anti
b1fe1f9403
30 YAMLs for the shell/command rule cohort per Appendix B (rules/ttp/). Splits into engine-active (R0007-R0029, regex on command_text / raw_url / user_agent) and lifter-bound (R0001-R0006, R0030 — the v0 RuleEngine cannot count auth attempts, do identity rollups, or parse fingerprint blobs; the BehavioralLifter / IdentityLifter / CredentialLifter consume them by rule_id at E.3.9 / E.3.13). test_command_rules.py asserts: - every R000N has a YAML that compiles - lifter-bound rules NEVER fire from the v0 engine (regression guard against a YAML drifting into a regex match.spec) - engine-active rules meet their Appendix-C precision target against the seed corpus (≥0.95 high-conf, ≥0.80 medium) Conftest fixes: precision_engine moved to module-scope so module- scope precomputed dispatch fixture (fired_by_label) can request it; _RULES_DIR path bumped from parents[2] to parents[3] so the loader resolves the project root regardless of pytest cwd; make_event synthesizes attacker_uuid so TTPTag's anchor invariant is satisfied. Seed corpus broadened: positive examples for every regex rule plus 6 negative examples across innocuous shell verbs (ls, echo, cd, ps, df, free) so FPs surface in precision rather than passing vacuously.
25 lines
674 B
YAML
25 lines
674 B
YAML
rule_id: R0007
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rule_version: 1
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name: sqlmap_user_agent
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description: |
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sqlmap's default User-Agent header. Triggers on the raw URL
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payload because the v0 engine's http_request default field is
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raw_url; we override to user_agent. Same matcher catches nikto,
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nmap-scripts, and other auto-tooling that brands itself in UA.
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applies_to:
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- http_request
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match:
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field: user_agent
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pattern: '(?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|w3af|acunetix|nessus|openvas|wpscan|dirbuster)\b'
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emits:
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- tactic: TA0001
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technique_id: T1190
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confidence: 0.9
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- tactic: TA0043
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technique_id: T1595
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sub_technique_id: T1595.002
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confidence: 0.9
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evidence_fields:
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- user_agent
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- raw_url
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