feat(templates): migrate six cred emitters to native shape

Phase 2/3 of DEBT-039. Switches FTP, POP3, IMAP, SMTP, Redis, and
LDAP from the legacy `username=` + `password=` SD-block shape to the
universal credential shape (`principal=` + `secret_printable=` +
`secret_b64=`) the new Credential storage model expects.

Pattern is uniform across all six services:

    _log("auth_attempt", username=u, principal=u, **encode_secret(pw))

Each service emits the canonical SD keys. The ingester's native-shape
branch (introduced in 2f47f67) now writes their cred attempts
directly without going through the legacy adapter. Once Phase 3
removes the adapter the contract becomes single-shape.

Per-service notes:
- POP3 / IMAP — `status="success"|"failed"` renamed to
  `outcome="success"|"failure"` to match Credential.outcome's
  vocabulary; the ingester reads outcome directly.
- SMTP — AUTH path migrated; in addition the existing mail_from
  event now exposes a parsed `domain=` field alongside the original
  `value=` so future "what domains do attackers spoof from" analytics
  have an indexed field. Not stored in Credential — regular Log row.
- Redis — was silently dropped by the legacy adapter (no `username`
  field). Native branch handles `principal=None` correctly. BONUS
  FIX: the Redis 6+ ACL syntax `AUTH <user> <pw>` now captures the
  ACL username as principal (was previously discarded).
- LDAP — was silently dropped by the legacy adapter (no `password`
  recognition for the `bind` event). Now lands as
  `principal=<dn>`. BONUS FIX.

Tests (tests/services/test_cred_emitters.py, 9 cases):
- per-service native-shape ingest path produces correct Credential
  rows; outcome maps for POP3/IMAP; principal=None for legacy Redis
  AUTH; principal=dn for LDAP.
- mail_from event does NOT trigger a credential write (it's a
  Log-only observation, not auth).
- 0xff/NUL/ANSI bytes in passwords survive losslessly through
  secret_b64 even when secret_printable is sanitized.

Phase 3 deletes the legacy adapter once all migrations land — the
adapter has no live emitters to handle anymore.
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-25 05:43:51 -04:00
parent aebb9f81c6
commit abb4dd9fc0
7 changed files with 248 additions and 20 deletions

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ from twisted.python.filepath import FilePath
from twisted.python import log as twisted_log
import instance_seed as _seed
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
from syslog_bridge import (
encode_secret,
forward_syslog,
syslog_line,
write_syslog_file,
)
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "ftpserver")
SERVICE_NAME = "ftp"
@@ -100,7 +105,8 @@ class ServerFTP(FTP):
return super().ftp_USER(username)
def ftp_PASS(self, password):
_log("auth_attempt", username=getattr(self, "_server_user", "?"), password=password)
_u = getattr(self, "_server_user", "?")
_log("auth_attempt", username=_u, principal=_u, **encode_secret(password))
# Decide whether this attempt succeeds. Unseeded randomness so
# scanners can't predict which creds will "work".
import random as _rand

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,13 @@ Banner advertises Dovecot so nmap fingerprints correctly.
import asyncio
import os
from syslog_bridge import SEVERITY_WARNING, syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
from syslog_bridge import (
SEVERITY_WARNING,
encode_secret,
forward_syslog,
syslog_line,
write_syslog_file,
)
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "mailserver")
SERVICE_NAME = "imap"
@@ -431,14 +437,15 @@ class IMAPProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
parts = args.split(None, 1)
username = parts[0].strip('"') if parts else ""
password = parts[1].strip('"') if len(parts) > 1 else ""
_enc = encode_secret(password)
if VALID_USERS.get(username) == password:
self._state = "AUTHENTICATED"
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, password=password,
status="success")
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, principal=username,
outcome="success", **_enc)
self._w(f"{tag} OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1] Logged in\r\n")
else:
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, password=password,
status="failed", severity=SEVERITY_WARNING)
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, principal=username,
outcome="failure", severity=SEVERITY_WARNING, **_enc)
self._w(f"{tag} NO [AUTHENTICATIONFAILED] Authentication failed.\r\n")
def _cmd_list(self, tag: str, cmd: str) -> None:

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,12 @@ import os
import re
import instance_seed as _seed
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
from syslog_bridge import (
encode_secret,
forward_syslog,
syslog_line,
write_syslog_file,
)
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "ldapserver")
SERVICE_NAME = "ldap"
@@ -173,7 +178,8 @@ class LDAPProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
except Exception:
message_id = 1
dn, password = _parse_bind_request(msg)
_log("bind", src=self._peer[0], dn=dn, password=password)
_log("bind", src=self._peer[0], dn=dn, principal=dn,
**encode_secret(password))
_seed.jitter_sync(10, 60)
if dn and not _is_valid_dn(dn):
# OpenLDAP returns invalidDNSyntax (34) for malformed DNs, with

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,13 @@ Credentials via IMAP_USERS env var (shared with IMAP service).
import asyncio
import os
from syslog_bridge import SEVERITY_WARNING, syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
from syslog_bridge import (
SEVERITY_WARNING,
encode_secret,
forward_syslog,
syslog_line,
write_syslog_file,
)
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "mailserver")
SERVICE_NAME = "pop3"
@@ -259,14 +265,15 @@ class POP3Protocol(asyncio.Protocol):
return
username = self._current_user
password = args.strip()
_enc = encode_secret(password)
if VALID_USERS.get(username) == password:
self._state = "TRANSACTION"
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, password=password,
status="success")
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, principal=username,
outcome="success", **_enc)
self._transport.write(b"+OK Logged in.\r\n")
else:
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, password=password,
status="failed", severity=SEVERITY_WARNING)
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, principal=username,
outcome="failure", severity=SEVERITY_WARNING, **_enc)
self._current_user = None
self._transport.write(b"-ERR Authentication failed.\r\n")

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ import asyncio
import os
import instance_seed as _seed
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
from syslog_bridge import (
encode_secret,
forward_syslog,
syslog_line,
write_syslog_file,
)
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "cache-server")
SERVICE_NAME = "redis"
@@ -231,8 +236,14 @@ class RedisProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
_log("command", src=self._peer[0], cmd=verb, args=args[:8])
if verb == "AUTH":
# Redis 6+ accepts two-arg AUTH (`AUTH <user> <pw>`) for ACL
# auth; legacy single-arg AUTH is just the password. Capture
# the username when present so attackers brute-forcing ACLs
# leave the same trail SSH/FTP do.
password = args[-1] if args else ""
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0], password=password)
_user = args[0] if len(args) >= 2 else None
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0],
principal=_user, **encode_secret(password))
if not _REQUIREPASS:
self._write(
_err("Client sent AUTH, but no password is set. "

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,13 @@ from email.header import decode_header, make_header
from email.message import Message
import instance_seed as _seed
from syslog_bridge import SEVERITY_WARNING, syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
from syslog_bridge import (
SEVERITY_WARNING,
encode_secret,
forward_syslog,
syslog_line,
write_syslog_file,
)
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "mailserver")
SERVICE_NAME = "smtp"
@@ -355,7 +361,14 @@ class SMTPProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
elif cmd == "MAIL":
addr = args.split(":", 1)[1].strip() if ":" in args else args
self._mail_from = addr
_log("mail_from", src=self._peer[0], value=addr)
# Strip <…> wrappers around the address; everything after the
# last @ is the domain. Empty when the attacker sent <> or a
# malformed envelope; keeping value= for back-compat with any
# log query that still reads it.
_bare = addr.strip("<>").strip()
_domain = _bare.rsplit("@", 1)[-1] if "@" in _bare else ""
_log("mail_from", src=self._peer[0], value=addr,
mail_from=_bare, domain=_domain)
self._transport.write(b"250 2.1.0 Ok\r\n")
elif cmd == "RCPT":
@@ -456,8 +469,8 @@ class SMTPProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
def _finish_auth(self, username: str, password: str) -> None:
_log("auth_attempt", src=self._peer[0],
username=username, password=password,
severity=SEVERITY_WARNING)
username=username, principal=username,
severity=SEVERITY_WARNING, **encode_secret(password))
if not OPEN_RELAY:
self._transport.write(b"535 5.7.8 Error: authentication failed\r\n")
return

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
"""Per-service credential-emitter integration tests.
Each test simulates the SD-block a migrated emitter produces, hands it
to the ingester, and asserts the resulting Credential row carries the
universal shape (principal + secret_sha256 + secret_b64 + outcome).
Closes the silent-loss bug for Redis (no username) and LDAP (dn-keyed)
by exercising the full ingester native-shape path for each.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import hashlib
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
import pytest
def _native_log(service: str, *, principal: str | None, password: str,
outcome: str | None = None, extra: dict | None = None) -> dict:
"""Build a parsed-log dict in the shape `_extract_bounty` consumes,
matching what a migrated emitter writes to the wire."""
raw = password.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
fields: dict[str, str] = {
"secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
"secret_printable": "".join(
chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw
),
}
if principal is not None:
fields["principal"] = principal
if outcome is not None:
fields["outcome"] = outcome
if extra:
fields.update(extra)
return {
"decky": "decky-01",
"service": service,
"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
"fields": fields,
}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ftp_native_shape():
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"ftp", principal="anonymous", password="test@example.com",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["service"] == "ftp"
assert cred["principal"] == "anonymous"
assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(b"test@example.com").hexdigest()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_pop3_outcome_mapped():
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"pop3", principal="alice", password="hunter2", outcome="failure",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["service"] == "pop3"
assert cred["outcome"] == "failure"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_imap_native_shape():
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"imap", principal="bob", password="letmein", outcome="success",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["principal"] == "bob"
assert cred["outcome"] == "success"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_smtp_auth_native_shape():
"""SMTP AUTH PLAIN/LOGIN — principal=SASL username."""
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"smtp", principal="postmaster@acme.com", password="abc123",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["service"] == "smtp"
assert cred["principal"] == "postmaster@acme.com"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_smtp_mail_from_is_not_a_credential():
"""`event_type=mail_from` must NOT trigger a credential write —
even if the SD-block carries a `domain` field, no `secret_b64`
means the native branch never fires and the legacy branch needs
a `password` it'll never see for this event."""
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
repo.add_bounty = AsyncMock()
log_data = {
"decky": "decky-01",
"service": "smtp",
"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
"fields": {
"value": "<spoof@evil.com>",
"mail_from": "spoof@evil.com",
"domain": "evil.com",
},
}
await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
repo.upsert_credential.assert_not_awaited()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_redis_principal_none_lands():
"""Redis legacy AUTH `<password>` — no username, principal stays
None. This was silently dropped by the legacy adapter pre-migration."""
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"redis", principal=None, password="hunter2",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["service"] == "redis"
assert cred["principal"] is None
assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(b"hunter2").hexdigest()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_redis_acl_two_arg_principal_present():
"""Redis 6+ `AUTH <user> <pw>` — principal carries the ACL user."""
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"redis", principal="default", password="hunter2",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["principal"] == "default"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ldap_principal_is_dn():
"""LDAP bind — the DN itself is the principal."""
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
"ldap", principal="cn=admin,dc=acme,dc=com", password="rootpw",
))
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert cred["service"] == "ldap"
assert cred["principal"] == "cn=admin,dc=acme,dc=com"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_lossless_b64_survives_nonprintable_password():
"""Even when secret_printable is sanitized, secret_b64 still decodes
to the original bytes — the cross-service reuse hash matches across
sanitized and non-sanitized representations."""
from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
raw = b"\x1b[31mbad\xff\x00trail"
repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
log_data = {
"decky": "decky-01",
"service": "ftp",
"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
"fields": {
"principal": "user",
"secret_printable": "?[31mbad??trail",
"secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
},
}
await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
assert base64.b64decode(cred["secret_b64"]) == raw
assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()