Adds per-mint nonce gating, structural shape validation, mint UUID consistency checks, and a per-(token, IP) rate limiter to the canary worker so attackers who extract a canary from a decky filesystem cannot poison fingerprint forensics by replaying or forging ?d= submissions. Changes: base.py fingerprint_nonce: Optional[str] added to CanaryArtifact so generators can surface the nonce to the cultivator without coupling the generator directly to DB code. obfuscator.py nonce_for(callback_token, mint_uuid): HMAC-SHA256 keyed on DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET, truncated to 16 hex chars. FingerprintSecretMissing raised at mint time if env var is unset. render_fingerprint_js() now accepts nonce= and substitutes MINT_NONCE. fingerprint_payload.js New MINT_NONCE placeholder. Appended as &k= on all beacon URLs (bare-open, single-shot, chunked). Using &k= avoids colliding with &n= (chunk total). fingerprint_html.py / fingerprint_svg.py Derive nonce via nonce_for() and pass to render_fingerprint_js(). Set artifact.fingerprint_nonce so the cultivator can persist it. cultivator.py Passes fingerprint_nonce into create_canary_token() when present on the artifact; NULL for all non-fingerprint generators. canary.py (model) fingerprint_nonce: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, max_length=16) added to CanaryToken. None for non-fingerprint tokens. worker.py _extract_fingerprint now returns (meta_dict, parsed_fp) tuple. _record_hit accepts parsed_fp + raw_nonce and runs 4 layers after token lookup: nonce match, shape check, mint UUID consistency, rate limit. Each failure sets _fp_invalid_* flag and drops structured _fp. Trigger row always lands regardless. tests/canary/conftest.py Session-scoped autouse fixture sets DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET so fingerprint generator and worker tests work offline. tests 5 new worker HTTP tests and 2 new generator tests covering each validation layer.
178 lines
7.0 KiB
Python
178 lines
7.0 KiB
Python
"""Per-mint JS obfuscator wrapper.
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Thin Python wrapper around the ``javascript-obfuscator`` Node package.
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Used by the fingerprint generators / instrumenters to produce a unique,
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hard-to-statically-analyse JS blob per canary mint.
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Two design choices flow from the canary contract in :mod:`base`:
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* **Determinism.** Generators must return byte-identical artifacts for
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the same ``(callback_token, http_base, dns_zone, persona)``. We
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derive a numeric seed from the callback token and pass it to the
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obfuscator's own ``seed`` option, and we derive the polymorphic
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config bits from the same hash so a re-mint reproduces exactly.
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* **Per-mint uniqueness.** Two different callback tokens produce
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structurally different output: different identifier names, different
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string-array rotation, optionally different transforms enabled.
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The Node helper at ``_obfuscate_helper.js`` is invoked via subprocess.
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We pass code+options as JSON on stdin and read the obfuscated result
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from stdout. Stderr surfaces obfuscator failures.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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import os
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import subprocess # nosec B404 — Node helper exec is the whole point
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any
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_HELPER = Path(__file__).parent / "_obfuscate_helper.js"
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_PAYLOAD = Path(__file__).parent / "fingerprint_payload.js"
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# Node binary path. Honor DECNET_NODE_BIN so deployments can pin a
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# specific runtime; default to PATH lookup.
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_NODE_BIN = os.environ.get("DECNET_NODE_BIN", "node")
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# Hard timeout for the obfuscator subprocess. Real runs on the
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# fingerprint payload sit well under 5s on a dev box.
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_TIMEOUT_S = 30
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class ObfuscatorError(RuntimeError):
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"""Raised when the Node helper fails or returns empty output."""
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class FingerprintSecretMissing(RuntimeError):
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"""Raised when ``DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET`` is unset.
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Fingerprint canaries embed a per-mint nonce derived from this
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server-side secret; without it the worker cannot validate incoming
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fingerprint beacons, so we fail loud at mint time rather than ship
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a defeatable canary.
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"""
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_FINGERPRINT_SECRET_ENV = "DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET" # nosec B105 — this is an env var name, not a hardcoded password
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def nonce_for(callback_token: str, mint_uuid: str) -> str:
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"""Compute the per-mint fingerprint nonce.
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HMAC-SHA256 keyed on the server-side master secret, message is
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``callback_token + "|" + mint_uuid``. Truncated to 16 hex chars
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(~64 bits of entropy) — enough to defeat slug-only forgery while
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fitting comfortably into a query string.
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"""
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secret = os.environ.get(_FINGERPRINT_SECRET_ENV, "")
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if not secret:
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raise FingerprintSecretMissing(
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f"{_FINGERPRINT_SECRET_ENV} is unset; fingerprint canaries cannot mint"
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)
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msg = f"{callback_token}|{mint_uuid}".encode("utf-8")
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return hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), msg, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()[:16]
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def _seed_from_token(callback_token: str) -> int:
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"""Derive a 31-bit numeric seed from the callback token.
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``javascript-obfuscator`` expects ``seed: number`` (int32-ish);
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using a SHA-256-derived prefix gives us a uniform distribution
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across the 31-bit positive range.
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"""
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h = hashlib.sha256(callback_token.encode("utf-8")).digest()
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return int.from_bytes(h[:4], "big") & 0x7FFFFFFF
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def _config_from_seed(seed: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Build a deterministic, per-mint obfuscator config.
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The hash bits drive *which* transforms apply — two mints get
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structurally different outputs, not just different identifier names.
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Defaults stay aggressive enough that reverse engineering is real
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work; we never disable string-array or rename, only vary the dial.
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"""
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bits = seed
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encodings = ("base64", "rc4")
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string_array_encoding = [encodings[bits & 1]]
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control_flow_threshold = 0.5 + ((bits >> 1) & 0xFF) / 512.0 # 0.5 .. ~1.0
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dead_code_threshold = 0.2 + ((bits >> 9) & 0xFF) / 512.0 # 0.2 .. ~0.7
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transform_object_keys = bool((bits >> 17) & 1)
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numbers_to_expressions = bool((bits >> 18) & 1)
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simplify = bool((bits >> 19) & 1)
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return {
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"compact": True,
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"seed": seed,
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"controlFlowFlattening": True,
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"controlFlowFlatteningThreshold": round(control_flow_threshold, 3),
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"deadCodeInjection": True,
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"deadCodeInjectionThreshold": round(dead_code_threshold, 3),
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"stringArray": True,
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"stringArrayEncoding": string_array_encoding,
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"stringArrayThreshold": 1,
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"stringArrayRotate": True,
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"stringArrayShuffle": True,
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"splitStrings": True,
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"splitStringsChunkLength": 4 + (bits & 7),
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"transformObjectKeys": transform_object_keys,
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"numbersToExpressions": numbers_to_expressions,
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"simplify": simplify,
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"selfDefending": False, # breaks SVG embed; not worth the cost
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"renameGlobals": False,
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"identifierNamesGenerator": "mangled-shuffled",
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}
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def obfuscate(code: str, *, callback_token: str) -> str:
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"""Obfuscate *code* deterministically per *callback_token*.
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Raises :class:`ObfuscatorError` if Node fails or returns empty.
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"""
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seed = _seed_from_token(callback_token)
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options = _config_from_seed(seed)
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payload = json.dumps({"code": code, "options": options})
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try:
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proc = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 — argv-form, no shell, fixed helper path; payload is JSON on stdin, not in argv
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[_NODE_BIN, str(_HELPER)],
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input=payload, capture_output=True, text=True,
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timeout=_TIMEOUT_S, check=False,
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)
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except FileNotFoundError as e:
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raise ObfuscatorError(f"node binary not found: {_NODE_BIN!r}") from e
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except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as e:
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raise ObfuscatorError("javascript-obfuscator timed out") from e
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if proc.returncode != 0:
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raise ObfuscatorError(
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f"javascript-obfuscator failed rc={proc.returncode} "
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f"stderr={proc.stderr.strip()[:400]}"
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)
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out = proc.stdout
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if not out.strip():
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raise ObfuscatorError("javascript-obfuscator returned empty output")
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return out
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def render_fingerprint_js(
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*, callback_token: str, http_base: str, mint_uuid: str, nonce: str,
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) -> str:
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"""Build the obfuscated fingerprint JS for a single mint.
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Substitutes ``{{BEACON_URL}}``, ``{{MINT_UUID}}``, and
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``{{MINT_NONCE}}`` in the payload template, then runs it through
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:func:`obfuscate` with a seed derived from the callback token.
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The nonce is appended as ``&k=`` on every beacon URL the JS emits;
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the worker rejects fingerprint payloads whose ``?k=`` doesn't match
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the row's :attr:`CanaryToken.fingerprint_nonce`.
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"""
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template = _PAYLOAD.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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beacon = f"{http_base.rstrip('/')}/c/{callback_token}"
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src = (
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template
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.replace("{{BEACON_URL}}", beacon)
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.replace("{{MINT_UUID}}", mint_uuid)
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.replace("{{MINT_NONCE}}", nonce)
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)
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return obfuscate(src, callback_token=callback_token)
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