371 lines
13 KiB
Python
371 lines
13 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Shared RFC 5424 syslog helper used by service containers.
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Services call syslog_line() to format an RFC 5424 message, then
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write_syslog_file() to emit it to stdout — the container runtime
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captures it, and the host-side collector streams it into the log file.
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RFC 5424 structure:
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<PRI>1 TIMESTAMP HOSTNAME APP-NAME PROCID MSGID [SD-ELEMENT] MSG
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Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
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"""
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import base64
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import binascii
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import hashlib as _hashlib
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import json as _json
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import re
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import socket as _socket
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import threading as _threading
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Any, Optional
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# ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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_FACILITY_LOCAL0 = 16
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_SD_ID = "relay@55555"
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_NILVALUE = "-"
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SEVERITY_EMERG = 0
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SEVERITY_ALERT = 1
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SEVERITY_CRIT = 2
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SEVERITY_ERROR = 3
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SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
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SEVERITY_NOTICE = 5
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SEVERITY_INFO = 6
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SEVERITY_DEBUG = 7
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_MAX_HOSTNAME = 255
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_MAX_APPNAME = 48
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_MAX_MSGID = 32
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# ─── Formatter ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def _sd_escape(value: str) -> str:
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"""Escape SD-PARAM-VALUE per RFC 5424 §6.3.3."""
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return value.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"').replace("]", "\\]")
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def _sd_element(fields: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
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if not fields:
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return _NILVALUE
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params = " ".join(f'{k}="{_sd_escape(str(v))}"' for k, v in fields.items())
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return f"[{_SD_ID} {params}]"
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def syslog_line(
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service: str,
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hostname: str,
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event_type: str,
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severity: int = SEVERITY_INFO,
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timestamp: datetime | None = None,
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msg: str | None = None,
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**fields: Any,
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) -> str:
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"""
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Return a single RFC 5424-compliant syslog line (no trailing newline).
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Args:
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service: APP-NAME (e.g. "http", "mysql")
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hostname: HOSTNAME (node name)
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event_type: MSGID (e.g. "request", "login_attempt")
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severity: Syslog severity integer (default: INFO=6)
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timestamp: UTC datetime; defaults to now
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msg: Optional free-text MSG
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**fields: Encoded as structured data params
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"""
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pri = f"<{_FACILITY_LOCAL0 * 8 + severity}>"
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ts = (timestamp or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).isoformat()
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host = (hostname or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_HOSTNAME]
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appname = (service or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_APPNAME]
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msgid = (event_type or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_MSGID]
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sd = _sd_element(fields)
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message = f" {msg}" if msg else ""
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return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
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def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
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Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
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into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
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_log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
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``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
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``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
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RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
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NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
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a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
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The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
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being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
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cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
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"""
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raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
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printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
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return {
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"secret_printable": printable,
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"secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
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}
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_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
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def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
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"""Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
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Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
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``_log(...)`` call::
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auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
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cred = classify_authorization(auth)
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if cred:
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_log("auth_attempt", **cred)
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Recognised schemes:
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* Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
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``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
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* Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
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``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
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* Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
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``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
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Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
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Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
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ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
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secret from it.
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"""
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if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
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return None
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parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
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if len(parts) < 2:
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return None
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scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
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if scheme == "basic":
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try:
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decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
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except (ValueError, binascii.Error):
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return None
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if ":" not in decoded:
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return None
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user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
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return {
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"principal": user,
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"secret_kind": "plaintext",
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**encode_secret(pw),
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}
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if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
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return {
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"principal": None,
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"secret_kind": "http_bearer",
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**encode_secret(rest),
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}
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if scheme == "digest":
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params: dict[str, str] = {}
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for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
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k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
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v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
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if k:
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params[k.lower()] = v
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response = params.get("response")
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if not response:
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return None
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return {
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"principal": params.get("username"),
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"secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
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**encode_secret(response),
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}
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return None
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_FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS = (
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"username", "user", "email", "login", "userid", "account",
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"log", # wp-login.php
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"user_login", # WordPress alt
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"uname", # phpMyAdmin
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"pma_username",
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)
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_FORM_SECRET_KEYS = (
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"password", "pass", "pwd", "passwd", "passwort", "mot_de_passe",
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"user_password", # WordPress alt
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"pma_password", # phpMyAdmin
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)
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def extract_form_credentials(
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body: Optional[str],
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content_type: Optional[str],
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) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
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"""Parse an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` body for credentials.
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Returns the universal cred SD shape ready to spread into a
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``_log(...)`` call when both a principal-shaped key and a secret-
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shaped key are present in the body. Otherwise returns ``None``.
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Field-name detection is case-insensitive and covers the most common
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login-form variants (WordPress wp-login.php, phpMyAdmin, Joomla,
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etc.). Add more entries to ``_FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS`` /
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``_FORM_SECRET_KEYS`` as new templates surface them.
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"""
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if not body or not isinstance(content_type, str):
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return None
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if not content_type.lower().startswith("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"):
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return None
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fields: dict[str, str] = {}
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for pair in body.split("&"):
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if "=" not in pair:
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continue
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k, _, v = pair.partition("=")
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# urllib decode without importing urllib at module scope (the
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# template emitters are import-cost-sensitive). Inline the
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# tiny percent-decode + plus-decode.
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try:
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from urllib.parse import unquote_plus
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key = unquote_plus(k).lower()
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val = unquote_plus(v)
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except Exception:
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continue
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# First-wins so duplicate-key forms don't get clobbered.
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fields.setdefault(key, val)
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principal: Optional[str] = None
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for k in _FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS:
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if k in fields:
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principal = fields[k]
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break
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secret: Optional[str] = None
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for k in _FORM_SECRET_KEYS:
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if k in fields:
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secret = fields[k]
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break
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if secret is None:
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return None
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return {
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"principal": principal,
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"secret_kind": "plaintext",
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**encode_secret(secret),
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}
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def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
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"""Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
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print(line, flush=True)
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def forward_syslog(line: str, log_target: str) -> None:
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"""No-op stub. TCP forwarding is handled by rsyslog, not by service containers."""
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pass
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# ─── Caddy fp-socket reader ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
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_FP_SOCK_SIZE = 65536
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def _ja4h_from_record(rec: dict) -> str:
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method = rec.get("method", "")[:2].upper() or "UN"
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proto = rec.get("proto", "")
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ver_map = {
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"HTTP/1.0": "10", "HTTP/1.1": "11", "HTTP/2.0": "20", "HTTP/3.0": "30",
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}
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ver_tag = ver_map.get(proto.upper(), "00")
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headers: list[str] = rec.get("headers_ordered", [])
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has_cookie = "c" if any(h.lower() == "cookie" for h in headers) else "n"
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has_referer = "r" if any(h.lower() == "referer" for h in headers) else "n"
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lang = rec.get("accept_language", "") or ""
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lang_tag = (lang[:4].ljust(4, "0") if lang else "0000")
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filtered = [h for h in headers if h.lower() not in ("cookie", "referer")]
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count_tag = f"{min(len(filtered), 99):02d}"
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header_hash = _hashlib.sha256(",".join(h.lower() for h in filtered).encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
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cookie_val = rec.get("cookie", "") or ""
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if cookie_val:
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pairs = sorted(p.strip() for p in cookie_val.split(";") if "=" in p.strip())
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cookie_hash = _hashlib.sha256(";".join(pairs).encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
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else:
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cookie_hash = "000000000000"
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return f"{method}{ver_tag}{has_cookie}{has_referer}{lang_tag}_{count_tag}_{header_hash}_{cookie_hash}"
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def _fp_socket_reader(
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node_name: str,
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service_name: str,
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log_target: str,
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sock_path: str = "/run/decnet/fp.sock",
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) -> None:
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import os as _os
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try:
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sock = _socket.socket(_socket.AF_UNIX, _socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
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_os.makedirs(_os.path.dirname(sock_path), exist_ok=True)
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try:
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_os.unlink(sock_path)
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except FileNotFoundError:
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pass
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sock.bind(sock_path)
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except Exception:
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return
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while True:
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try:
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data = sock.recv(_FP_SOCK_SIZE)
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rec = _json.loads(data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
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kind = rec.get("kind", "")
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remote = rec.get("remote_addr", "").split(":")[0]
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if kind == "http_request":
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ja4h = _ja4h_from_record(rec)
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proto_tag = rec.get("proto_tag", "h1")
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line = syslog_line(
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service_name, node_name, "http_request_fingerprint",
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attacker_ip=remote,
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ja4h=ja4h,
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protocol=proto_tag,
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method=rec.get("method", ""),
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path=rec.get("path", ""),
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)
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write_syslog_file(line)
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forward_syslog(line, log_target)
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elif kind == "h2_settings":
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settings_hash = _hashlib.sha256(
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_json.dumps(rec.get("settings", {}), sort_keys=True).encode()
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).hexdigest()[:12]
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line = syslog_line(
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service_name, node_name, "http2_settings",
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attacker_ip=remote,
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settings=_json.dumps(rec.get("settings", {})),
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frame_order=_json.dumps(rec.get("frame_order", [])),
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settings_hash=settings_hash,
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)
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write_syslog_file(line)
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forward_syslog(line, log_target)
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except Exception:
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pass
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def start_fp_socket_reader(
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node_name: str,
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service_name: str,
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log_target: str = "",
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sock_path: str = "/run/decnet/fp.sock",
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) -> None:
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import os as _os
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if not _os.path.isdir(_os.path.dirname(sock_path) or "."):
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return
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t = _threading.Thread(
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target=_fp_socket_reader,
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args=(node_name, service_name, log_target, sock_path),
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daemon=True,
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name="fp-socket-reader",
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)
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t.start()
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