After DECNET_WEBHOOK_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD (default 5) consecutive failed
deliveries, the worker calls trip_webhook_circuit(uuid, ts) which
flips enabled=False and stamps auto_disabled_at. The worker sets its
reload flag so the next dispatch epoch stops consuming events for the
tripped sub entirely — one dead receiver can't poison the shared
egress pool anymore.
Operator clears the trip via PATCH — setting enabled=True when the
sub was previously disabled clears auto_disabled_at, zeros
consecutive_failures, and clears last_error. Admin-pause → re-enable
hits the same path harmlessly.
Three observable states now distinguishable in the UI:
- Active enabled=True, auto_disabled_at=NULL
- Admin-paused enabled=False, auto_disabled_at=NULL
- Tripped enabled=False, auto_disabled_at=<ts>
UI surfaces a TRIPPED · <ts> chip on the row (red, alert-styled) and
a "N TRIPPED" count in the page header. Hover tooltip tells the
operator how to reset ("Re-enable via Edit").
record_webhook_failure now returns the new consecutive_failures count
so the worker can compare against the threshold without a second
roundtrip. trip_webhook_circuit is idempotent — re-tripping just
re-stamps auto_disabled_at.
Closes THREAT_MODEL WH-02 and DEBT-037 §1.
WebhookResponse now carries a `warnings: list[str]` field. When the
subscription's URL starts with http://, an `insecure_url` advisory is
surfaced on every GET/CREATE without blocking the request. HMAC still
detects tampering regardless of transport — only read-confidentiality
is lost over plaintext — and test/dev environments without TLS stay
usable.
Matches the operator-trust posture already established by DA-06
(admin-on-admin protection is out of scope). The alternative — hard
rejection at admin time — was considered and declined; warning-plus-
visibility is the right shape.
THREAT_MODEL WH-03 accepted risk registered; revisit triggers are
multi-admin delegation, a regulated customer, or an operator ticket
asking for a DECNET_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_HTTPS enforcement knob.
- DEVELOPMENT.md: tick the "Real-time alerting" roadmap item with a
note that Slack/Telegram-specific senders remain per-destination
follow-ups (they accept generic webhook payloads already).
- THREAT_MODEL.md: new Component 2 — DECNET↔External webhook
destination. DFD, full STRIDE table, WH-01 (secret at rest) and
WH-02 (half-dead-receiver retry waste) registered as accepted
risks pointing at DEBT-037 for post-MVP hardening. Checklist lists
two open items: OpenAPI schema omits `secret`, and http:// URL
rejection at admin time.
New decnet/web/sse_limits.py provides sse_connection_slot, an async
context manager that counts live SSE connections per user UUID and
raises 429 when a per-user cap is exceeded (default 5, override via
DECNET_SSE_MAX_PER_USER). Wired into both SSE generators as their
first async with, so the cap check fires before any stream data is
yielded.
The cap must sit inside the generator — StreamingResponse returns
before the generator body runs, so a handler-level wrapper would
release the slot immediately. Put prefetch + slot + loop all under
the one async with.
Also documents F6/I (role leakage) as mitigated-by-construction via
handler docstrings: every event type on both streams wraps data
already reachable via viewer-gated REST, so no per-event filter is
needed until a new event family is introduced. The invariant is
written into the handler docstrings so a future PR can't silently
add admin-only events.
Resolves THREAT_MODEL F6/I and F6/D.
Every mutation route that returned an untyped dict now declares
response_model at the decorator. MessageResponse covers the eight
{"message": ...} envelopes (change-password, mutate-decky, mutate-
interval, update-deployment-limit, update-global-mutation-interval,
delete-user, update-user-role, reset-user-password). Purpose-built
models cover the richer shapes (DeployResponse for /deckies/deploy,
PurgeResponse for /config/reinit, ReapReportResponse for /reap-orphans,
UserResponse for /config/users). 204-No-Content and Response/
ORJSONResponse routes stay as-is.
The wire shape for clients is unchanged — the envelopes already only
shipped a message field. What changes is that a handler which
accidentally returns a richer dict (e.g. a full user row including
password_hash) would be silently stripped to the declared fields at
serialization time.
Also flips F4/D "expensive LIKE" to accepted (new DA-09) — the /logs
and /attackers search routes LIKE-scan unbounded columns, but both are
admin-gated, limit-capped, and operator rate-limit scope per DA-04.
FTS5 stays a performance TODO, not a security blocker.
The other five query endpoints (/logs, /attackers, /attacker-commands,
/bounties, /topologies/{id}) already declared le=2147483647 on offset;
these two were inconsistently uncapped. Bring them in line to close
the F4/D deep-pagination row.
Also resolves F4/T (ORM sort injection — already mitigated by the
regex pattern on /attackers sort_by, no other route accepts a column
name) and F4/D (limit cap — already universal) with code pointers.
New test walks app.routes, classifies each APIRoute as admin/viewer/open
by identity-matching require_admin / require_viewer closures inside the
route's dependency tree, then asserts:
- admin routes return 403 to a viewer JWT
- viewer routes return neither 401 nor 403 to a viewer JWT
SSE routes skipped (separate scope under F6). Role hints deliberately
NOT encoded in the OpenAPI spec — classification stays server-side so
/openapi.json can't be used to enumerate admin routes.
Resolves THREAT_MODEL F2/I + F5/E; paired with the existing
test_schemathesis.py::test_auth_enforcement (401-half coverage).
Harden the attacker-controlled artifact download path (F7) with explicit
response headers instead of relying on Starlette's defaults (which only
emit attachment for non-ASCII filenames and never set nosniff). Also
resolves the THREAT_MODEL F7 path-traversal row (containment check was
already in _resolve_artifact_path) and the fleet-deploy detail=str(e)
audit (all four sites are admin-gated deliberate validator UX or
structured worker-response fields).
Registers a generic @app.exception_handler(Exception) that catches anything
uncaught in route handlers / dependencies. Prod response is opaque:
{detail: 'Internal Server Error', error_id: <uuid4 hex>}. Dev mode
(DECNET_DEVELOPER=True) adds exception_type and traceback fields so
failures are debuggable without tailing server logs.
The error_id is logged alongside the full traceback server-side, letting
operators correlate a user's 500 report with the exact exception via
`grep <error_id> /var/log/decnet.log`.
FastAPI's own HTTPException routing and the existing
RequestValidationError / ValidationError / RateLimitExceeded handlers
still take precedence — this handler only fires on genuinely-uncaught
exceptions.
Flips threat model F1/I 'traceback / stack trace leakage' from ? to M
and logs a follow-up checklist entry for 4 detail=str(e) sites in the
fleet deploy router (admin-gated, different threat class, separate
audit).
Adds slowapi two-bucket rate limit on /auth/login — 10 attempts per
5 minutes per-IP AND per-username, tripping either → 429. Per-IP
catches botnets hitting one account; per-username catches distributed
credential stuffing against one account. In-memory storage: dashboard
API is single-process, Redis is disproportionate for v1.
X-Forwarded-For is deliberately NOT trusted (spoofable); reverse-proxy
deployments get one shared bucket per proxy IP. Logged in the threat
model as accepted risk DA-08, to be revisited when a verified-proxy
config lands.
Also scaffolds development/THREAT_MODEL.md with STRIDE-per-element
methodology, system-context DFD, and Dashboard↔API as the first fully
worked component (7 sub-flows, ~50 threat entries). F1 Authn ships
with 3 threats mitigated: rate limit (new), uniform 401 (verified
already in place), bcrypt length clamp (verified already in place via
Pydantic max_length=72).
