Files
DECNET/decnet/templates/postgres/server.py
anti 6b16c844b6 fix(creds): MQTT regression + secret_kind for hash credentials
Honest correction to the "every cred-emitting service" claim. Audit
of templates/* found three gaps:

1. MQTT — was working through the legacy adapter, silently dropped
   when Phase 3 (e696c2b) deleted it. Now migrated to encode_secret()
   alongside the others.
2. Postgres — `auth, pw_hash=…` event captures the MD5
   challenge-response the attacker sent. Plaintext irrecoverable, so
   it never fit the (principal, secret_b64=raw_bytes) shape. Lands
   in Credential as secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge".
3. VNC — `auth_response, response=…hex` event captures the 16-byte
   DES-encrypted challenge. Same situation as Postgres: plaintext
   irrecoverable. Lands as secret_kind="vnc_des_response".

Adds a `secret_kind` discriminator column to Credential (default
"plaintext", indexed). The dedup tuple gains secret_kind so two
credentials with the same sha256 but different kinds are
fundamentally different rows — different challenges produce
different bytes for the same plaintext password, so cross-kind
reuse matches are meaningless and would only confuse analytics.

The model now genuinely covers every cred-emitting service in the
fleet:

  plaintext        SSH, Telnet, FTP, POP3, IMAP, SMTP, Redis, LDAP,
                   MQTT
  postgres_md5_*   Postgres
  vnc_des_response VNC

Username-only services (MySQL/MSSQL — TDS pre-encryption captures
the user but never sees the password byte) intentionally don't feed
Credential — they're recon signals, not cred attempts.

40 tests pass in the touched scope. New cases: secret_kind dedups
independently in the repo; Postgres MD5 + VNC DES emitters thread
through; MQTT round-trips through the native branch.
2026-04-25 06:16:57 -04:00

182 lines
6.7 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PostgreSQLserver.
Reads the startup message, extracts username and database, responds with
an AuthenticationMD5Password challenge, logs the hash sent back, then
returns an error. Logs all interactions as JSON.
"""
import asyncio
import os
import struct
import instance_seed as _seed
import base64 as _base64
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "pgserver")
SERVICE_NAME = "postgres"
LOG_TARGET = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "")
PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "5432"))
# Per-instance list of "existing" databases. A real server knows which dbs
# it hosts and returns SQLSTATE 3D000 "database does not exist" for anything
# else — refusing with "password authentication failed" for every single
# probe is a strong honeypot signal.
_BASE_DBS = {"postgres", "template0", "template1"}
_APP_DB_CHOICES = [
["app", "app_prod"],
["webapp", "sessions"],
["erp", "erp_hist"],
["django", "django_cache"],
["rails_production"],
["wordpress"],
["gitlabhq_production"],
["metrics", "grafana"],
]
_DATABASES = _BASE_DBS | set(_seed.pick(_APP_DB_CHOICES))
def _error_response(severity: str, sqlstate: str, message: str) -> bytes:
"""Wire-level PG ErrorResponse. Fields: S (localized severity), V
(non-localized severity, PG 9.6+), C (SQLSTATE), M (message)."""
body = (
b"S" + severity.encode() + b"\x00"
+ b"V" + severity.encode() + b"\x00"
+ b"C" + sqlstate.encode() + b"\x00"
+ b"M" + message.encode() + b"\x00"
+ b"\x00"
)
return b"E" + struct.pack(">I", len(body) + 4) + body
def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
line = syslog_line(SERVICE_NAME, NODE_NAME, event_type, severity, **kwargs)
write_syslog_file(line)
forward_syslog(line, LOG_TARGET)
class PostgresProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
def __init__(self):
self._transport = None
self._peer = None
self._buf = b""
self._state = "startup"
def connection_made(self, transport):
self._transport = transport
self._peer = transport.get_extra_info("peername", ("?", 0))
_log("connect", src=self._peer[0], src_port=self._peer[1])
def data_received(self, data):
self._buf += data
self._process()
def _process(self):
if self._state == "startup":
if len(self._buf) < 4:
return
msg_len = struct.unpack(">I", self._buf[:4])[0]
if msg_len < 8 or msg_len > 10_000:
self._transport.close()
self._buf = b""
return
if len(self._buf) < msg_len:
return
msg = self._buf[:msg_len]
self._buf = self._buf[msg_len:]
self._handle_startup(msg)
elif self._state == "auth":
if len(self._buf) < 5:
return
msg_type = chr(self._buf[0])
msg_len = struct.unpack(">I", self._buf[1:5])[0]
if msg_len < 4 or msg_len > 10_000:
self._transport.close()
self._buf = b""
return
if len(self._buf) < msg_len + 1:
return
payload = self._buf[5:msg_len + 1]
self._buf = self._buf[msg_len + 1:]
if msg_type == "p":
self._handle_password(payload)
def _handle_startup(self, msg: bytes):
# Startup message: length(4) + protocol_version(4) + params (key=value\0 pairs)
if len(msg) < 8:
return
proto = struct.unpack(">I", msg[4:8])[0]
if proto == 80877103: # SSL request
self._transport.write(b"N") # reject SSL
return
params_raw = msg[8:].split(b"\x00")
params = {}
for i in range(0, len(params_raw) - 1, 2):
k = params_raw[i].decode(errors="replace")
v = params_raw[i + 1].decode(errors="replace") if i + 1 < len(params_raw) else ""
if k:
params[k] = v
username = params.get("user", "")
database = params.get("database", "") or username
self._username = username
self._database = database
_log("startup", src=self._peer[0], username=username, database=database)
# If the requested DB doesn't exist on this instance, real Postgres
# rejects *before* asking for a password. Short-circuit so the decoy
# matches that behavior and exposes the per-decky DB list.
if database and database not in _DATABASES:
msg = f'database "{database}" does not exist'
self._transport.write(_error_response("FATAL", "3D000", msg))
self._transport.close()
return
self._state = "auth"
salt = os.urandom(4)
auth_md5 = b"R" + struct.pack(">I", 12) + struct.pack(">I", 5) + salt
self._transport.write(auth_md5)
def _handle_password(self, payload: bytes):
# Postgres MD5 challenge-response: the wire form is the literal
# ASCII string "md5" + 32 hex chars (md5(md5(pw+user)+salt)).
# Plaintext is unrecoverable, so we land this in the Credential
# table as secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge" — secret_b64
# carries the raw hash bytes (after stripping the "md5" prefix
# and hex-decoding) for content-addressable reuse within-kind.
pw_hash = payload.rstrip(b"\x00").decode(errors="replace")
_hex = pw_hash[3:] if pw_hash.startswith("md5") else pw_hash
try:
_raw = bytes.fromhex(_hex)
except ValueError:
_raw = _hex.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
_b64 = _base64.b64encode(_raw).decode("ascii")
_user = getattr(self, "_username", "")
_log("auth", src=self._peer[0],
username=_user, principal=_user,
database=getattr(self, "_database", ""),
pw_hash=pw_hash,
secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge",
secret_printable=pw_hash,
secret_b64=_b64)
user = getattr(self, "_username", "")
msg = f'password authentication failed for user "{user}"'
_seed.jitter_sync(20, 90)
self._transport.write(_error_response("FATAL", "28P01", msg))
self._transport.close()
def connection_lost(self, exc):
_log("disconnect", src=self._peer[0] if self._peer else "?")
async def main():
_log("startup", msg=f"PostgreSQL server starting as {NODE_NAME}")
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
server = await loop.create_server(PostgresProtocol, "0.0.0.0", PORT) # nosec B104
async with server:
await server.serve_forever()
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())