anti
806301e179
10 YAMLs for the behavioral / cross-event cohort per Appendix B: beaconing, data destruction, ransom note, web exfil, DB mass-read, credentials-in-files, k8s SA token harvest, Docker host escape, LLMNR poisoning, TFTP router-config retrieval. Every rule is lifter-bound (BehavioralLifter / IdentityLifter) — the v0 RuleEngine cannot count, aggregate, or compose cross-event signals, so these YAMLs declare the technique mappings the lifter will consume by rule_id at E.3.9. Their match specs use a 'kind: lifter:*' shape inert to the regex matcher. test_behavioral_rules.py asserts each YAML compiles, none fire from the v0 engine (FP regression guard against a YAML drifting into a regex), and an xfail(strict=True, reason='impl phase E.3.9') precision case that will flip green when the lifter lands.
27 lines
576 B
YAML
27 lines
576 B
YAML
rule_id: R0033
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rule_version: 1
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name: ransom_note_pattern
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description: |
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Bitcoin/Monero address + payment-demand language inserted into a
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honeydoc, mail body, or DB collection. EmailLifter (R0033 fires
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from email_body too) and BehavioralLifter share the same rule_id.
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applies_to:
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- session
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- email
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match:
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kind: lifter:ransom_note
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require_btc_or_xmr: true
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payment_keywords:
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- bitcoin
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- btc
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- monero
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- ransom
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- decrypt
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emits:
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- tactic: TA0040
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technique_id: T1486
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confidence: 0.9
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evidence_fields:
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- btc_address
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- matched_keywords
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