Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5): - env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env; gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest). - must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint. - GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size). - CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating. Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16): - Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed, ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'. - Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError). Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2): - Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop, blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0. Correctness (BUG-12..16): - BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry, consistent principal_key canonicalization). - BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop). - BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick). - BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise. - BUG-16 see above. Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk + documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
271 lines
10 KiB
Python
271 lines
10 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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"""Credential model + repo tests — upsert, dedup, cross-service reuse."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from decnet.web.db.factory import get_repository
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from decnet.web.db.models import Credential
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@pytest.fixture
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async def repo(tmp_path: Path):
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r = get_repository(db_path=str(tmp_path / "creds.db"))
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await r.initialize()
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return r
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def _sha256(s: str) -> str:
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return hashlib.sha256(s.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_upsert_inserts_then_dedups(repo) -> None:
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"""Same dedup tuple twice → one row, attempt_count=2."""
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payload = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"decky_name": "decky-01",
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"service": "ssh",
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"principal": "root",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"secret_printable": "hunter2",
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"fields": {"user": "root"},
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}
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rid_a = await repo.upsert_credential(payload)
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rid_b = await repo.upsert_credential(payload)
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assert rid_a == rid_b
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 1
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assert rows[0]["attempt_count"] == 2
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assert rows[0]["fields"] == {"user": "root"} # preserved
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_different_principal_creates_new_row(repo) -> None:
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base = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"decky_name": "decky-01",
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"service": "ssh",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"secret_printable": "hunter2",
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"fields": {},
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}
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": "root"})
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": "admin"})
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 2
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_null_principal_dedups_independently(repo) -> None:
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"""principal=None and principal='root' are different keys."""
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base = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"decky_name": "decky-01",
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"service": "ssh",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"secret_printable": "hunter2",
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"fields": {},
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}
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": None})
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": None}) # dedupes
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": "root"})
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 2
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null_row = next(r for r in rows if r["principal"] is None)
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assert null_row["attempt_count"] == 2
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_cross_service_reuse_query(repo) -> None:
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"""Same secret across SSH + FTP + SMTP → reuse query returns all three."""
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secret = "hunter2"
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sha = _sha256(secret)
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services = [
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("ssh", "decky-01", "root"),
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("ftp", "decky-02", "anonymous"),
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("smtp", "decky-03", "acme.com"),
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]
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for svc, decky, principal in services:
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await repo.upsert_credential({
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"decky_name": decky,
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"service": svc,
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"principal": principal,
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"secret_sha256": sha,
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"secret_printable": secret,
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"fields": {},
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})
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reuse = await repo.get_credential_attempts_for_secret(sha)
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assert {r["service"] for r in reuse} == {"ssh", "ftp", "smtp"}
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_get_credentials_for_attacker(repo) -> None:
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base = {
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"decky_name": "decky-01",
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"service": "ssh",
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"principal": "root",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"secret_printable": "hunter2",
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"fields": {},
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}
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5"})
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "attacker_ip": "10.0.0.6"})
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rows = await repo.get_credentials_for_attacker("10.0.0.5")
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assert len(rows) == 1
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assert rows[0]["attacker_ip"] == "10.0.0.5"
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_secret_kind_dedups_independently(repo) -> None:
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"""Same sha256, same principal — different secret_kind = different row.
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Two rows with the same content-addressable hash but different kinds
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represent fundamentally different credentials (e.g. a plaintext
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password that happens to hash to the same value as a Postgres
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md5 challenge response is statistically impossible but semantically
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distinct anyway). Dedup must respect the kind boundary."""
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base = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5",
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"decky_name": "decky-01",
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"service": "ssh",
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"principal": "root",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"fields": {},
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}
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "secret_kind": "plaintext"})
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await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "secret_kind": "postgres_md5_challenge"})
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 2
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kinds = {r["secret_kind"] for r in rows}
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assert kinds == {"plaintext", "postgres_md5_challenge"}
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_filters(repo) -> None:
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base_secret = _sha256("a")
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await repo.upsert_credential({
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5", "decky_name": "decky-01", "service": "ssh",
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"principal": "root", "secret_sha256": base_secret,
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"secret_printable": "a", "fields": {},
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})
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await repo.upsert_credential({
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.5", "decky_name": "decky-01", "service": "ftp",
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"principal": "root", "secret_sha256": base_secret,
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"secret_printable": "a", "fields": {},
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})
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rows = await repo.get_credentials(service="ssh")
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assert len(rows) == 1 and rows[0]["service"] == "ssh"
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assert await repo.get_total_credentials(service="ssh") == 1
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assert await repo.get_total_credentials() == 2
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_concurrent_upsert_hits_integrity_retry_branch(
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repo, monkeypatch
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) -> None:
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"""BUG-12 regression: deterministically exercise the IntegrityError
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retry branch in ``upsert_credential``.
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The prior asyncio.gather test proved nothing — aiosqlite serializes
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both calls through one worker thread, so the second's dedup SELECT
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runs only AFTER the first commits and takes the 'existing is not None'
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fast path. The except-IntegrityError handler NEVER executed; the test
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passed with or without the fix.
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Here we force the race deterministically: the first upsert creates the
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row normally. For the second upsert we monkeypatch the module-level
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``select`` so its FIRST call (the dedup SELECT) yields a statement that
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matches NOTHING — simulating two callers who both saw 'not found'. The
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second upsert then attempts an INSERT that hits the UNIQUE constraint
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→ IntegrityError → rollback → re-SELECT (a fresh, un-poisoned ``select``
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call) finds the winner row → returns its id + increments attempt_count.
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Red-before/green-after: if the ``except IntegrityError`` handler is
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removed, the IntegrityError propagates out of the second upsert and
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this test fails (raises instead of returning a matching id).
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"""
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from decnet.web.db.sqlmodel_repo.credentials import _core
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payload = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.99",
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"decky_name": "decky-concurrent",
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"service": "ssh",
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"principal": "root",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("racepassword"),
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"secret_b64": "cmFjZXBhc3N3b3Jk",
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"secret_printable": "racepassword",
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"fields": {},
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}
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# First upsert: lands the row normally.
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id_a = await repo.upsert_credential(payload)
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# Poison ONLY the first select() call of the next upsert so the dedup
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# SELECT matches nothing (the simulated race). All later select() calls
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# — including the post-IntegrityError re-SELECT — behave normally.
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real_select = _core.select
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calls = {"n": 0}
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def _poisoned_select(*args, **kwargs):
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stmt = real_select(*args, **kwargs)
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calls["n"] += 1
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if calls["n"] == 1:
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# Append an always-false predicate so the dedup SELECT returns
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# None even though the row exists → forces the INSERT path.
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stmt = stmt.where(Credential.id == -1)
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return stmt
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monkeypatch.setattr(_core, "select", _poisoned_select)
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# Second upsert: dedup SELECT misses → INSERT → IntegrityError → retry.
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id_b = await repo.upsert_credential(payload)
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monkeypatch.undo()
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assert id_a == id_b, "retry branch must return the existing winner's id"
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 1, f"expected 1 row, got {len(rows)} (duplicate inserts)"
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assert rows[0]["attempt_count"] == 2, (
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"retry branch must increment attempt_count on the winner row"
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)
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_none_and_empty_principal_canonicalize_to_one_row(repo) -> None:
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"""BUG-12 canonicalization: principal=None and principal='' canonicalize
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to the SAME principal_key ('') and, with an otherwise-identical dedup
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tuple, must dedup to ONE row — not crash on the UNIQUE constraint.
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Before the fix the dedup SELECT distinguished None from '' (it branched
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on ``is_(None)`` vs ``== principal``) while the constraint keyed on
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principal_key='' for both → the second upsert's SELECT missed, the
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INSERT collided, and the re-SELECT used the wrong (mismatched) filter
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→ re-raise / crash. Now SELECT and constraint agree on principal_key.
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"""
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base = {
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"attacker_ip": "10.0.0.7",
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"decky_name": "decky-canon",
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"service": "ssh",
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"secret_sha256": _sha256("hunter2"),
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"secret_b64": "aHVudGVyMg==",
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"secret_printable": "hunter2",
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"fields": {},
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}
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id_none = await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": None})
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id_empty = await repo.upsert_credential({**base, "principal": ""})
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assert id_none == id_empty, "None and '' must dedup to the same row"
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rows = await repo.get_credentials()
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assert len(rows) == 1, f"expected 1 row, got {len(rows)}"
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assert rows[0]["attempt_count"] == 2
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