Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5): - env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env; gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest). - must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint. - GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size). - CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating. Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16): - Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed, ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'. - Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError). Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2): - Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop, blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0. Correctness (BUG-12..16): - BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry, consistent principal_key canonicalization). - BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop). - BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick). - BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise. - BUG-16 see above. Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk + documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
131 lines
4.5 KiB
Python
131 lines
4.5 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
|
|
"""POST /topologies/blank — create an empty editable topology.
|
|
|
|
Produces a minimal ``pending`` topology seeded with exactly one DMZ LAN
|
|
and its mandatory host-gateway decky. Intended for the MazeNET editor
|
|
landing flow: unlike ``POST /topologies`` (which runs the generator),
|
|
this endpoint takes no generator parameters and skips the planner
|
|
entirely. The DMZ+gateway invariant is enforced server-side so the
|
|
editor never has to special-case a "no DMZ yet" state.
|
|
"""
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import json
|
|
|
|
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status
|
|
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field as PydanticField
|
|
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
|
|
|
|
from decnet.telemetry import traced as _traced
|
|
from decnet.topology.allocator import SubnetAllocator, reserved_subnets
|
|
from decnet.web.db.models import TopologySummary
|
|
from decnet.web.dependencies import repo, require_admin
|
|
from decnet.web.router.topology._target_host import validate_target_host
|
|
|
|
router = APIRouter()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class BlankTopologyRequest(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Body for POST /topologies/blank — name plus optional agent pinning."""
|
|
name: str = PydanticField(..., min_length=1, max_length=64)
|
|
mode: str = PydanticField(default="unihost", pattern=r"^(unihost|agent)$")
|
|
target_host_uuid: str | None = PydanticField(default=None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post(
|
|
"/blank",
|
|
tags=["MazeNET Topologies"],
|
|
response_model=TopologySummary,
|
|
status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED,
|
|
responses={
|
|
400: {"description": "Malformed body or invalid topology name"},
|
|
401: {"description": "Missing or invalid credentials"},
|
|
403: {"description": "Insufficient permissions"},
|
|
409: {"description": "Name collision or subnet pool exhausted"},
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
@_traced("api.topology.create_blank")
|
|
async def api_create_blank_topology(
|
|
body: BlankTopologyRequest,
|
|
_admin: dict = Depends(require_admin),
|
|
) -> TopologySummary:
|
|
# 0. Validate mode/host pairing before any writes.
|
|
await validate_target_host(repo, body.mode, body.target_host_uuid)
|
|
|
|
# 1. Topology row
|
|
try:
|
|
topology_id = await repo.create_topology(
|
|
{
|
|
"name": body.name,
|
|
"mode": body.mode,
|
|
"target_host_uuid": body.target_host_uuid,
|
|
"status": "pending",
|
|
"config_snapshot": json.dumps({"blank": True}),
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
except IntegrityError as exc:
|
|
# Unique constraint on topologies.name — report the collision without
|
|
# leaking the raw DB message.
|
|
raise HTTPException(
|
|
status_code=409,
|
|
detail=f"A topology named {body.name!r} already exists.",
|
|
) from exc
|
|
|
|
# 2. DMZ LAN with auto-allocated subnet
|
|
try:
|
|
allocator = SubnetAllocator(
|
|
"10.0", reserved=await reserved_subnets(repo)
|
|
)
|
|
subnet = allocator.next_free()
|
|
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=str(exc)) from exc
|
|
|
|
lan_id = await repo.add_lan(
|
|
{
|
|
"topology_id": topology_id,
|
|
"name": "dmz",
|
|
"subnet": subnet,
|
|
"is_dmz": True,
|
|
"x": 40,
|
|
"y": 40,
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 3. DMZ-gateway decky — a normal multi-homed bridge decky.
|
|
# `forwards_l3=True` turns on net.ipv4.ip_forward + NET_ADMIN at
|
|
# compose time (see decnet/topology/compose.py). No host-mode,
|
|
# no MACVLAN — the gateway reaches the outside world via Docker
|
|
# port publishing (see composer port emission).
|
|
decky_uuid = await repo.add_topology_decky(
|
|
{
|
|
"topology_id": topology_id,
|
|
"name": "dmz-gateway",
|
|
"services": ["ssh"],
|
|
"decky_config": {
|
|
"archetype": "deaddeck",
|
|
"forwards_l3": True,
|
|
},
|
|
"state": "pending",
|
|
"x": 20,
|
|
"y": 60,
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 4. Membership edge on the DMZ — is_bridge=True marks this decky
|
|
# as the topology's bridge gateway; forwards_l3 mirrors the decky
|
|
# config so the generator/compose paths stay consistent.
|
|
await repo.add_topology_edge(
|
|
{
|
|
"topology_id": topology_id,
|
|
"decky_uuid": decky_uuid,
|
|
"lan_id": lan_id,
|
|
"is_bridge": True,
|
|
"forwards_l3": True,
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
row = await repo.get_topology(topology_id)
|
|
if row is None: # pragma: no cover — create then vanish
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="topology insert vanished")
|
|
return row
|