fix(creds): MQTT regression + secret_kind for hash credentials
Honest correction to the "every cred-emitting service" claim. Audit
of templates/* found three gaps:
1. MQTT — was working through the legacy adapter, silently dropped
when Phase 3 (e696c2b) deleted it. Now migrated to encode_secret()
alongside the others.
2. Postgres — `auth, pw_hash=…` event captures the MD5
challenge-response the attacker sent. Plaintext irrecoverable, so
it never fit the (principal, secret_b64=raw_bytes) shape. Lands
in Credential as secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge".
3. VNC — `auth_response, response=…hex` event captures the 16-byte
DES-encrypted challenge. Same situation as Postgres: plaintext
irrecoverable. Lands as secret_kind="vnc_des_response".
Adds a `secret_kind` discriminator column to Credential (default
"plaintext", indexed). The dedup tuple gains secret_kind so two
credentials with the same sha256 but different kinds are
fundamentally different rows — different challenges produce
different bytes for the same plaintext password, so cross-kind
reuse matches are meaningless and would only confuse analytics.
The model now genuinely covers every cred-emitting service in the
fleet:
plaintext SSH, Telnet, FTP, POP3, IMAP, SMTP, Redis, LDAP,
MQTT
postgres_md5_* Postgres
vnc_des_response VNC
Username-only services (MySQL/MSSQL — TDS pre-encryption captures
the user but never sees the password byte) intentionally don't feed
Credential — they're recon signals, not cred attempts.
40 tests pass in the touched scope. New cases: secret_kind dedups
independently in the repo; Postgres MD5 + VNC DES emitters thread
through; MQTT round-trips through the native branch.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -123,6 +123,32 @@ async def test_get_credentials_for_attacker(repo) -> None:
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assert rows[0]["attacker_ip"] == "10.0.0.5"
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_secret_kind_dedups_independently(repo) -> None:
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"""Same sha256, same principal — different secret_kind = different row.
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Two rows with the same content-addressable hash but different kinds
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represent fundamentally different credentials (e.g. a plaintext
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password that happens to hash to the same value as a Postgres
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md5 challenge response is statistically impossible but semantically
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distinct anyway). Dedup must respect the kind boundary."""
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base = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"decky_name": "decky-01",
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"service": "ssh",
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"principal": "root",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"fields": {},
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}
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "secret_kind": "plaintext"})
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "secret_kind": "postgres_md5_challenge"})
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 2
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kinds = {r["secret_kind"] for r in rows}
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assert kinds == {"plaintext", "postgres_md5_challenge"}
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_filters(repo) -> None:
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base_secret = _sha256("a")
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@@ -154,6 +154,74 @@ async def test_ldap_principal_is_dn():
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assert cred["principal"] == "cn=admin,dc=acme,dc=com"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_mqtt_native_shape():
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"""MQTT CONNECT — username + password decoded from the wire,
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emitted as principal + secret_b64. Was silently dropped between
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Phase 3 (legacy adapter removed) and the MQTT migration commit."""
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from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
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repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
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await _extract_bounty(repo, _native_log(
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"mqtt", principal="iotuser", password="iotpass",
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))
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cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
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assert cred["service"] == "mqtt"
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assert cred["principal"] == "iotuser"
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assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(b"iotpass").hexdigest()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_postgres_hash_credential():
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"""Postgres MD5 challenge-response — plaintext irrecoverable, lands
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as secret_kind=postgres_md5_challenge with the raw hash bytes."""
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from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
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repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
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pw_hash = "md5" + "ab" * 16 # 32 hex chars after the "md5" prefix
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raw = bytes.fromhex("ab" * 16)
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log_data = {
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"decky": "decky-01",
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"service": "postgres",
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"fields": {
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"username": "postgres",
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"principal": "postgres",
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"pw_hash": pw_hash,
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"secret_kind": "postgres_md5_challenge",
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"secret_printable": pw_hash,
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"secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
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},
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}
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await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
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cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
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assert cred["service"] == "postgres"
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assert cred["secret_kind"] == "postgres_md5_challenge"
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assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_vnc_hash_credential():
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"""VNC DES-encrypted challenge response — same shape, different kind."""
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from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
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repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
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raw = bytes(range(16))
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log_data = {
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"decky": "decky-01",
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"service": "vnc",
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"fields": {
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"response": raw.hex(),
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"secret_kind": "vnc_des_response",
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"secret_printable": raw.hex(),
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"secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
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},
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}
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await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
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cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
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assert cred["service"] == "vnc"
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assert cred["secret_kind"] == "vnc_des_response"
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assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_lossless_b64_survives_nonprintable_password():
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"""Even when secret_printable is sanitized, secret_b64 still decodes
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