Files
DECNET/tests/core/test_env_secrets.py
anti 337520c7ad fix(security): close INFO ASVS findings — secret echo, TLS floor, mandatory tarball SHA, CORS/Content-Type guards, BUG-17
- V7.1.3: env known-insecure-default error no longer echoes the rejected secret value.
- V9.1.4: syslog-over-TLS forwarder + listener pin minimum_version=TLSv1_2.
- V12.1.2: updater tarball SHA-256 verification is now mandatory and fail-closed —
  /update and /update-self reject a missing digest (400), the executor rejects
  missing/mismatched digests before extract/apply. Every push path supplies it.
- V13.1.4: reject a wildcard '*' in DECNET_CORS_ORIGINS at startup.
- V13.1.5: enforce application/json on JSON write endpoints (415 otherwise),
  exempting multipart upload routes.
- BUG-17: SSE error log records the user uuid, not the resume cursor.

Also completes V2.1.7 consistently: the attacker-injectable PYTEST* env bypass is
replaced with explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 in the three remaining sites
(env.validate_public_binding, config logging, mysql url builder).

Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review (no update-outage risk —
all push paths verified to send the digest).
2026-06-10 13:50:06 -04:00

102 lines
4.1 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
"""Fail-closed validation of security-sensitive env secrets (env._require_env).
DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD must never silently default to "admin": it is resolved
lazily and validated like DECNET_JWT_SECRET. These tests drive _require_env
against a controlled environ so the production raise paths (which are bypassed
under the test harness via DECNET_TESTING=1) are actually exercised.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
import decnet.env as envmod
def _require(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, environ: dict[str, str]) -> str:
# Replace the whole environ for the call so the DECNET_TESTING short-circuit
# in _require_env doesn't fire — we want the real production behaviour.
monkeypatch.setattr(envmod.os, "environ", dict(environ))
return envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
def test_admin_password_unset_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not set"):
_require(monkeypatch, {})
def test_admin_password_known_bad_default_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="insecure default"):
_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin"})
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["secret", "password", "changeme", "ADMIN"])
def test_admin_password_other_known_bad_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, bad: str) -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="insecure default"):
_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": bad})
def test_known_bad_message_does_not_leak_secret_value(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
# V7.1.3: the known-bad rejection must NOT echo the rejected secret value
# (it would land in logs / stderr / crash reporters). Name the variable,
# not its value.
secret = "admin"
with pytest.raises(ValueError) as exc:
_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": secret})
msg = str(exc.value)
assert secret not in msg
assert "DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD" in msg
def test_admin_password_too_short_raises_in_production(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too short"):
_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "short1"})
def test_admin_password_short_allowed_in_developer_mode(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
val = _require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "short1", "DECNET_DEVELOPER": "true"})
assert val == "short1"
def test_admin_password_strong_value_passes(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
val = _require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "a-strong-unique-password"})
assert val == "a-strong-unique-password"
def test_testing_flag_short_circuit_returns_value_unchecked() -> None:
# Under the test harness (DECNET_TESTING=1, set in conftest), _require_env
# returns the configured value without the production checks — documents
# why the dev loop is safe. conftest sets a strong value, so this also
# proves lazy resolution works.
assert envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD") == "test-password-123"
def test_pytest_var_leak_does_not_bypass_validation(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
# V2.1.7 regression: a leaked PYTEST_* env var must NOT disable strength
# validation. With DECNET_TESTING unset, a known-bad / short secret is
# still rejected even though a PYTEST_* var is present.
monkeypatch.setattr(
envmod.os,
"environ",
{"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": "x", "DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin"},
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
monkeypatch.setattr(
envmod.os,
"environ",
{"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": "x", "DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "short1"},
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
def test_lazy_getattr_resolves_admin_password() -> None:
# Accessing the attribute (not a module global anymore) routes through
# __getattr__ -> _require_env.
assert envmod.DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD == "test-password-123"
with pytest.raises(AttributeError):
envmod.NOT_A_REAL_SECRET # noqa: B018