feat(creds): Phase 1 — Authorization header + SNMP community capture

Closes the cred-coverage gap for 7 services that already had the data
on the wire but never landed it in the Credential table:

- SNMP — community string lands as secret_kind="snmp_community",
  principal=None (v1/v2c has no per-user identity, the community IS
  the auth).
- SIP — Digest response hash, previously buried in the auth= header
  dump, now classify_authorization()-extracted.
- HTTP / HTTPS — Authorization header was in the headers JSON but
  never extracted. Now Basic decodes to plaintext, Bearer →
  http_bearer (principal=None), Digest → http_digest_md5.
- K8s — already extracted Authorization but didn't normalize. Service-
  account JWTs flow through as Bearer.
- Docker API — headers absent entirely. Adds the headers JSON dump
  and runs Authorization through the classifier.
- Elasticsearch — five distinct request handlers; each gains a
  per-handler _cred_fields() helper.

Adds canonical templates/syslog_bridge.py:classify_authorization().
Recognised: Basic / Bearer / Token / Digest. Unknown schemes (NTLM,
AWS4-HMAC, Negotiate) return None; the header still rides in the
ambient SD-block but isn't normalized as a credential. The SD shape
on the wire collapses sip_digest_md5 into http_digest_md5 — same
algorithm, so cross-protocol reuse correlates correctly when (rare)
nonce collisions allow.

Drive-by repair of tests/core/test_fingerprinting.py:

- The pre-existing `test_http_useragent_extracted` asserted both that
  add_bounty was called exactly once AND that the UA payload carried
  `path` and `method` fields. Both wrong since this session opened:
  the http_quirks fingerprint added later fires too, and the UA
  payload never actually included path/method despite the assertion.
- Adds `path`/`method` to the UA fingerprint payload (real operator
  value: "Nikto hit /admin" beats "Nikto seen on this decky").
- Replaces `assert_awaited_once` with a `_find_ua_bounty()` helper
  that filters add_bounty calls by `fingerprint_type`. New fingerprint
  families landing later won't retroactively break old tests.
- Updates the two credential-bearing tests to use the post-DEBT-039
  native shape (`secret_b64` / `principal`) and `upsert_credential`,
  not the deleted legacy `username+password` adapter.

Also rebuilds the per-service fake `syslog_bridge` modules in
tests/service_testing/{conftest,test_imap,test_pop3,test_snmp,test_mqtt,test_smtp}.py
to expose `encode_secret` + `classify_authorization`. Service templates
that import either now no longer fail at test collection.

173 tests pass in the touched scope. Phases 2-7 still pending.

decnet/templates/conpot/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/docker_api/server.py

@@ -10,7 +10,12 @@ import json
 import os
 
 from flask import Flask, request
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "docker-host")
 SERVICE_NAME   = "docker_api"
@@ -68,12 +73,15 @@ def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
 
 @app.before_request
 def log_request():
+    cred = classify_authorization(request.headers.get("Authorization"))
     _log(
         "request",
         method=request.method,
         path=request.path,
         remote_addr=request.remote_addr,
+        headers=json.dumps(dict(request.headers)),
         body=request.get_data(as_text=True)[:512],
+        **(cred or {}),
     )
 
 

decnet/templates/docker_api/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/elasticsearch/server.py

@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ import os
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
 
 import instance_seed as _seed
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "esserver")
 SERVICE_NAME   = "elasticsearch"
@@ -102,18 +107,23 @@ class ESHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
         return self.rfile.read(length).decode(errors="replace") if length else ""
 
+    def _cred_fields(self) -> dict:
+        """Universal cred shape from this request's Authorization header,
+        or empty dict when absent / unrecognized."""
+        return classify_authorization(self.headers.get("Authorization")) or {}
+
     def do_GET(self):
         src = self.client_address[0]
         path = self.path.split("?")[0]
 
         if path in ("/", ""):
-            _log("root_probe", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path)
+            _log("root_probe", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path, **self._cred_fields())
             self._send_json(200, _ROOT_RESPONSE)
         elif path.startswith("/_cat/"):
-            _log("cat_api", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path)
+            _log("cat_api", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path, **self._cred_fields())
             self._send_json(200, [])
         elif path.startswith("/_cluster/"):
-            _log("cluster_recon", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path)
+            _log("cluster_recon", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path, **self._cred_fields())
             self._send_json(200, {
                 "cluster_name": _CLUSTER_NAME,
                 "cluster_uuid": _CLUSTER_UUID,
@@ -129,7 +139,7 @@ class ESHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 "active_shards_percent_as_number": 100.0,
             })
         elif path.startswith("/_nodes"):
-            _log("nodes_recon", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path)
+            _log("nodes_recon", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path, **self._cred_fields())
             self._send_json(200, {
                 "_nodes": {"total": _CLUSTER_NODES, "successful": _CLUSTER_NODES, "failed": 0},
                 "cluster_name": _CLUSTER_NAME,
@@ -137,10 +147,10 @@ class ESHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                                        "build_hash": _ES_BUILD_HASH}},
             })
         elif path.startswith("/_security/") or path.startswith("/_xpack/"):
-            _log("security_probe", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path)
+            _log("security_probe", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path, **self._cred_fields())
             self._send_json(200, {"enabled": True, "available": True})
         else:
-            _log("request", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path)
+            _log("request", src=src, method="GET", path=self.path, **self._cred_fields())
             self._send_json(404, {"error": {"root_cause": [{"type": "index_not_found_exception",
                                                              "reason": "no such index"}]}})
 
@@ -149,7 +159,8 @@ class ESHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         body = self._read_body()
         path = self.path.split("?")[0]
         _log("post_request", src=src, method="POST", path=self.path,
-             body_preview=body[:300], user_agent=self.headers.get("User-Agent", ""))
+             body_preview=body[:300], user_agent=self.headers.get("User-Agent", ""),
+             **self._cred_fields())
         if "_search" in path or "_bulk" in path:
             self._send_json(200, {"took": 1, "timed_out": False, "hits": {"total": {"value": 0}, "hits": []}})
         else:
@@ -158,17 +169,20 @@ class ESHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     def do_PUT(self):
         src = self.client_address[0]
         body = self._read_body()
-        _log("put_request", src=src, method="PUT", path=self.path, body_preview=body[:300])
+        _log("put_request", src=src, method="PUT", path=self.path,
+             body_preview=body[:300], **self._cred_fields())
         self._send_json(200, {"acknowledged": True})
 
     def do_DELETE(self):
         src = self.client_address[0]
-        _log("delete_request", src=src, method="DELETE", path=self.path)
+        _log("delete_request", src=src, method="DELETE", path=self.path,
+             **self._cred_fields())
         self._send_json(200, {"acknowledged": True})
 
     def do_HEAD(self):
         src = self.client_address[0]
-        _log("head_request", src=src, method="HEAD", path=self.path)
+        _log("head_request", src=src, method="HEAD", path=self.path,
+             **self._cred_fields())
         self._send_json(200, {})
 
     def log_message(self, fmt, *args):

decnet/templates/elasticsearch/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/ftp/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/http/server.py

@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ from flask import Flask, request, send_from_directory
 from werkzeug.serving import make_server, WSGIRequestHandler
 
 import instance_seed as _seed
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 logging.getLogger("werkzeug").setLevel(logging.ERROR)
 
@@ -93,6 +98,11 @@ def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
 
 @app.before_request
 def log_request():
+    # Classify Authorization → universal credential SD shape. Lands in
+    # the Credential table on Basic / Bearer / Digest; opaque schemes
+    # (NTLM, AWS4-HMAC-…) fall through and ride only in the headers
+    # dump. None when no Authorization header present.
+    cred = classify_authorization(request.headers.get("Authorization"))
     _log(
         "request",
         method=request.method,
@@ -100,6 +110,7 @@ def log_request():
         remote_addr=request.remote_addr,
         headers=json.dumps(dict(request.headers)),
         body=request.get_data(as_text=True)[:512],
+        **(cred or {}),
     )
 
 

decnet/templates/http/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/https/server.py

@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@ from flask import Flask, request, send_from_directory
 from werkzeug.serving import make_server, WSGIRequestHandler
 
 import instance_seed as _seed
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 logging.getLogger("werkzeug").setLevel(logging.ERROR)
 
@@ -94,6 +99,7 @@ def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
 
 @app.before_request
 def log_request():
+    cred = classify_authorization(request.headers.get("Authorization"))
     _log(
         "request",
         method=request.method,
@@ -101,6 +107,7 @@ def log_request():
         remote_addr=request.remote_addr,
         headers=dict(request.headers),
         body=request.get_data(as_text=True)[:512],
+        **(cred or {}),
     )
 
 

decnet/templates/https/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/imap/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/k8s/server.py

@@ -10,7 +10,12 @@ import json
 import os
 
 from flask import Flask, request
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "k8s-master")
 SERVICE_NAME   = "k8s"
@@ -75,13 +80,16 @@ def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
 
 @app.before_request
 def log_request():
+    auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    cred = classify_authorization(auth_header)
     _log(
         "request",
         method=request.method,
         path=request.path,
         remote_addr=request.remote_addr,
-        auth=request.headers.get("Authorization", ""),
+        auth=auth_header,
         body=request.get_data(as_text=True)[:512],
+        **(cred or {}),
     )
 
 

decnet/templates/k8s/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/ldap/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/llmnr/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/mongodb/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/mqtt/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/mssql/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/mysql/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/pop3/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/postgres/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/rdp/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/redis/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/sip/server.py

@@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ Authorization header and call metadata, then responds with 401 Unauthorized.
 import asyncio
 import os
 import re
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "pbx")
 SERVICE_NAME   = "sip"
@@ -58,6 +63,13 @@ def _handle_message(data: bytes, src_addr) -> bytes | None:
         m = re.search(r'username="([^"]+)"', auth_header)
         username = m.group(1) if m else ""
 
+    # SIP Digest is the same shape as HTTP Digest (RFC 7616 derived from
+    # RFC 2617). classify_authorization handles it identically — emits
+    # secret_kind="http_digest_md5", which is correct: the cred is the
+    # MD5 hash response, regardless of whether it rode in over SIP or
+    # HTTP. Reuse-analytics correlates across both.
+    cred = classify_authorization(auth_header)
+
     _log(
         "request",
         src=src_addr[0],
@@ -67,6 +79,7 @@ def _handle_message(data: bytes, src_addr) -> bytes | None:
         to=headers.get("to", ""),
         username=username,
         auth=auth_header[:256],
+        **(cred or {}),
     )
 
     if method in ("REGISTER", "INVITE", "OPTIONS"):

decnet/templates/sip/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/smb/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/smtp/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/snmp/server.py

@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ Logs all requests as JSON.
 import asyncio
 import os
 import struct
-from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    encode_secret,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
 
 NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "switch")
 SERVICE_NAME   = "snmp"
@@ -229,8 +234,15 @@ class SNMPProtocol(asyncio.DatagramProtocol):
     def datagram_received(self, data, addr):
         try:
             version, community, request_id, oids = _parse_snmp(data)
+            # SNMP v1/v2c community is the only auth mechanism on the wire
+            # — every packet carries the shared secret in plaintext. Land
+            # it as a Credential row keyed `snmp_community` so reuse-
+            # analytics treats community-string spray as the same shape
+            # of attack signal as cleartext password spray.
             _log("get_request", src=addr[0], src_port=addr[1],
-                 version=version, community=community, oids=oids)
+                 version=version, community=community, oids=oids,
+                 principal=None, secret_kind="snmp_community",
+                 **encode_secret(community))
             response = _build_response(version, community, request_id, oids)
             self._transport.sendto(response, addr)
         except Exception as e:

decnet/templates/snmp/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/ssh/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
 import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -106,6 +107,80 @@ def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
     }
 
 
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/telnet/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/tftp/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/templates/vnc/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ RFC 5424 structure:
 Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
 """
 
+import base64
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Any, Optional
 
 # ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -79,6 +81,106 @@ def syslog_line(
     return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
 
 
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
 def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
     """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
     print(line, flush=True)

decnet/web/ingester.py

@@ -316,6 +316,11 @@ async def _extract_bounty(repo: BaseRepository, log_data: dict[str, Any]) -> Non
                 "category": _ua_category,
                 "tool": _ua_tool,
                 "signals": _ua_signals or None,
+                # Request context — which endpoint did the tool hit?
+                # Useful in the dashboard so analysts see "Nikto hit
+                # /admin" rather than just "Nikto seen on this decky".
+                "method": _fields.get("method"),
+                "path": _fields.get("path"),
             }
         })
 

tests/core/test_fingerprinting.py

@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@ def _make_repo():
 # HTTP User-Agent
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+def _find_ua_bounty(repo) -> dict:
+    """Find the http_useragent fingerprint among all add_bounty calls.
+
+    A single HTTP request can produce multiple `bounty_type="fingerprint"`
+    bounties (UA, http_quirks, ip_leak, …). Tests for one specific kind
+    must filter rather than assert call count, so adding new fingerprint
+    families later doesn't retroactively break old tests."""
+    for c in repo.add_bounty.await_args_list:
+        payload = c[0][0].get("payload") or {}
+        if payload.get("fingerprint_type") == "http_useragent":
+            return c[0][0]
+    raise AssertionError(
+        "no http_useragent bounty found; calls=%r"
+        % [c[0][0].get("payload") for c in repo.add_bounty.await_args_list]
+    )
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_http_useragent_extracted():
     repo = _make_repo()
@@ -30,13 +47,12 @@ async def test_http_useragent_extracted():
         },
     }
     await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
-    repo.add_bounty.assert_awaited_once()
+    bounty = _find_ua_bounty(repo)
-    call_kwargs = repo.add_bounty.call_args[0][0]
+    assert bounty["bounty_type"] == "fingerprint"
-    assert call_kwargs["bounty_type"] == "fingerprint"
+    assert bounty["payload"]["fingerprint_type"] == "http_useragent"
-    assert call_kwargs["payload"]["fingerprint_type"] == "http_useragent"
+    assert bounty["payload"]["value"] == "Nikto/2.1.6"
-    assert call_kwargs["payload"]["value"] == "Nikto/2.1.6"
+    assert bounty["payload"]["path"] == "/admin"
-    assert call_kwargs["payload"]["path"] == "/admin"
+    assert bounty["payload"]["method"] == "GET"
-    assert call_kwargs["payload"]["method"] == "GET"
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -52,12 +68,14 @@ async def test_http_useragent_lowercase_key():
         },
     }
     await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
-    call_kwargs = repo.add_bounty.call_args[0][0]
+    bounty = _find_ua_bounty(repo)
-    assert call_kwargs["payload"]["value"] == "sqlmap/1.7"
+    assert bounty["payload"]["value"] == "sqlmap/1.7"
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_http_no_useragent_no_fingerprint_bounty():
+    """No User-Agent header → no http_useragent bounty (other fingerprint
+    families like http_quirks may still fire on the same request)."""
     repo = _make_repo()
     log_data = {
         "decky": "decky-01",
@@ -69,7 +87,11 @@ async def test_http_no_useragent_no_fingerprint_bounty():
         },
     }
     await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
-    repo.add_bounty.assert_not_awaited()
+    ua_calls = [
+        c for c in repo.add_bounty.await_args_list
+        if (c[0][0].get("payload") or {}).get("fingerprint_type") == "http_useragent"
+    ]
+    assert ua_calls == []
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -142,39 +164,59 @@ async def test_vnc_version_event_no_client_version_field():
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_credential_still_extracted_alongside_fingerprint():
+    """Native-shape credential lands via upsert_credential, not add_bounty.
+
+    The legacy username+password adapter was deleted in DEBT-039; the
+    universal shape (secret_b64 + principal) goes straight to the
+    Credential table. Fingerprint bounties continue to ride add_bounty."""
+    import base64
     repo = _make_repo()
+    repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
     log_data = {
         "decky": "decky-03",
         "service": "ftp",
         "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.8",
         "event_type": "auth_attempt",
-        "fields": {"username": "admin", "password": "1234"},
+        "fields": {
+            "username": "admin",
+            "principal": "admin",
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            "secret_printable": "1234",
+            "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(b"1234").decode(),
+        },
     }
     await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
-    repo.add_bounty.assert_awaited_once()
+    repo.upsert_credential.assert_awaited_once()
-    call_kwargs = repo.add_bounty.call_args[0][0]
+    cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
-    assert call_kwargs["bounty_type"] == "credential"
+    assert cred["service"] == "ftp"
+    assert cred["principal"] == "admin"
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_http_credential_and_fingerprint_both_extracted():
-    """An HTTP login attempt can yield both a credential and a UA fingerprint."""
+    """An HTTP login attempt yields both a Credential row and a UA
+    fingerprint bounty — distinct write paths."""
+    import base64
     repo = _make_repo()
+    repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
     log_data = {
         "decky": "decky-03",
         "service": "http",
         "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.9",
         "event_type": "request",
         "fields": {
-            "username": "root",
+            "principal": "root",
-            "password": "toor",
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            "secret_printable": "toor",
+            "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(b"toor").decode(),
             "headers": {"User-Agent": "curl/7.88.1"},
         },
     }
     await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
-    assert repo.add_bounty.await_count == 2
+    repo.upsert_credential.assert_awaited_once()
-    types = {c[0][0]["bounty_type"] for c in repo.add_bounty.call_args_list}
+    # add_bounty fired for the UA fingerprint; http_quirks may also fire.
-    assert types == {"credential", "fingerprint"}
+    bounty_types = {c[0][0]["bounty_type"] for c in repo.add_bounty.call_args_list}
+    assert "fingerprint" in bounty_types
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

tests/service_testing/conftest.py

@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ def make_fake_syslog_bridge() -> ModuleType:
     mod.forward_syslog = MagicMock()
     mod.SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
     mod.SEVERITY_INFO = 6
+    # encode_secret returns the universal cred SD shape; tests don't
+    # care about the exact bytes, just that the key set is correct.
+    mod.encode_secret = MagicMock(
+        return_value={"secret_printable": "", "secret_b64": ""}
+    )
+    # classify_authorization returns None for unknown / absent auth so
+    # services that call **(cred or {}) get a no-op spread.
+    mod.classify_authorization = MagicMock(return_value=None)
     return mod
 
 

tests/service_testing/test_imap.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ def _make_fake_syslog_bridge() -> ModuleType:
     mod.forward_syslog = MagicMock()
     mod.SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
     mod.SEVERITY_INFO = 6
+    mod.encode_secret = MagicMock(return_value={"secret_printable": "", "secret_b64": ""})
+    mod.classify_authorization = MagicMock(return_value=None)
     return mod
 
 

tests/service_testing/test_mqtt.py

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ def _make_fake_syslog_bridge() -> ModuleType:
     mod.forward_syslog = MagicMock()
     mod.SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
     mod.SEVERITY_INFO = 6
+    mod.encode_secret = MagicMock(return_value={"secret_printable": "", "secret_b64": ""})
+    mod.classify_authorization = MagicMock(return_value=None)
     return mod
 
 

tests/service_testing/test_pop3.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ def _make_fake_syslog_bridge() -> ModuleType:
     mod.forward_syslog = MagicMock()
     mod.SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
     mod.SEVERITY_INFO = 6
+    mod.encode_secret = MagicMock(return_value={"secret_printable": "", "secret_b64": ""})
+    mod.classify_authorization = MagicMock(return_value=None)
     return mod
 
 

tests/service_testing/test_smtp.py

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ def _make_fake_syslog_bridge() -> ModuleType:
     mod.forward_syslog = MagicMock()
     mod.SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
     mod.SEVERITY_INFO = 6
+    mod.encode_secret = MagicMock(return_value={"secret_printable": "", "secret_b64": ""})
+    mod.classify_authorization = MagicMock(return_value=None)
     return mod
 
 

tests/service_testing/test_snmp.py

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ def _make_fake_syslog_bridge() -> ModuleType:
     mod.forward_syslog = MagicMock()
     mod.SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
     mod.SEVERITY_INFO = 6
+    mod.encode_secret = MagicMock(return_value={"secret_printable": "", "secret_b64": ""})
+    mod.classify_authorization = MagicMock(return_value=None)
     return mod
 
 

tests/services/test_cred_emitters.py

@@ -222,6 +222,109 @@ async def test_vnc_hash_credential():
     assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
 
 
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_snmp_community_native_shape():
+    """SNMP v1/v2c community string lands as secret_kind=snmp_community,
+    principal=None (no per-user identity in v1/v2c)."""
+    from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
+    repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
+    raw = b"public"
+    log_data = {
+        "decky": "decky-01",
+        "service": "snmp",
+        "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
+        "fields": {
+            "version": 1,
+            "community": "public",
+            "secret_kind": "snmp_community",
+            "secret_printable": "public",
+            "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+        },
+    }
+    await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
+    cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
+    assert cred["service"] == "snmp"
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "snmp_community"
+    assert cred["principal"] is None
+    assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_http_basic_native_shape():
+    """HTTP Basic via classify_authorization → principal+plaintext."""
+    from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
+    repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
+    log_data = {
+        "decky": "decky-01",
+        "service": "http",
+        "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
+        "fields": {
+            "method": "GET",
+            "path": "/admin",
+            "principal": "admin",
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            "secret_printable": "hunter2",
+            "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(b"hunter2").decode("ascii"),
+        },
+    }
+    await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
+    cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
+    assert cred["service"] == "http"
+    assert cred["principal"] == "admin"
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "plaintext"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_http_bearer_native_shape():
+    """HTTP Bearer — principal=None, secret_kind=http_bearer, opaque."""
+    from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
+    repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
+    token = b"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.foo.bar"
+    log_data = {
+        "decky": "decky-01",
+        "service": "k8s",
+        "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
+        "fields": {
+            "method": "GET",
+            "path": "/api/v1/secrets",
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            "secret_printable": token.decode(),
+            "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(token).decode("ascii"),
+        },
+    }
+    await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
+    cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "http_bearer"
+    assert cred["principal"] is None
+    assert cred["secret_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(token).hexdigest()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_sip_digest_native_shape():
+    """SIP Digest via classify_authorization → response hash captured."""
+    from decnet.web.ingester import _extract_bounty
+    repo = MagicMock(); repo.upsert_credential = AsyncMock()
+    response_hash = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
+    log_data = {
+        "decky": "decky-01",
+        "service": "sip",
+        "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
+        "fields": {
+            "method": "REGISTER",
+            "principal": "alice",
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            "secret_printable": response_hash,
+            "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(response_hash.encode()).decode("ascii"),
+        },
+    }
+    await _extract_bounty(repo, log_data)
+    cred = repo.upsert_credential.call_args[0][0]
+    assert cred["service"] == "sip"
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "http_digest_md5"
+    assert cred["principal"] == "alice"
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_lossless_b64_survives_nonprintable_password():
     """Even when secret_printable is sanitized, secret_b64 still decodes

tests/services/test_syslog_bridge_helpers.py

@@ -65,6 +65,53 @@ def test_encode_secret_preserves_rfc5424_specials(syslog_bridge):
     assert base64.b64decode(out["secret_b64"]) == secret.encode("utf-8")
 
 
+def test_classify_authorization_basic(syslog_bridge):
+    """HTTP Basic — base64(user:pw) decodes to plaintext credential."""
+    cred = syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("Basic YWRtaW46aHVudGVyMg==")
+    assert cred is not None
+    assert cred["principal"] == "admin"
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "plaintext"
+    assert base64.b64decode(cred["secret_b64"]) == b"hunter2"
+    assert cred["secret_printable"] == "hunter2"
+
+
+def test_classify_authorization_bearer(syslog_bridge):
+    cred = syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.foo.bar")
+    assert cred["principal"] is None
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "http_bearer"
+    assert base64.b64decode(cred["secret_b64"]) == b"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.foo.bar"
+
+
+def test_classify_authorization_token_alias(syslog_bridge):
+    """`Token <opaque>` = same shape as Bearer (Kubernetes service accounts)."""
+    cred = syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("Token sa-jwt-token-abc")
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "http_bearer"
+
+
+def test_classify_authorization_digest(syslog_bridge):
+    """RFC 7616 Digest — extract username + response hash."""
+    header = ('Digest username="alice", realm="example.com", '
+              'nonce="abc123", uri="/", response="d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"')
+    cred = syslog_bridge.classify_authorization(header)
+    assert cred["principal"] == "alice"
+    assert cred["secret_kind"] == "http_digest_md5"
+    assert cred["secret_printable"] == "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
+
+
+def test_classify_authorization_unknown_scheme(syslog_bridge):
+    """NTLM, AWS4-HMAC-…, Negotiate — all return None for now."""
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("NTLM TlRMTVNTUAA=") is None
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=…") is None
+
+
+def test_classify_authorization_malformed(syslog_bridge):
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization(None) is None
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("") is None
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("Basic !!not-base64!!") is None
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("Basic dXNlcg==") is None  # no colon
+    assert syslog_bridge.classify_authorization("Digest no-response-here") is None
+
+
 def test_encode_secret_unicode_replaced(syslog_bridge):
     """Non-ASCII unicode encodes via utf-8, then printable strips the
     multi-byte sequence to '?' chars (one per raw byte)."""