feat(ssh,telnet): add non-root user account for privesc + enum lure

Real Linux deployments (especially Ubuntu cloud images) ship a non-
root admin user; honeypots that only accept root logins are a tell.
Add a second account on both SSH and Telnet decoys, configurable
via service_cfg keys `user` / `user_password`, defaulting to
`ubuntu` / `admin` so the lure is live on every fresh deploy.

* `decnet/services/{ssh,telnet}.py` — two new ServiceConfigFields
  (`user` string, `user_password` secret) and matching env vars
  (`SSH_USER` / `SSH_USER_PASSWORD`, mirror for telnet) propagated
  via the compose fragment.
* `decnet/templates/ssh/entrypoint.sh` — runtime `useradd -m -s
  /usr/libexec/login-session -G sudo "$SSH_USER"` so the new user
  inherits the same sessrec pty-recording shell as root and lands
  in the sudo group. Privesc attempts (`sudo`) flow through the
  existing sudo-log capture; network-enum from the user's shell
  rides the recorded transcript.
* `decnet/templates/telnet/entrypoint.sh` — same useradd pattern
  (no sudo group — busybox+login telnet image has no sudo
  package; privesc rides `su -` which itself flows through the
  existing PAM auth-helper at /etc/pam.d/login).
* New tests for default + custom user / password + independence
  from root password. Updated the schema-keys assertion to match
  the four-field shape.

The new account is ALSO the natural home for the body-aware
predicates that were previously gated on root-only sessions —
attackers who land on `ubuntu@host` and run network-recon /
privesc commands now generate the same structured TTP-rule
events as root sessions did, captured via the same auth-helper
+ sessrec + sudo-log pipes.

decnet/services/ssh.py

@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@ class SSHService(BaseService):
     RFC 5424 via the rsyslog bridge baked into the image.
 
     service_cfg keys:
-        password      Root password (default: "admin")
+        password         Root password (default: "admin")
-        hostname      Override container hostname
+        user             Non-root user name (default: "ubuntu") for
+                         realistic "ssh user@host" lures + privesc capture
+        user_password    Non-root user's password (default: "admin")
+        hostname         Override container hostname
     """
 
     name = "ssh"
@@ -34,6 +37,33 @@ class SSHService(BaseService):
             secret=True,
             help="Plaintext root password for the in-container sshd.",
         ),
+        ServiceConfigField(
+            key="user",
+            label="Non-root user",
+            type="string",
+            default="ubuntu",
+            help=(
+                "Username for the second account on the decoy. Real Linux "
+                "boxes (especially Ubuntu cloud images) ship a non-root "
+                "admin user — having one makes the decoy more lifelike, "
+                "captures attackers who try `ssh user@host` for network "
+                "enumeration, and surfaces sudo/privesc behaviour the root-"
+                "only path misses."
+            ),
+        ),
+        ServiceConfigField(
+            key="user_password",
+            label="Non-root user password",
+            type="password",
+            default="admin",
+            secret=True,
+            help=(
+                "Password for the non-root user. Captured at PAM auth time "
+                "via the same auth-helper that handles root logins. The "
+                "user is in the `sudo` group; subsequent privesc attempts "
+                "fan out through the existing sudo-log capture."
+            ),
+        ),
         ServiceConfigField(
             key="hostname",
             label="Container hostname",
@@ -55,6 +85,13 @@ class SSHService(BaseService):
         cfg = service_cfg or {}
         env: dict = {
             "SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD": cfg.get("password", "admin"),
+            # Non-root user account — created at runtime by the entrypoint
+            # iff SSH_USER is non-empty. Defaults to "ubuntu"/"admin" so
+            # `ssh ubuntu@<decky>` works out of the box (the conventional
+            # cloud-init account on Ubuntu cloud images, very low-friction
+            # for attackers running ssh enumeration scripts).
+            "SSH_USER": cfg.get("user", "ubuntu"),
+            "SSH_USER_PASSWORD": cfg.get("user_password", "admin"),
             # NODE_NAME is the authoritative decky identifier for log
             # attribution — matches the host path used for the artifacts
             # bind mount below. The container hostname (optionally overridden

decnet/services/telnet.py

@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@ class TelnetService(BaseService):
     are logged as RFC 5424 via the same rsyslog bridge used by the SSH service.
 
     service_cfg keys:
-        password    Root password (default: "admin")
+        password         Root password (default: "admin")
-        hostname    Override container hostname
+        user             Non-root user name (default: "ubuntu") for
+                         realistic "telnet user@host" lures + privesc capture
+        user_password    Non-root user's password (default: "admin")
+        hostname         Override container hostname
     """
 
     name = "telnet"
@@ -33,6 +36,33 @@ class TelnetService(BaseService):
             secret=True,
             help="Plaintext root password for the in-container telnetd.",
         ),
+        ServiceConfigField(
+            key="user",
+            label="Non-root user",
+            type="string",
+            default="ubuntu",
+            help=(
+                "Username for the second account on the decoy. The telnet "
+                "image is busybox + real /bin/login (PAM-aware), so a "
+                "non-root user widens the attack surface — captures "
+                "enumeration scripts that only try common usernames "
+                "(`telnet ubuntu@host`) and post-login `su -` privesc "
+                "attempts via the existing PAM auth-helper."
+            ),
+        ),
+        ServiceConfigField(
+            key="user_password",
+            label="Non-root user password",
+            type="password",
+            default="admin",
+            secret=True,
+            help=(
+                "Password for the non-root user. Captured at PAM auth "
+                "time via the same auth-helper that handles root logins. "
+                "Telnet has no sudo (busybox+login image); privesc rides "
+                "`su -` which itself flows through PAM."
+            ),
+        ),
         ServiceConfigField(
             key="hostname",
             label="Container hostname",
@@ -54,6 +84,13 @@ class TelnetService(BaseService):
         cfg = service_cfg or {}
         env: dict = {
             "TELNET_ROOT_PASSWORD": cfg.get("password", "admin"),
+            # Non-root user account — created at runtime by the
+            # entrypoint iff TELNET_USER is non-empty. Defaults to
+            # "ubuntu"/"admin" to mirror the SSH service shape and
+            # match the Ubuntu-flavoured motd already baked into the
+            # telnet image.
+            "TELNET_USER": cfg.get("user", "ubuntu"),
+            "TELNET_USER_PASSWORD": cfg.get("user_password", "admin"),
             # NODE_NAME is the authoritative decky identifier for log
             # attribution — matches the host path used for the artifacts
             # bind mount below.

decnet/templates/ssh/entrypoint.sh

@@ -5,6 +5,26 @@ set -e
 ROOT_PASSWORD="${SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD:-admin}"
 echo "root:${ROOT_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
 
+# Non-root user — gives the decoy a realistic "ssh user@host" surface
+# so attackers running enumeration scripts find a plausible second
+# account, AND so post-login privesc (sudo) flows through the
+# existing sudo-log capture pipe. SSH_USER blank means "no second
+# user" (legacy single-account behaviour); the compose fragment
+# defaults SSH_USER to "ubuntu" so this branch is the live path on
+# fresh deploys.
+SSH_USER="${SSH_USER:-}"
+SSH_USER_PASSWORD="${SSH_USER_PASSWORD:-admin}"
+if [ -n "${SSH_USER}" ] && [ "${SSH_USER}" != "root" ]; then
+    if ! id -u "${SSH_USER}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        # Login shell points at the same sessrec wrapper root uses,
+        # so the new user's pty session is recorded — privesc and
+        # network-enum behaviour ride the existing capture pipe
+        # without a parallel implementation.
+        useradd -m -s /usr/libexec/login-session -G sudo "${SSH_USER}"
+    fi
+    echo "${SSH_USER}:${SSH_USER_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
+fi
+
 # Optional: override hostname inside container
 if [ -n "$SSH_HOSTNAME" ]; then
     echo "$SSH_HOSTNAME" > /etc/hostname

decnet/templates/telnet/entrypoint.sh

@@ -5,6 +5,23 @@ set -e
 ROOT_PASSWORD="${TELNET_ROOT_PASSWORD:-admin}"
 echo "root:${ROOT_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
 
+# Non-root user — gives the decoy a realistic "telnet user@host"
+# surface so enumeration scripts that only try common usernames find
+# a plausible second account, AND so post-login `su -` privesc flows
+# through the existing PAM auth-helper. Login shell is the sessrec
+# wrapper so the user's pty session is recorded in the same shape
+# as root's. TELNET_USER blank disables the second account; the
+# compose fragment defaults TELNET_USER to "ubuntu" so this branch
+# is the live path on fresh deploys.
+TELNET_USER="${TELNET_USER:-}"
+TELNET_USER_PASSWORD="${TELNET_USER_PASSWORD:-admin}"
+if [ -n "${TELNET_USER}" ] && [ "${TELNET_USER}" != "root" ]; then
+    if ! id -u "${TELNET_USER}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        useradd -m -s /usr/libexec/login-session "${TELNET_USER}"
+    fi
+    echo "${TELNET_USER}:${TELNET_USER_PASSWORD}" | chpasswd
+fi
+
 # Optional: override hostname inside container
 if [ -n "$TELNET_HOSTNAME" ]; then
     echo "$TELNET_HOSTNAME" > /etc/hostname

tests/services/test_config_schema.py

@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ def test_field_to_json_omits_unused_enum():
 
 
 def test_ssh_schema_keys_match_compose_reads():
-    # SSHService.compose_fragment reads cfg.get("password") and cfg.get("hostname")
+    # SSHService.compose_fragment reads password / user / user_password /
-    # — the schema must expose exactly those.
+    # hostname — the schema must expose exactly those.
     keys = {f.key for f in SSHService.config_schema}
-    assert keys == {"password", "hostname"}
+    assert keys == {"password", "user", "user_password", "hostname"}
 
 
 def test_ssh_compose_round_trip_through_validator():
@@ -144,16 +144,33 @@ def test_https_schema_includes_tls_fields():
 
 
 def test_telnet_schema_keys_match_compose_reads():
-    assert {f.key for f in TelnetService.config_schema} == {"password", "hostname"}
+    assert {f.key for f in TelnetService.config_schema} == {
+        "password", "user", "user_password", "hostname",
+    }
 
 
 def test_telnet_compose_round_trip():
     svc = TelnetService()
-    cfg = svc.validate_cfg({"password": "hunter2", "hostname": "mail-01"})
+    cfg = svc.validate_cfg({
+        "password": "hunter2", "hostname": "mail-01",
+        "user": "deploy", "user_password": "Tr0ub4dor",
+    })
     frag = svc.compose_fragment("decky-test", service_cfg=cfg)
     env = frag["environment"]
     assert env["TELNET_ROOT_PASSWORD"] == "hunter2"
     assert env["TELNET_HOSTNAME"] == "mail-01"
+    assert env["TELNET_USER"] == "deploy"
+    assert env["TELNET_USER_PASSWORD"] == "Tr0ub4dor"
+
+
+def test_telnet_default_non_root_user():
+    """Defaults to ubuntu/admin so a fresh decoy lures `telnet
+    ubuntu@host` enumeration scripts without operator setup."""
+    svc = TelnetService()
+    frag = svc.compose_fragment("decky-test", service_cfg={})
+    env = frag["environment"]
+    assert env["TELNET_USER"] == "ubuntu"
+    assert env["TELNET_USER_PASSWORD"] == "admin"
 
 
 def test_rdp_schema_matches_and_bool_coerces():

tests/services/test_ssh.py

@@ -123,6 +123,36 @@ def test_no_log_target_in_env():
     assert "LOG_TARGET" not in _fragment(log_target="10.0.0.1:5140").get("environment", {})
 
 
+def test_default_non_root_user_and_password():
+    """The compose fragment defaults SSH_USER to "ubuntu" and
+    SSH_USER_PASSWORD to "admin" — privesc + network-enum lure on
+    every fresh deploy without an operator intervention."""
+    env = _fragment()["environment"]
+    assert env["SSH_USER"] == "ubuntu"
+    assert env["SSH_USER_PASSWORD"] == "admin"
+
+
+def test_custom_non_root_user_and_password():
+    env = _fragment(service_cfg={
+        "user": "deploy",
+        "user_password": "Tr0ub4dor",
+    })["environment"]
+    assert env["SSH_USER"] == "deploy"
+    assert env["SSH_USER_PASSWORD"] == "Tr0ub4dor"
+
+
+def test_non_root_user_independent_of_root_password():
+    """User account password must be a distinct knob from the root
+    password — operators routinely set them to different values to
+    exercise multi-credential capture."""
+    env = _fragment(service_cfg={
+        "password": "rootpw",
+        "user_password": "userpw",
+    })["environment"]
+    assert env["SSH_ROOT_PASSWORD"] == "rootpw"
+    assert env["SSH_USER_PASSWORD"] == "userpw"
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Logging pipeline wiring (Dockerfile + entrypoint)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------