The profiler worker now consumes attacker.session.ended on the bus
AND walks unprofiled session_recorded log rows on every tick. Both
paths converge on a single handler that:
1. Validates required payload fields (session_id, decky_id, service,
attacker_ip, shard_path).
2. Builds evidence_ref shard:{decky}/{service}/{shard_basename}#{sid}
and skips when has_observations_for_evidence is True (idempotent
re-runs).
3. Resolves attacker_uuid via get_attacker_uuid_by_ip; defers if the
profiler tick hasn't materialised the row yet.
4. Reads the asciinema shard, slices events for the sid, calls
extract_session, persists each Observation via upsert_observation
(per-row; batch transaction filed as follow-up), then publishes
each on the bus best-effort (fire-and-forget per DEBT-029 §6).
Architecture:
* Handler lives in decnet/profiler/behave_shell/_handler.py — pure
function, unit-tested in isolation.
* Worker.py adds _behave_pump (queue feed), _drain_behave_queue
(per-tick drain), _behave_poll_tick (cursor scan over
session_recorded logs), and _payload_from_log_row (Log → bus-shape
payload projection).
* Poll cursor uses a separate state key
(attacker_worker_session_cursor) so the correlation tick's cursor
doesn't conflate.
* has_observations_for_evidence promoted to BaseRepository abstract.
22 new tests across handler / drain / poll layers covering happy
path, all skip paths, isolation against handler exceptions,
idempotency on re-run, and cursor key separation. TTP worker bus
tests still green — payload field is purely additive.
Closes BEHAVE-INTEGRATION.md Phase 4.
Move `_find_shard_with_sid`, `_resolve_shard`, `_validate_names`,
`_get_index`, and the index cache from
`decnet/web/router/transcripts/api_get_transcript.py` into
`decnet/artifacts/shards.py`. The shared module speaks
`ValueError`; the router keeps thin wrappers that translate to
`HTTPException(400)` so the route's error UX is unchanged.
This unblocks the BEHAVE-INTEGRATION Phase 4 worker wiring — the
profiler worker (and the collector's session aggregator) need to
disk-reach asciinema shards but must not import from a FastAPI
router.
11 new unit tests for the shared helper. Existing transcript router
tests pass (the shard fixture's monkeypatch points at the shared
module's ARTIFACTS_ROOT now).
* careful — operator hits OPSEC_HISTORY_TOKENS AND tail-K commands
include _CLEANUP_TOKEN_HASHES (re-imported from temporal.py).
* learning — history hit without cleanup-tail follow-through.
* careless — no history-clearing vocabulary at all.
Confidence 0.45 (small lexicon, soft); 0.30 below
MIN_COMMANDS_FOR_FULL_CONFIDENCE.
Destructive half of BEHAVE-INTEGRATION.md Phase 1. SessionProfile +
its kd_* columns + the dialect ALTER TABLE migration helpers are
deleted outright; pre-v1, the table shipped empty, no migration
ceremony required (per the no-new-_migrate_-pre-v1 memory rule).
DEBT-036 closes via DEBT-050 supersedure. AttackerDetail's
``observations`` field is wired to the new ``observations`` table
and returns an empty list until the BEHAVE-SHELL extractor (DEBT-050
Phase 2) starts emitting.
decnet/web/db/models/attackers.py — SessionProfile class deleted
(~135 lines), KD_PAUSE_*/KD_START_OF_ACTION_IDLE_S module constants
deleted, module docstring updated to point at the observations
table. AttackerIdentity.kd_digraph_simhash is KEPT — it's the v2
federation centroid hook, not a SessionProfile field; docstring
repointed to the BEHAVE primitive that will populate it.
decnet/web/db/sqlmodel_repo/attackers/sessions.py — DELETED.
SessionProfilesMixin dropped from the AttackersMixin MRO.
decnet/web/db/repository.py — abstract upsert_session_profile +
get_session_profile removed.
decnet/web/db/sqlite/repository.py + mysql/repository.py —
_migrate_session_profile_table helpers and their initialize() calls
removed. mysql initialize() now goes attackers → column_types →
admin (no session_profile step).
decnet/web/db/models/__init__.py — SessionProfile re-export gone.
decnet/web/db/models/attacker_intel.py — docstring cross-reference
to SessionProfile.schema_version retargeted to AttackerIdentity.
decnet/web/router/attackers/api_get_attacker_detail.py — adds
``observations: []`` to the response by calling
``repo.latest_observation_per_primitive(uuid)`` and projecting to a
list sorted by primitive path. Empty until the extractor lands;
shape matches BEHAVE-INTEGRATION.md §"AttackerDetail consumer".
tests/profiler/test_session_profile.py — DELETED (56 lines).
tests/db/test_base_repo.py — DummyRepo loses upsert_session_profile
and get_session_profile overrides.
tests/db/mysql/test_mysql_migration.py — initialize-call-order
assertion updated; session_profile step removed from the expected
sequence; docstring records why.
tests/ttp/test_lifter_absence.py — docstring "no SessionProfile" →
"no ObservationRow".
Additive Phase 1 of BEHAVE-INTEGRATION.md. Lays the storage layer
the BEHAVE-SHELL extractor (DEBT-050) will write into. Nothing
breaks; SessionProfile coexists for now and is dropped in the
follow-up commit.
decnet/web/db/models/observations.py — new ObservationRow SQLModel
mirroring the BEHAVE Observation envelope field-for-field
(core/decnet_behave_core/spec/envelope.py). ``id`` is a hex-string
UUID (matching BEHAVE), not a typed UUID column. ``identity_ref``
is str | None — written by the future attribution engine, NULL
until then. ``attacker_uuid`` is the one DECNET-side
denormalisation; FK'd to attackers.uuid for cheap AttackerDetail
joins. ``evidence_ref`` is NOT NULL for DECNET emissions even
though the upstream envelope makes it optional — the worker's
"already profiled?" check keys on it. UniqueConstraint(evidence_ref,
primitive) enforces idempotency at the schema level so re-running
the extractor on the same shard+sid produces a DB-side conflict
the upsert path resolves deterministically. Class is named
``ObservationRow`` (not ``Observation``) to avoid colliding with
the BEHAVE Pydantic envelope at sites that import both.
decnet/web/db/sqlmodel_repo/observations.py — ObservationsMixin.
Three public methods backing the canonical queries from
BEHAVE-INTEGRATION.md §"Storage": ``upsert_observation`` (idempotent
on the natural key), ``latest_observation_per_primitive`` (per-
primitive MAX(ts) subquery, portable across SQLite and MySQL — no
DISTINCT ON), ``observations_time_series`` (asc-by-ts). Plus
``has_observations_for_evidence`` for the worker's session-already-
profiled check.
decnet/bus/topics.py — ATTACKER_OBSERVATION_PREFIX = "observation"
constant + ``attacker_observation(primitive)`` builder. Full topic
shape ``attacker.observation.<primitive>`` matches what BEHAVE's
spec.event_adapter.event_topic_for produces upstream. Documentation
+ pattern matching only — bus auth is socket file perms (DEBT-029
§2), not topic-level.
decnet/web/db/repository.py — abstract ``upsert_observation``,
``latest_observation_per_primitive``, ``observations_time_series``
on BaseRepository.
tests/db/test_observations.py — 11 tests covering upsert round-trip,
idempotency under the unique constraint, latest-per-primitive
ordering across multiple sessions, time-series asc-ordering, empty-
attacker contract, every BEHAVE ValueKind round-tripping through
the JSON column, and the has_observations_for_evidence check.
tests/db/test_base_repo.py — DummyRepo gains the three new abstract
overrides so its coverage suite still instantiates.
New MalHashProvider sibling ABC (decnet/intel/base.py) since SHA-256
is a different keyspace from IntelProvider's IPs. MalwareBazaarProvider
mirrors FeodoProvider's bulk-feed shape: 24h refresh via _ensure_fresh
/ _refresh, in-memory set[str] of hex-lowercased hashes, set-membership
lookup. Auth-keyed via DECNET_MALWAREBAZAAR_AUTH_KEY; absent key
silent-no-ops the lane (single warning, no HTTP traffic).
Per-hash observations persist to a new observed_attachments table.
DECNET is a honeypot platform — every attachment hash an attacker
delivers is intel, regardless of whether anyone classified it. Verdict
is sticky: True never downgrades to False/None on subsequent
observations. Out of scope: API surface, federation export, retention.
Ingester _publish_email_received calls the provider for each attachment
sha256, sets mal_hash_match on the bus payload (omitted entirely when
the message had no attachments — keeps R0046's `is True` predicate
silent on hash-less mail, matching pre-paydown behavior), and upserts
the row regardless of provider availability.
New GET /api/v1/orchestrator/events/stats?since=1h&success=false&kind=...
backed by repo.count_orchestrator_failures(since_ts, kind), which
counts failed rows across both orchestrator_events and
orchestrator_emails since the cutoff.
Window parser accepts ^\d+[smhd]$, capped at 7d. Today only
success=false is accepted on this surface so the endpoint isn't
accidentally repurposed before the next consumer is properly
designed.
Orchestrator.tsx polls the endpoint on mount + every 30 s and
renders the authoritative DB-derived count instead of deriving from
the in-memory SSE buffer + one paginated page (which silently
excluded failures older than the local window).
When the prober observes a NEW hash for an
(attacker_uuid, port, probe_type) triple it has seen before — VPS
rotation, SSH server rebuild, TLS cert swap — emit a derived
attacker.fingerprint_rotated event carrying both old and new hash.
Detection is a small library (decnet.correlation.fingerprint_rotation)
called inline from the prober at each of the three emit sites
(JARM/HASSH/TCPFP). No new daemon. New AttackerFingerprintState table
holds per-triple last-hash state; Attacker.rotation_count and
Attacker.last_rotation_at are stamped on every diff. Library is sync,
fully unit-tested via injected publish_fn / syslog_fn callbacks.
Move artifact path validation + symlink-escape check out of the
admin-gated download endpoint into decnet/artifacts/paths.py so the
TTP EmailLifter can disk-reach .eml files at tag-time without
duplicating regex/root logic (DEBT-047).
The router now catches ArtifactPathError and re-raises HTTPException(400);
behavior is unchanged.
The decky's Layer-2 extension (commit 291b78c1) emits body_simhash /
body_base64_bytes / html_smuggling on the message_stored log and adds
macro_indicator / encrypted booleans to each attachments_json
manifest entry. Lift them all onto the email.received bus payload:
* body_simhash — passes through as-is (16 hex chars or "")
* body_base64_bytes — coerced to int (0 on absent / malformed)
* attachment_macros / attachment_password_protected — OR-reduced
across the per-attachment manifest booleans; matches R0046's
matched_trigger semantics where a single positive lane fires the
rule
* html_smuggling — coerced bool from the decky's 0/1 int
Pre-Layer-2 message_stored events (older deckies, malformed log
rows) project to safe defaults: empty simhash, zero base64-bytes,
all booleans False — the EmailLifter then stays silent, never
fires a false positive on missing data.
R0042 (mass-phish) / R0046 macro / R0046 password / R0046 smuggling
/ R0048 (encoded payload) all fire end-to-end after this commit.
R0046 mal_hash_match and R0047 BEC remain deferred per their
respective DEBT entries (filed in the next commit).
Wires the EmailLifter (R0041–R0048) producer that DEBT.md item #3
deferred. After the existing add_bounty() call in _extract_bounty
(line 615), call _publish_email_received() which:
* resolves the attacker_uuid via repo.get_attacker_uuid_by_ip; drops
the publish if unresolved (the TTP worker can't anchor orphan
events)
* projects the message_stored fields onto the EmailLifter wire
contract: from_domain / mail_from_domain / return_path_domain
parsed via _domain_of, rcpt_count + rcpt_domains via
_rcpt_projection, attachment_sha256s + attachment_extensions
derived from the existing attachments_json manifest, urls from
urls_json, dkim_signed/spf_pass coerced from 0/1 ints to bool
* mirrors _publish_probe_pending's bus-per-call pattern and
swallows all exceptions (the bus is the notification layer, not
the source of truth)
Fires for both relay and non-relay SMTP services. R0041 / R0043 /
R0044 / R0045 are now live end-to-end; R0046 partial (extension
lane). Heavyweight predicates (R0042 simhash, R0046-deep, R0047 /
R0048 body_text) stay deferred per the EmailLifter heavyweight
DEBT entry.
The 2026-05-02 ship-time audit of the R0054-R0058 intel rule pack found
that AbuseIPDB / GreyNoise / ThreatFox stored only the aggregate verdict
(score / classification / listed-bool) plus the raw response blob. The
TTP IntelLifter expects per-provider taxonomy fields (categories, tags,
threat_types) that were never populated, so R0054 / R0055 / R0057
emitted zero tags in production despite passing unit tests.
Add typed columns: abuseipdb_categories, greynoise_tags, greynoise_name,
feodo_malware_family, threatfox_threat_types, threatfox_ioc_types,
threatfox_malware_families. Each provider now parses the relevant
taxonomy out of the upstream response and writes it through
column_updates. JSON-list columns ride as TEXT with default "[]" to
keep the SQLite/MySQL backend split honest, deserialised back to native
lists by the repo on read.
"T1595" alone is opaque; "T1595 — Active Scanning" tells you the
story at a glance. The names come from a backend-side static catalogue
pinned to the same ATT&CK release as the rule engine
(_ATTACK_RELEASE = "v15.1") — names are the canonical MITRE labels,
not author-supplied strings on rules, so a rule author can't typo a
name and the entire fleet sees the typo.
- New `decnet/ttp/attack_catalog.py` with `TECHNIQUE_NAMES` covering
every technique_id + sub_technique_id emitted by `rules/ttp/`
(R0001..R0058 → 69 IDs in the v0 pack).
- `IdentityTechniqueRow` / `TechniqueRollupRow` / `CampaignTechniqueRow`
/ `TTPTagDetailRow` gain optional `technique_name` /
`sub_technique_name` fields. Repo + router populate them from the
catalogue at row-construction time. None when an ID isn't in the
catalogue — UI falls back to the bare ID.
- Coverage test (`tests/ttp/test_attack_catalog.py`) walks every
YAML rule and asserts every emitted ID has a catalogue entry, so
a future rule author who forgets to update the catalogue gets a
loud failure rather than a silent UI fallback.
Frontend:
- `TTPsObservedSection` shows "T1595.002 — Active Scanning:
Vulnerability Scanning" instead of just the ID, with overflow
ellipsis + tooltip for narrow viewports. Inspector header /
TECHNIQUE row also surface the names.
The TTPsObservedSection rollup tells the operator "we saw T1059" but
not why. Click any technique row → side drawer opens listing every
ttp_tag row in scope with the persisted evidence JSON, firing
rule_id / rule_version, source_kind / source_id, confidence, and
created_at. Mirrors the CredentialReuseInspector / BountyInspector
pattern (drawer-backdrop + bd-head/bd-body + kvs grid).
Backend:
- New `GET /api/v1/ttp/tags/by-{scope}/{uuid}/{technique_id}`
(`scope ∈ {identity, attacker, session}`, optional
`?sub_technique_id=`, `?limit=` capped to 1000). Returns raw
TTPTag rows newest-first.
- New `TTPTagDetailRow` Pydantic model + re-export.
- New repo method `list_tags_by_scope_and_technique` on
TTPMixin (+ abstract on BaseRepository) — single query branched
on scope; identity scope projects through `Attacker.identity_id`
the same way `list_techniques_by_identity` does.
- Tests: evidence round-trips, sub_technique filter, JWT-required,
empty scope, unknown scope rejected.
Frontend:
- New `TTPInspector.tsx` + `TTPInspector.css` (violet accent, slide
animation, focus-trapped panel matching the existing inspector
family).
- `TTPsObservedSection`'s TechniqueBar is now click+keyboard
activatable; clicking opens the inspector for that
(technique, sub_technique) tuple.
mypy clean. 532 passed in the targeted sweep.
The collector's `attacker.session.ended` envelope carries
`attacker_uuid: null` and `attacker_ip: <ip>` because the collector
doesn't talk to the DB. The TTP worker passed that null straight
through, and `TTPTag.__init__` raised the documented invariant:
ValueError: ttp_tag requires at least one of attacker_uuid /
identity_uuid; both NULL is not a valid anchor.
The worker now resolves `attacker_uuid` from `attacker_ip` via
`BaseRepository.get_attacker_uuid_by_ip` before fanning out the
event. When the IP isn't in the DB yet (profiler hasn't ingested
the row), the event is dropped with one log line — better than
exploding mid-tag.
- New `get_attacker_uuid_by_ip(ip) -> str | None` on the repo
(BaseRepository abstract + AttackersCoreMixin impl).
- `_resolve_attacker_uuid` helper in `decnet/ttp/worker.py` runs
before `_build_events`. Short-circuits when the payload already
has either anchor; drops the event when neither anchor is
resolvable.
- Tests pin: short-circuit on existing uuid/identity, repo lookup,
drop on unknown IP, drop on "Unknown" sentinel, drop on
no-anchor payload, drop on repo failure.
The endpoint was a contract-phase stub returning `[]` even though the
RuleStore loaded all 58 YAML rules at worker startup. UI saw an empty
table; operators couldn't tell whether anything was wired up.
- `api_list_rules` now calls `get_rule_store().load_compiled()` and
serializes each CompiledRule + its operational state into a
RuleCatalogueRow. Sorted by rule_id for stable golden snapshots.
- Add `description: str` to RuleSchema (pydantic) and CompiledRule
(NamedTuple, defaulted) + propagate through `_compile_one` so the
catalogue surfaces the human-readable YAML description, not just
the slug-style `name`.
- Update `tests/ttp/test_rule_engine.py` _fields assertion for the
new column; new `tests/api/ttp/test_rules_catalogue.py` pins the
catalogue contents (R0001/R0014 presence, row shape, sort order).
Worker behaviour is unchanged: it was already loading rules
correctly. This is purely a read-side wiring fix on the operator API.
The TTP worker entry moved out of decnet/cli/workers.py into its own
module so the TTP CLI surface (worker + admin verbs) is colocated,
mirroring decnet/cli/canary.py / webhook.py / swarm.py.
- New `decnet/cli/ttp.py` with `decnet ttp` (worker, ExecStart-stable
for decnet-ttp.service) and `decnet ttp-backfill --since-days N`.
- `decnet ttp-backfill` walks Attacker.commands and CanaryTrigger
history, dispatches each row through the live CompositeTagger,
persists tags via repo.insert_tags (idempotent INSERT OR IGNORE).
--dry-run / --source command|canary|all / --batch-size supported.
- Backfill deliberately bypasses bus publish — historical replay
must not re-trigger SIEM/webhook fan-out per TTP_TAGGING.md
§"Bus topics" loop-prevention invariant.
- Added `iter_attacker_commands_since` / `iter_canary_triggers_since`
read-only iterators on TTPMixin + abstract bindings on
BaseRepository.
- Master-only via gating; both `ttp` and `ttp-backfill` listed in
MASTER_ONLY_COMMANDS.
Add BaseRepository.list_ttp_decky_phases(identity_uuid) returning
per-decky tag observations as (decky_id, tactic, created_at_ts) rows
ordered by creation time. Rewrite from_identity_row() to project
tactic → UKCPhase via tactic_to_ukc_phase and populate the four
phase-handoff maps (first/last_phase_per_decky,
first/last_seen_per_decky) so combined_campaign_weight finally lights
up on real DB rows — not just synthetic fixtures.
ConnectedComponentsCampaignClusterer.tick() pulls each active
identity's per-decky phase observations before projecting features.
Repo failures are non-fatal: a partial repo falls back to the empty
phase-handoff signal (legacy behavior) so the worker stays up.
tests/clustering/test_ttp_phase_handoff.py pins the production-row
pair clearing CAMPAIGN_EDGE_THRESHOLD on a C2 → DISCOVERY hand-off —
the trip-wire that says the whole project paid off.
commands_by_phase_on_decky itself stays empty on the production path:
it is consumed only by the synthetic-fixture similarity surface, and
the phase-handoff edge does not use it. Synthetic fixtures still
populate it directly via from_synthetic_identity.
SMTP message-level technique tagger per Appendix A.6: open relay abuse
(rcpt_count + foreign From), mass phishing (rcpt_count + body simhash),
phishing-kit X-Mailer, IDN/punycode URL, sender masquerade composite
(From/Return-Path/DKIM/SPF), malicious attachment (macro/.lnk/.iso/.img/
hash match), BEC subject+body composite, encoded payload in body.
PII discipline (TTP_TAGGING.md §'Hard parts §6') is enforced at the
lifter layer via _filter_evidence(): emitted TTPTag.evidence is
restricted to the EmailEvidence-allowed allowlist (body_sha256,
matched_headers — names only, rcpt_domain_set — domains only,
attachment_sha256s, rcpt_count) plus PII-safe match discriminators
(matched_kit, matched_trigger, matched_url_host, etc). Raw addresses,
raw body bytes, full URLs, and decoded base64 previews NEVER appear in
evidence — defense-in-depth over the YAML evidence_fields hint.
Tests: tests/ttp/test_email_lifter.py per-rule positive + negative +
PII allowlist guard + state modulation. tests/ttp/rule_precision/
test_email_rules.py xfail flipped to real precision (R0041-R0048
H-band ≥95%). Corpus rows updated to acknowledge that R0045 (masquerade)
co-fires with R0041 / R0047 when the sender-masquerade signals are
present alongside open-relay or BEC patterns — overlap is by design,
not a precision bug.
Five GET rollup endpoints (techniques, by-identity, by-attacker,
by-campaign, by-session) and the Navigator export (fleet +
per-identity) now call into the TTPMixin methods. Rule catalogue
endpoint still returns [] — backed by the RuleStore which lands
at E.3.5/E.3.6.
Dialect-split: portable rollup queries on TTPMixin; bulk insert with
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING / INSERT IGNORE in the per-dialect repos.
Confidence-floor (< 0.3) drop applied at mixin layer before the
dialect hook. BaseRepository now declares the six TTP methods abstract.
Tests in tests/web/db/test_ttp_repo.py flipped from pytest.fail stubs
to real dual-backend behavioral tests; tests/ttp/test_confidence.py
drop-below-floor xfail removed.
Empty NotImplementedError bodies; the SQL lands at E.3 implementation.
Mixin composed onto SQLModelRepository alongside the existing domain
mixins. Dialect-specific INSERT-OR-IGNORE syntax overrides land in
the per-backend subclasses at E.3 per the dual-DB-backend convention.
Mounts /api/v1/ttp/* with empty-list / empty-Navigator responses.
GET endpoints viewer-gated; POST/DELETE /rules/{rule_id}/state
admin-gated server-side. POST parses JSON manually so a malformed
body returns the documented 400 (per feedback_schemathesis_400).
Drops xfail-strict markers from E.2.8 tests now that the router is
mounted; 26 tests pass against the contract handlers.
First contract commit of TTP tagging. Shapes only — no behavior.
- TTPTag SQLModel: deterministic UUIDv5 PK; (source_kind, source_id)
discriminated provenance; nullable attacker_uuid + identity_uuid
with ON DELETE CASCADE; native sqlalchemy.JSON evidence column;
required attack_release; CheckConstraint('attacker_uuid IS NOT
NULL OR identity_uuid IS NOT NULL'); composite indexes for the
primary query patterns (identity_uuid+technique_id,
attacker_uuid+technique_id, technique_id+created_at); __init__
guard raising ValueError with both anchor names in the message
(belt-and-braces for MySQL <8.0.16 where CHECK is silent).
- compute_tag_uuid(): RFC-4122 UUIDv5 over the six tag-identity
fields under a fixed _TTP_TAG_NS. Pure, deterministic, replay-safe.
- Per-source_kind evidence TypedDicts (CommandEvidence,
IntelEvidence, EmailEvidence, CanaryFingerprintEvidence) — PII
rule lives in the type: EmailEvidence has no field for raw rcpt
addresses or body bytes.
- TTPRule + TTPRuleState tables for the DatabaseRuleStore (E.1.11).
- All symbols re-exported from decnet.web.db.models per the
package's existing convention.
Tests for invariants (CHECK behavior, evidence round-trip across
SQLite+MySQL, idempotency property, init-guard ordering) land in
E.2.1/E.2.2 with xfail-strict markers per Appendix E discipline.
- Add _MixinBase abstract class to _helpers.py: declares _session(),
_deserialize_attacker(), _assert_pending(), _check_and_bump_version(),
and list_running_topology_deckies() so mypy can see cross-mixin contracts
- Add _require(val, msg) helper for narrowing T | None → T
- Inherit _MixinBase in all 26 leaf mixin classes
- Wrap SQLAlchemy column method calls (.is_(), .like(), .notin_(), .in_(),
.contains()) with col() from sqlmodel — fixes attr-defined false positives
caused by pydantic plugin typing class-level fields as Python value types
- Wrap select(Model.field) with select(col(Model.field)) for column projections
- Add pyproject.toml [[tool.mypy.overrides]] to disable arg-type in
sqlmodel_repo.*: pydantic plugin resolves .where(Model.field == v) as
where(bool), a false positive; call-arg still catches real argument errors
- Remove 9 stale # type: ignore comments (logging, helpers, credentials)
- Fix telemetry.py traced() overload no-redef + misc
- Fix logs.py datetime/str operator and nullable PK comparison with col()
- sqlmodel_repo/ now has 0 mypy errors
Replace repo: BaseRepository with a structural TopologyRepository protocol
in persistence.py and allocator.py. All read methods now return typed DTOs
(TopologySummary, LANRow, DeckyRow, EdgeRow) instead of raw dicts, eliminating
silent field-shape regressions across the topology subsystem.
TopologySummary gains email_personas and language_default so api_personas.py
can continue reading those fields via attribute access. hydrate() converts
DTOs to dicts before passing to _backfill_decky_configs, keeping the mutable
working-state function dict-based at its boundary. All production callers
(router handlers, mutator, CLI, heartbeat) migrated from dict/get access to
attribute access. 134 tests pass.
MutationRow.op was str despite _MUTATION_OPS existing; Topology.mode/status,
TopologyDecky.state, TopologyMutation.op/state carried valid values only in
comments; deferred json import had no justification.
- Promote _MUTATION_OPS before table classes so table fields can reference it
- Add sa_column=Column(String) on each Literal-annotated table field to satisfy
SQLModel 0.0.38 column-type inference
- Move import json to module top; remove deferred import inside _decode_json_payload
- MutationRow.op: str -> _MUTATION_OPS
await inside a threading.Lock yields to the event loop while the OS
thread still holds the lock — potential deadlock under FastAPI thread
pool dispatch. asyncio.Lock is the correct primitive for async
critical sections. Also fixed stale diurnal.py docstring that had the
delegation direction backwards.
_parse_weights was silently dropping content_class values that don't
belong on their target list with no operator feedback. Changed it to
return (weights, dropped), apply_payload to collect and return all
dropped names, and put_config to include dropped_entries in the
response when non-empty.
get_config was calling planner.apply_payload on every GET request, racing
concurrent reads on module-level globals. Added a _hydrated flag + lock
so DB hydration runs at most once per process lifetime; put_config marks
it done too. Test fixture resets the flag between tests.
ServiceNotFoundError (→ 404) and ServiceConflictError (→ 409) replace the
"not found" / "already on" / "not on" substring checks in _map_mutation_error;
base ServiceMutationError still maps to 422. Fixes three pre-existing test
status-code assertions (201 vs 200 on POST endpoints).
Pure tarball construction (_build_tarball, _render_*, _iter_included,
_SYSTEMD_UNITS) moved to decnet/swarm/bundle_builder.py — no FastAPI
dependency, independently testable. EnrollBundleRequest/Response moved
to decnet/web/db/models/swarm.py alongside the other swarm DTOs.
Router drops from 504 to 260 lines; keeps only the in-memory token
registry, sweeper, and endpoints.
Attacker probe emails are now forwarded by the master (realism worker)
rather than inside the MACVLAN container, which has no internet gateway.
- New smtp.probe.pending bus topic: ingester publishes when smtp_relay
message_stored fires; worker subscribes and does the actual delivery
- decnet/orchestrator/drivers/smtp_relay.py: pure-sync forward_probe()
reads the .eml from disk and sends via smtplib on a thread executor
- worker.py: _run_smtp_probe_listener + _handle_probe_pending subtask;
limit enforced via count_probe_relays() (DB-backed, restart-safe)
- bounties.py: count_probe_relays() query on probe_relay bounty type
- fleet.py: get_fleet_decky_by_name() to pull service config from DB
- services/smtp_relay.py: upstream_* and probe_limit fields defined in
config_schema but NOT injected into container env (credentials stay
out of docker env vars)
- ingester.py: stripped of smtplib; publishes probe.pending and exits
- tests: assert upstream keys absent from container environment
Adds probe_forwarded to meaningful event kinds and stores it in the
bounty table as bounty_type=probe_relay with forwarded=true/false, so
the dashboard shows whether the upstream actually accepted the test email.
Once a fingerprint canary's HTTP beacon passes all 4 validation layers
and the trigger row lands, the token is immediately set to state=revoked
and canary.<id>.revoked is published on the bus. The slug lookup is
tightened to only return planted tokens, so subsequent requests to the
same URL silently return the transparent GIF without persisting anything
(stealth posture preserved). Plain http/dns canaries with no
fingerprint_nonce are not affected.
Changes:
- sqlmodel_repo/canary.py: add state == "planted" filter to
get_canary_token_by_slug so revoked slugs resolve to None
- worker.py: after record_canary_trigger, if parsed_fp survived all
layers and token has a fingerprint_nonce, call
update_canary_token_state("revoked") + publish CANARY_REVOKED; errors
are best-effort (trigger row already landed)
- test_worker_http.py: assert state=revoked in test_fp_valid_nonce_persists;
new test_fp_deregisters_slug_after_valid_hit (second hit records nothing);
new test_plain_http_canary_not_deregistered (env_file stays planted)
