anti
806301e179
10 YAMLs for the behavioral / cross-event cohort per Appendix B: beaconing, data destruction, ransom note, web exfil, DB mass-read, credentials-in-files, k8s SA token harvest, Docker host escape, LLMNR poisoning, TFTP router-config retrieval. Every rule is lifter-bound (BehavioralLifter / IdentityLifter) — the v0 RuleEngine cannot count, aggregate, or compose cross-event signals, so these YAMLs declare the technique mappings the lifter will consume by rule_id at E.3.9. Their match specs use a 'kind: lifter:*' shape inert to the regex matcher. test_behavioral_rules.py asserts each YAML compiles, none fire from the v0 engine (FP regression guard against a YAML drifting into a regex), and an xfail(strict=True, reason='impl phase E.3.9') precision case that will flip green when the lifter lands.
23 lines
522 B
YAML
23 lines
522 B
YAML
rule_id: R0037
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rule_version: 1
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name: k8s_service_account_token
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description: |
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Reading /api/v1/namespaces/*/secrets or /var/run/secrets/k8s.io/
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serviceaccount/token — kube SA harvest.
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applies_to:
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- session
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- http_request
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match:
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kind: lifter:k8s_sa_token
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paths:
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- '/api/v1/namespaces/[^/]+/secrets'
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- '/var/run/secrets/kubernetes\\.io/serviceaccount'
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emits:
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- tactic: TA0006
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technique_id: T1552
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sub_technique_id: T1552.007
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confidence: 0.95
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evidence_fields:
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- matched_path
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- namespace
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