||||
- Denial of service at the network layer (operator deployment).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Master out-of-scope register
|
||||
|
||||
These threats are excluded from the DECNET threat model entirely,
|
||||
regardless of component:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Physical attacker at the master or agent console.** Disk
|
||||
encryption, console access, BMC/iLO security is the operator's
|
||||
responsibility.
|
||||
- **Nation-state zero-days in Linux kernel / systemd / Docker.**
|
||||
- **Upstream supply-chain compromise of Python packages or base images**
|
||||
beyond what `pip-audit` + the pre-commit hook catches.
|
||||
- **Side channels at the hardware level** (Spectre, Rowhammer, etc.).
|
||||
- **Attacks on the operator's own endpoint** (laptop used to access the
|
||||
dashboard).
|
||||
|
||||
## Master accepted-risks register
|
||||
|
||||
*(Consolidates per-component accepted entries as they are added.)*
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | ID | Summary |
|
||||
|-----------|----|---------|
|
||||
| Dashboard↔API | DA-01..DA-07 | See component section. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Components not yet modeled
|
||||
|
||||
In priority order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Decky ↔ Master (syslog path) — data-integrity critical.
|
||||
2. Swarm agent ↔ Master (mTLS) — existing pinning; document it.
|
||||
3. Federation peer ↔ Peer — see `DEVELOPMENT_V2.md` §Federation for
|
||||
analysis; migrate into this doc when v2 lands.
|
||||
4. Bus client ↔ Bus — local IPC, narrow surface.
|
||||
5. Updater daemon ↔ Update source.
|
||||
6. Decky itself (attacker-facing surface) — largest S/T/E surface; do
|
||||
this once the internal boundaries are modeled.
|
||||
|
||||
## Change log
|
||||
|
||||
| Date | Change | Author |
|
||||
|------|--------|--------|
|
||||
| 2026-04-23 | Initial scaffold. System context + Dashboard↔API as first worked component. | ANTI |
|
||||
| 2026-04-23 | F1 Authn: 3 threats moved from **?** to **M** (rate limit shipped; uniform 401 verified; bcrypt length clamp verified). Added DA-08 accepted risk: reverse-proxy per-IP bucket collapse. | ANTI |
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ dependencies = [
|
||||
"cryptography>=46.0.7",
|
||||
"python-multipart>=0.0.20",
|
||||
"httpx>=0.28.1",
|
||||
"requests>=2.33.1"
|
||||
"requests>=2.33.1",
|
||||
"slowapi>=0.1.9"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[project.optional-dependencies]
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ dev = [
|
||||
"freezegun>=1.5.5",
|
||||
"schemathesis>=4.15.1",
|
||||
"pytest-xdist>=3.8.0",
|
||||
"pytest-timeout>=2.4.0",
|
||||
"flask>=3.1.3",
|
||||
"twisted>=25.5.0",
|
||||
"requests>=2.33.1",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import pytest
|
||||
from hypothesis import given, strategies as st, settings
|
||||
import httpx
|
||||
from decnet.env import DECNET_ADMIN_USER, DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD
|
||||
from decnet.web.limiter import limiter as _login_limiter
|
||||
from ..conftest import _FUZZ_SETTINGS
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.anyio
|
||||
@@ -42,9 +43,85 @@ async def test_login_failure(client: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:
|
||||
)
|
||||
async def test_fuzz_login(client: httpx.AsyncClient, username: str, password: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Fuzz the login endpoint with random strings (including non-ASCII)."""
|
||||
# Hypothesis runs hundreds of cases within one test; the rate limiter
|
||||
# doesn't care it's fuzzing and would 429 after ~10. Clear per-case.
|
||||
_login_limiter.reset()
|
||||
_payload: dict[str, str] = {"username": username, "password": password}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
_response: httpx.Response = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/login", json=_payload)
|
||||
assert _response.status_code in (200, 401, 422)
|
||||
assert _response.status_code in (200, 401, 422, 429)
|
||||
except (UnicodeEncodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ─── Rate-limit enforcement ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.anyio
|
||||
async def test_login_ip_bucket_trips_after_10_failures(client: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:
|
||||
"""10 failed attempts from one IP → 11th returns 429 with Retry-After."""
|
||||
for i in range(10):
|
||||
r = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login",
|
||||
json={"username": DECNET_ADMIN_USER, "password": f"wrong-{i}"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert r.status_code == 401, f"attempt {i}: got {r.status_code}"
|
||||
r = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login",
|
||||
json={"username": DECNET_ADMIN_USER, "password": "still-wrong"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert r.status_code == 429
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.anyio
|
||||
async def test_login_successful_attempts_count_against_bucket(
|
||||
client: httpx.AsyncClient,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Successful logins are also counted — bucket does not reset on success.
|
||||
10 successes → 11th returns 429 (whether right or wrong password)."""
|
||||
for i in range(10):
|
||||
r = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login",
|
||||
json={"username": DECNET_ADMIN_USER, "password": DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert r.status_code == 200, f"attempt {i}: got {r.status_code}"
|
||||
r = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login",
|
||||
json={"username": DECNET_ADMIN_USER, "password": DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert r.status_code == 429
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.anyio
|
||||
async def test_login_username_key_extracts_from_body() -> None:
|
||||
"""Per-username bucket key function: valid body → distinct key per
|
||||
user. Malformed body → single shared bucket (intentional: garbage
|
||||
traffic throttles as one actor)."""
|
||||
from decnet.web.limiter import login_username_key
|
||||
|
||||
class _Req:
|
||||
def __init__(self, body: bytes) -> None:
|
||||
self._body = body
|
||||
|
||||
async def body(self) -> bytes:
|
||||
return self._body
|
||||
|
||||
assert await login_username_key(_Req(b'{"username":"alice","password":"x"}')) == "login-user:alice"
|
||||
assert await login_username_key(_Req(b'{"username":"bob","password":"y"}')) == "login-user:bob"
|
||||
# Malformed or missing username → single bucket
|
||||
assert await login_username_key(_Req(b"not json at all")) == "login-user:__unparseable__"
|
||||
assert await login_username_key(_Req(b'{"password":"x"}')) == "login-user:__unparseable__"
|
||||
assert await login_username_key(_Req(b"")) == "login-user:__unparseable__"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.anyio
|
||||
async def test_login_route_has_both_rate_limits() -> None:
|
||||
"""Contract test: the login handler must import both key functions
|
||||
and have been wrapped by slowapi. Guards against someone removing
|
||||
one decorator and not noticing."""
|
||||
from decnet.web.router.auth import api_login as _login_mod
|
||||
|
||||
assert hasattr(_login_mod, "login_ip_key")
|
||||
assert hasattr(_login_mod, "login_username_key")
|
||||
# slowapi wraps the handler; unwrapped original lives at __wrapped__.
|
||||
assert getattr(_login_mod.login, "__wrapped__", None) is not None
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,9 +32,19 @@ from decnet.web.api import app
|
||||
from decnet.web.dependencies import repo
|
||||
from decnet.web.db.models import User
|
||||
from decnet.web.auth import get_password_hash
|
||||
from decnet.web.limiter import limiter as _login_limiter
|
||||
from decnet.env import DECNET_ADMIN_USER, DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD
|
||||
import decnet.config
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
|
||||
def _reset_login_rate_limiter() -> None:
|
||||
"""Rate-limit buckets are process-wide; clear before each test so
|
||||
prior tests don't consume another test's budget."""
|
||||
_login_limiter.reset()
|
||||
yield
|
||||
_login_limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
VIEWER_USERNAME = "testviewer"
|
||||
VIEWER_PASSWORD = "viewer-pass-123"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user