feat(templates): migrate six cred emitters to native shape
Phase 2/3 of DEBT-039. Switches FTP, POP3, IMAP, SMTP, Redis, and
LDAP from the legacy `username=` + `password=` SD-block shape to the
universal credential shape (`principal=` + `secret_printable=` +
`secret_b64=`) the new Credential storage model expects.
Pattern is uniform across all six services:
_log("auth_attempt", username=u, principal=u, **encode_secret(pw))
Each service emits the canonical SD keys. The ingester's native-shape
branch (introduced in 2f47f67) now writes their cred attempts
directly without going through the legacy adapter. Once Phase 3
removes the adapter the contract becomes single-shape.
Per-service notes:
- POP3 / IMAP — `status="success"|"failed"` renamed to
`outcome="success"|"failure"` to match Credential.outcome's
vocabulary; the ingester reads outcome directly.
- SMTP — AUTH path migrated; in addition the existing mail_from
event now exposes a parsed `domain=` field alongside the original
`value=` so future "what domains do attackers spoof from" analytics
have an indexed field. Not stored in Credential — regular Log row.
- Redis — was silently dropped by the legacy adapter (no `username`
field). Native branch handles `principal=None` correctly. BONUS
FIX: the Redis 6+ ACL syntax `AUTH <user> <pw>` now captures the
ACL username as principal (was previously discarded).
- LDAP — was silently dropped by the legacy adapter (no `password`
recognition for the `bind` event). Now lands as
`principal=<dn>`. BONUS FIX.
Tests (tests/services/test_cred_emitters.py, 9 cases):
- per-service native-shape ingest path produces correct Credential
rows; outcome maps for POP3/IMAP; principal=None for legacy Redis
AUTH; principal=dn for LDAP.
- mail_from event does NOT trigger a credential write (it's a
Log-only observation, not auth).
- 0xff/NUL/ANSI bytes in passwords survive losslessly through
secret_b64 even when secret_printable is sanitized.
Phase 3 deletes the legacy adapter once all migrations land — the
adapter has no live emitters to handle anymore.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ import asyncio
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import os
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import instance_seed as _seed
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from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
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from syslog_bridge import (
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encode_secret,
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forward_syslog,
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syslog_line,
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write_syslog_file,
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)
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NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "cache-server")
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SERVICE_NAME = "redis"
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@@ -231,8 +236,14 @@ class RedisProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
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_log("command", src=self._peer[0], cmd=verb, args=args[:8])
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if verb == "AUTH":
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# Redis 6+ accepts two-arg AUTH (`AUTH <user> <pw>`) for ACL
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# auth; legacy single-arg AUTH is just the password. Capture
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# the username when present so attackers brute-forcing ACLs
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# leave the same trail SSH/FTP do.
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password = args[-1] if args else ""
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_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], password=password)
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_user = args[0] if len(args) >= 2 else None
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_log("auth", src=self._peer[0],
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principal=_user, **encode_secret(password))
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if not _REQUIREPASS:
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self._write(
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_err("Client sent AUTH, but no password is set. "
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