Files
DECNET/decnet/canary/obfuscator.py
anti b26dd8f529 feat(canary): API-trashing defense — 4-layer fingerprint validation
Adds per-mint nonce gating, structural shape validation, mint UUID
consistency checks, and a per-(token, IP) rate limiter to the canary
worker so attackers who extract a canary from a decky filesystem cannot
poison fingerprint forensics by replaying or forging ?d= submissions.

Changes:

base.py
  fingerprint_nonce: Optional[str] added to CanaryArtifact so generators
  can surface the nonce to the cultivator without coupling the generator
  directly to DB code.

obfuscator.py
  nonce_for(callback_token, mint_uuid): HMAC-SHA256 keyed on
  DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET, truncated to 16 hex chars.
  FingerprintSecretMissing raised at mint time if env var is unset.
  render_fingerprint_js() now accepts nonce= and substitutes MINT_NONCE.

fingerprint_payload.js
  New MINT_NONCE placeholder. Appended as &k= on all beacon URLs (bare-open,
  single-shot, chunked). Using &k= avoids colliding with &n= (chunk total).

fingerprint_html.py / fingerprint_svg.py
  Derive nonce via nonce_for() and pass to render_fingerprint_js(). Set
  artifact.fingerprint_nonce so the cultivator can persist it.

cultivator.py
  Passes fingerprint_nonce into create_canary_token() when present on the
  artifact; NULL for all non-fingerprint generators.

canary.py (model)
  fingerprint_nonce: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, max_length=16)
  added to CanaryToken. None for non-fingerprint tokens.

worker.py
  _extract_fingerprint now returns (meta_dict, parsed_fp) tuple.
  _record_hit accepts parsed_fp + raw_nonce and runs 4 layers after
  token lookup: nonce match, shape check, mint UUID consistency, rate limit.
  Each failure sets _fp_invalid_* flag and drops structured _fp.
  Trigger row always lands regardless.

tests/canary/conftest.py
  Session-scoped autouse fixture sets DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET so
  fingerprint generator and worker tests work offline.

tests
  5 new worker HTTP tests and 2 new generator tests covering each
  validation layer.
2026-04-29 17:41:04 -04:00

178 lines
7.0 KiB
Python

"""Per-mint JS obfuscator wrapper.
Thin Python wrapper around the ``javascript-obfuscator`` Node package.
Used by the fingerprint generators / instrumenters to produce a unique,
hard-to-statically-analyse JS blob per canary mint.
Two design choices flow from the canary contract in :mod:`base`:
* **Determinism.** Generators must return byte-identical artifacts for
the same ``(callback_token, http_base, dns_zone, persona)``. We
derive a numeric seed from the callback token and pass it to the
obfuscator's own ``seed`` option, and we derive the polymorphic
config bits from the same hash so a re-mint reproduces exactly.
* **Per-mint uniqueness.** Two different callback tokens produce
structurally different output: different identifier names, different
string-array rotation, optionally different transforms enabled.
The Node helper at ``_obfuscate_helper.js`` is invoked via subprocess.
We pass code+options as JSON on stdin and read the obfuscated result
from stdout. Stderr surfaces obfuscator failures.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import subprocess # nosec B404 — Node helper exec is the whole point
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
_HELPER = Path(__file__).parent / "_obfuscate_helper.js"
_PAYLOAD = Path(__file__).parent / "fingerprint_payload.js"
# Node binary path. Honor DECNET_NODE_BIN so deployments can pin a
# specific runtime; default to PATH lookup.
_NODE_BIN = os.environ.get("DECNET_NODE_BIN", "node")
# Hard timeout for the obfuscator subprocess. Real runs on the
# fingerprint payload sit well under 5s on a dev box.
_TIMEOUT_S = 30
class ObfuscatorError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when the Node helper fails or returns empty output."""
class FingerprintSecretMissing(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when ``DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET`` is unset.
Fingerprint canaries embed a per-mint nonce derived from this
server-side secret; without it the worker cannot validate incoming
fingerprint beacons, so we fail loud at mint time rather than ship
a defeatable canary.
"""
_FINGERPRINT_SECRET_ENV = "DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET" # nosec B105 — this is an env var name, not a hardcoded password
def nonce_for(callback_token: str, mint_uuid: str) -> str:
"""Compute the per-mint fingerprint nonce.
HMAC-SHA256 keyed on the server-side master secret, message is
``callback_token + "|" + mint_uuid``. Truncated to 16 hex chars
(~64 bits of entropy) — enough to defeat slug-only forgery while
fitting comfortably into a query string.
"""
secret = os.environ.get(_FINGERPRINT_SECRET_ENV, "")
if not secret:
raise FingerprintSecretMissing(
f"{_FINGERPRINT_SECRET_ENV} is unset; fingerprint canaries cannot mint"
)
msg = f"{callback_token}|{mint_uuid}".encode("utf-8")
return hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), msg, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()[:16]
def _seed_from_token(callback_token: str) -> int:
"""Derive a 31-bit numeric seed from the callback token.
``javascript-obfuscator`` expects ``seed: number`` (int32-ish);
using a SHA-256-derived prefix gives us a uniform distribution
across the 31-bit positive range.
"""
h = hashlib.sha256(callback_token.encode("utf-8")).digest()
return int.from_bytes(h[:4], "big") & 0x7FFFFFFF
def _config_from_seed(seed: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build a deterministic, per-mint obfuscator config.
The hash bits drive *which* transforms apply — two mints get
structurally different outputs, not just different identifier names.
Defaults stay aggressive enough that reverse engineering is real
work; we never disable string-array or rename, only vary the dial.
"""
bits = seed
encodings = ("base64", "rc4")
string_array_encoding = [encodings[bits & 1]]
control_flow_threshold = 0.5 + ((bits >> 1) & 0xFF) / 512.0 # 0.5 .. ~1.0
dead_code_threshold = 0.2 + ((bits >> 9) & 0xFF) / 512.0 # 0.2 .. ~0.7
transform_object_keys = bool((bits >> 17) & 1)
numbers_to_expressions = bool((bits >> 18) & 1)
simplify = bool((bits >> 19) & 1)
return {
"compact": True,
"seed": seed,
"controlFlowFlattening": True,
"controlFlowFlatteningThreshold": round(control_flow_threshold, 3),
"deadCodeInjection": True,
"deadCodeInjectionThreshold": round(dead_code_threshold, 3),
"stringArray": True,
"stringArrayEncoding": string_array_encoding,
"stringArrayThreshold": 1,
"stringArrayRotate": True,
"stringArrayShuffle": True,
"splitStrings": True,
"splitStringsChunkLength": 4 + (bits & 7),
"transformObjectKeys": transform_object_keys,
"numbersToExpressions": numbers_to_expressions,
"simplify": simplify,
"selfDefending": False, # breaks SVG embed; not worth the cost
"renameGlobals": False,
"identifierNamesGenerator": "mangled-shuffled",
}
def obfuscate(code: str, *, callback_token: str) -> str:
"""Obfuscate *code* deterministically per *callback_token*.
Raises :class:`ObfuscatorError` if Node fails or returns empty.
"""
seed = _seed_from_token(callback_token)
options = _config_from_seed(seed)
payload = json.dumps({"code": code, "options": options})
try:
proc = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 — argv-form, no shell, fixed helper path; payload is JSON on stdin, not in argv
[_NODE_BIN, str(_HELPER)],
input=payload, capture_output=True, text=True,
timeout=_TIMEOUT_S, check=False,
)
except FileNotFoundError as e:
raise ObfuscatorError(f"node binary not found: {_NODE_BIN!r}") from e
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as e:
raise ObfuscatorError("javascript-obfuscator timed out") from e
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise ObfuscatorError(
f"javascript-obfuscator failed rc={proc.returncode} "
f"stderr={proc.stderr.strip()[:400]}"
)
out = proc.stdout
if not out.strip():
raise ObfuscatorError("javascript-obfuscator returned empty output")
return out
def render_fingerprint_js(
*, callback_token: str, http_base: str, mint_uuid: str, nonce: str,
) -> str:
"""Build the obfuscated fingerprint JS for a single mint.
Substitutes ``{{BEACON_URL}}``, ``{{MINT_UUID}}``, and
``{{MINT_NONCE}}`` in the payload template, then runs it through
:func:`obfuscate` with a seed derived from the callback token.
The nonce is appended as ``&k=`` on every beacon URL the JS emits;
the worker rejects fingerprint payloads whose ``?k=`` doesn't match
the row's :attr:`CanaryToken.fingerprint_nonce`.
"""
template = _PAYLOAD.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
beacon = f"{http_base.rstrip('/')}/c/{callback_token}"
src = (
template
.replace("{{BEACON_URL}}", beacon)
.replace("{{MINT_UUID}}", mint_uuid)
.replace("{{MINT_NONCE}}", nonce)
)
return obfuscate(src, callback_token=callback_token)