Files
DECNET/rules/ttp/R0035.yaml
anti 806301e179 feat(ttp): E.3.8 R0031-R0040 behavioral cohort
10 YAMLs for the behavioral / cross-event cohort per Appendix B:
beaconing, data destruction, ransom note, web exfil, DB mass-read,
credentials-in-files, k8s SA token harvest, Docker host escape,
LLMNR poisoning, TFTP router-config retrieval.

Every rule is lifter-bound (BehavioralLifter / IdentityLifter) —
the v0 RuleEngine cannot count, aggregate, or compose cross-event
signals, so these YAMLs declare the technique mappings the lifter
will consume by rule_id at E.3.9. Their match specs use a
'kind: lifter:*' shape inert to the regex matcher.

test_behavioral_rules.py asserts each YAML compiles, none fire
from the v0 engine (FP regression guard against a YAML drifting
into a regex), and an xfail(strict=True, reason='impl phase E.3.9')
precision case that will flip green when the lifter lands.
2026-05-01 09:18:27 -04:00

22 lines
438 B
YAML

rule_id: R0035
rule_version: 1
name: db_mass_read
description: |
SELECT/COPY/RETR pulling many rows or whole tables from a DB
honeypot. BehavioralLifter (E.3.9) reads the per-session
query-byte aggregate.
applies_to:
- session
match:
kind: lifter:db_mass_read
min_rows: 10000
min_bytes: 5242880
emits:
- tactic: TA0009
technique_id: T1213
confidence: 0.85
evidence_fields:
- service
- rows_read
- bytes_read