feat(api): rate-limit /auth/login + scaffold threat model

Adds slowapi two-bucket rate limit on /auth/login — 10 attempts per
5 minutes per-IP AND per-username, tripping either → 429. Per-IP
catches botnets hitting one account; per-username catches distributed
credential stuffing against one account. In-memory storage: dashboard
API is single-process, Redis is disproportionate for v1.

X-Forwarded-For is deliberately NOT trusted (spoofable); reverse-proxy
deployments get one shared bucket per proxy IP. Logged in the threat
model as accepted risk DA-08, to be revisited when a verified-proxy
config lands.

Also scaffolds development/THREAT_MODEL.md with STRIDE-per-element
methodology, system-context DFD, and Dashboard↔API as the first fully
worked component (7 sub-flows, ~50 threat entries). F1 Authn ships
with 3 threats mitigated: rate limit (new), uniform 401 (verified
already in place), bcrypt length clamp (verified already in place via
Pydantic max_length=72).
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-23 13:25:28 -04:00
parent 8cbb7834ef
commit 2f4f81e5de
7 changed files with 551 additions and 7 deletions

View File

@@ -32,9 +32,19 @@ from decnet.web.api import app
from decnet.web.dependencies import repo
from decnet.web.db.models import User
from decnet.web.auth import get_password_hash
from decnet.web.limiter import limiter as _login_limiter
from decnet.env import DECNET_ADMIN_USER, DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD
import decnet.config
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_login_rate_limiter() -> None:
"""Rate-limit buckets are process-wide; clear before each test so
prior tests don't consume another test's budget."""
_login_limiter.reset()
yield
_login_limiter.reset()
VIEWER_USERNAME = "testviewer"
VIEWER_PASSWORD = "viewer-pass-123"