anti
f2b3393669
Replaces LICENSE (GPLv3 -> AGPLv3) and prepends `SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later` to every source file across decnet/, decnet_web/, tests/, scripts/, and tools/. Rationale: closes the GPLv3 ASP loophole so any party operating a modified DECNET as a network service must offer their modified source. Personal copyright (Samuel Paschuan) + inbound=outbound contributions make a future unilateral relicense infeasible. - LICENSE: full AGPL-3.0 text (gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.txt) - COPYRIGHT: project copyright notice - tools/add_spdx_headers.py: idempotent header injector (shebang- and PEP 263-aware) Touches 1565 source files (.py, .ts, .tsx, .js, .jsx, .css, .sh). No behavior change; comments only.
226 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
226 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
import time
|
|
from typing import Any, Optional
|
|
|
|
import jwt
|
|
from fastapi import HTTPException, status, Request
|
|
from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer
|
|
|
|
from decnet.web.auth import ALGORITHM, SECRET_KEY
|
|
from decnet.web.db.repository import BaseRepository
|
|
from decnet.web.db.factory import get_repository
|
|
|
|
# Shared repository singleton
|
|
_repo: Optional[BaseRepository] = None
|
|
|
|
def get_repo() -> BaseRepository:
|
|
"""FastAPI dependency to inject the configured repository."""
|
|
global _repo
|
|
if _repo is None:
|
|
_repo = get_repository()
|
|
return _repo
|
|
|
|
repo = get_repo()
|
|
|
|
oauth2_scheme = OAuth2PasswordBearer(tokenUrl="/api/v1/auth/login")
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Per-request user lookup was the hidden tax behind every authed endpoint —
|
|
# SELECT users WHERE uuid=? ran once per call, serializing through aiosqlite.
|
|
# 10s TTL is well below JWT expiry and we invalidate on all user writes.
|
|
_USER_TTL = 10.0
|
|
_user_cache: dict[str, tuple[Optional[dict[str, Any]], float]] = {}
|
|
_user_cache_lock: Optional[asyncio.Lock] = None
|
|
|
|
# Username cache for the login hot path. Short TTL — the bcrypt verify
|
|
# still runs against the cached hash, so security is unchanged. The
|
|
# staleness window is: if a password is changed, the old password is
|
|
# usable for up to _USERNAME_TTL seconds until the cache expires (or
|
|
# invalidate_user_cache fires). We invalidate on every user write.
|
|
# Missing lookups are NOT cached to avoid locking out a just-created user.
|
|
_USERNAME_TTL = 5.0
|
|
_username_cache: dict[str, tuple[dict[str, Any], float]] = {}
|
|
_username_cache_lock: Optional[asyncio.Lock] = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _reset_user_cache() -> None:
|
|
global _user_cache, _user_cache_lock, _username_cache, _username_cache_lock
|
|
_user_cache = {}
|
|
_user_cache_lock = None
|
|
_username_cache = {}
|
|
_username_cache_lock = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def invalidate_user_cache(user_uuid: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
|
|
"""Drop a single user (or all users) from the auth caches.
|
|
|
|
Callers: password change, role change, user create/delete.
|
|
The username cache is always cleared wholesale — we don't track
|
|
uuid→username and user writes are rare, so the cost is trivial.
|
|
"""
|
|
if user_uuid is None:
|
|
_user_cache.clear()
|
|
else:
|
|
_user_cache.pop(user_uuid, None)
|
|
_username_cache.clear()
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def get_user_by_username_cached(username: str) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
|
|
"""Cached read of get_user_by_username for the login path.
|
|
|
|
Positive hits are cached for _USERNAME_TTL seconds. Misses bypass
|
|
the cache so a freshly-created user can log in immediately.
|
|
"""
|
|
global _username_cache_lock
|
|
entry = _username_cache.get(username)
|
|
now = time.monotonic()
|
|
if entry is not None and now - entry[1] < _USERNAME_TTL:
|
|
return entry[0]
|
|
if _username_cache_lock is None:
|
|
_username_cache_lock = asyncio.Lock()
|
|
async with _username_cache_lock:
|
|
entry = _username_cache.get(username)
|
|
now = time.monotonic()
|
|
if entry is not None and now - entry[1] < _USERNAME_TTL:
|
|
return entry[0]
|
|
user = await repo.get_user_by_username(username)
|
|
if user is not None:
|
|
_username_cache[username] = (user, time.monotonic())
|
|
return user
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _get_user_cached(user_uuid: str) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
|
|
global _user_cache_lock
|
|
entry = _user_cache.get(user_uuid)
|
|
now = time.monotonic()
|
|
if entry is not None and now - entry[1] < _USER_TTL:
|
|
return entry[0]
|
|
if _user_cache_lock is None:
|
|
_user_cache_lock = asyncio.Lock()
|
|
async with _user_cache_lock:
|
|
entry = _user_cache.get(user_uuid)
|
|
now = time.monotonic()
|
|
if entry is not None and now - entry[1] < _USER_TTL:
|
|
return entry[0]
|
|
user = await repo.get_user_by_uuid(user_uuid)
|
|
_user_cache[user_uuid] = (user, time.monotonic())
|
|
return user
|
|
|
|
|
|
_CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION = HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
|
detail="Could not validate credentials",
|
|
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _jwt_to_uuid(token: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Decode a raw JWT string and return the user UUID, or raise 401."""
|
|
try:
|
|
payload: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[ALGORITHM])
|
|
user_uuid: Optional[str] = payload.get("uuid")
|
|
if user_uuid is None:
|
|
raise _CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION
|
|
return user_uuid
|
|
except jwt.PyJWTError:
|
|
raise _CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _bearer_from_header(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
|
|
if auth and auth.startswith("Bearer "):
|
|
return auth.split(" ", 1)[1]
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def get_stream_user(request: Request, token: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
|
|
"""Auth dependency for SSE endpoints — accepts Bearer header OR ?token= query param.
|
|
EventSource does not support custom headers, so the query-string fallback is intentional here only.
|
|
"""
|
|
resolved = _bearer_from_header(request) or token
|
|
if not resolved:
|
|
raise _CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION
|
|
return _jwt_to_uuid(resolved)
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def _decode_token(request: Request) -> str:
|
|
"""Decode and validate a Bearer JWT, returning the user UUID."""
|
|
token = _bearer_from_header(request)
|
|
if not token:
|
|
raise _CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION
|
|
return _jwt_to_uuid(token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def get_current_user(request: Request) -> str:
|
|
"""Auth dependency — enforces must_change_password."""
|
|
_user_uuid = await _decode_token(request)
|
|
_user = await _get_user_cached(_user_uuid)
|
|
if _user and _user.get("must_change_password"):
|
|
raise HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
|
detail="Password change required before accessing this resource",
|
|
)
|
|
return _user_uuid
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def get_current_user_unchecked(request: Request) -> str:
|
|
"""Auth dependency — skips must_change_password enforcement.
|
|
Use only for endpoints that must remain reachable with the flag set (e.g. change-password).
|
|
"""
|
|
return await _decode_token(request)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Role-based access control
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
def require_role(*allowed_roles: str):
|
|
"""Factory that returns a FastAPI dependency enforcing role membership.
|
|
|
|
Inlines JWT decode + user lookup + must_change_password + role check so the
|
|
user is only loaded from the DB once per request (not once in
|
|
``get_current_user`` and again here). Returns the full user dict so
|
|
endpoints can inspect ``user["uuid"]``, ``user["role"]``, etc.
|
|
"""
|
|
async def _check(request: Request) -> dict:
|
|
user_uuid = await _decode_token(request)
|
|
user = await _get_user_cached(user_uuid)
|
|
if not user:
|
|
raise HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
|
detail="Could not validate credentials",
|
|
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
|
|
)
|
|
if user.get("must_change_password"):
|
|
raise HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
|
detail="Password change required before accessing this resource",
|
|
)
|
|
if user["role"] not in allowed_roles:
|
|
raise HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
|
detail="Insufficient permissions",
|
|
)
|
|
return user
|
|
return _check
|
|
|
|
|
|
def require_stream_role(*allowed_roles: str):
|
|
"""Like ``require_role`` but for SSE endpoints that accept a query-param token."""
|
|
async def _check(request: Request, token: Optional[str] = None) -> dict:
|
|
user_uuid = await get_stream_user(request, token)
|
|
user = await _get_user_cached(user_uuid)
|
|
if not user or user["role"] not in allowed_roles:
|
|
raise HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
|
detail="Insufficient permissions",
|
|
)
|
|
return user
|
|
return _check
|
|
|
|
|
|
require_admin = require_role("admin")
|
|
require_viewer = require_role("viewer", "admin")
|
|
require_stream_viewer = require_stream_role("viewer", "admin")
|