anti
806301e179
10 YAMLs for the behavioral / cross-event cohort per Appendix B: beaconing, data destruction, ransom note, web exfil, DB mass-read, credentials-in-files, k8s SA token harvest, Docker host escape, LLMNR poisoning, TFTP router-config retrieval. Every rule is lifter-bound (BehavioralLifter / IdentityLifter) — the v0 RuleEngine cannot count, aggregate, or compose cross-event signals, so these YAMLs declare the technique mappings the lifter will consume by rule_id at E.3.9. Their match specs use a 'kind: lifter:*' shape inert to the regex matcher. test_behavioral_rules.py asserts each YAML compiles, none fire from the v0 engine (FP regression guard against a YAML drifting into a regex), and an xfail(strict=True, reason='impl phase E.3.9') precision case that will flip green when the lifter lands.
24 lines
537 B
YAML
24 lines
537 B
YAML
rule_id: R0038
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rule_version: 1
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name: docker_host_escape
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description: |
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Privileged container creation or bind-mount of host /, /etc, or
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/var/run/docker.sock — host-escape primitive. Lifter inspects
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the structured Docker-API event payload.
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applies_to:
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- session
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match:
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kind: lifter:docker_escape
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signals:
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- 'privileged:true'
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- 'bind:/:/'
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- 'bind:/etc'
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- 'bind:/var/run/docker.sock'
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emits:
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- tactic: TA0004
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technique_id: T1611
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confidence: 0.95
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evidence_fields:
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- matched_signal
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- container_image
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