Files
DECNET/tests/ttp/test_evidence_shape.py
anti 9056e33962 feat(ttp): Ipv6LeakLifter + R0059 rule for IPv6 link-local opsec failures
Ipv6LeakLifter subscribes to source_kind="ipv6_leak" events from both
the passive sniffer and active prober. Emits T1090 (Proxy) under TA0011
(C2) when fe80:: source address is observed — the attacker's VPN only
tunnels IPv4 so their link-local IID leaks their NIC identity.

Rule R0059 sets base confidence 0.85; iid_kind in the evidence carries
the per-observation strength (eui64 = MAC-derived, deterministic;
stable_privacy = RFC 7217; temporary = RFC 4941).
2026-05-17 20:22:26 -04:00

263 lines
8.4 KiB
Python

"""Evidence shape contract tests (E.2.1b).
Pins the per-``source_kind`` ``TypedDict`` contract on
:class:`~decnet.web.db.models.ttp.TTPTag.evidence`.
The PII property — ``EmailEvidence`` carries no field for raw rcpt
addresses or body bytes — is GREEN today: it lives in the type, not
in code paths.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import typing
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
import pytest
from decnet.ttp.base import TaggerEvent, TolerantTagger
from decnet.ttp.impl.canary_fingerprint_lifter import CanaryFingerprintLifter
from decnet.ttp.impl.email_lifter import EmailLifter
from decnet.ttp.impl.http_fingerprint_lifter import HttpFingerprintLifter
from decnet.ttp.impl.intel_lifter import IntelLifter
from decnet.ttp.impl.ipv6_leak_lifter import Ipv6LeakLifter
from decnet.ttp.impl.rule_engine import CompiledRule
from decnet.ttp.store.base import RuleState
from decnet.ttp.store.impl.filesystem import _parse_and_compile
from decnet.web.db.models.ttp import (
CanaryFingerprintEvidence,
CommandEvidence,
EmailEvidence,
HttpFingerprintEvidence,
IntelEvidence,
Ipv6LinkLocalLeakEvidence,
TTPTag,
compute_tag_uuid,
)
from tests.ttp._stub_store import StubRuleStore
_RULES_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "rules" / "ttp"
# ── PII rule §6: type-level, GREEN today ────────────────────────────
def test_email_evidence_excludes_raw_rcpt_and_body() -> None:
"""``EmailEvidence`` MUST NOT carry raw recipient addresses or
body bytes. The PII discipline lives in the *type* — a lifter that
tries to leak them fails type-check before it can run.
"""
keys = (
EmailEvidence.__required_keys__ | EmailEvidence.__optional_keys__
)
assert "rcpt_to_list" not in keys
assert "body" not in keys
def test_command_evidence_keys() -> None:
keys = (
CommandEvidence.__required_keys__ | CommandEvidence.__optional_keys__
)
assert keys == {"matched_tokens", "rule_pattern"}
def test_intel_evidence_keys() -> None:
keys = (
IntelEvidence.__required_keys__ | IntelEvidence.__optional_keys__
)
assert keys == {
# AbuseIPDB
"abuseipdb_categories", "abuseipdb_score", "abuse_confidence_score",
# GreyNoise
"greynoise_classification", "greynoise_tags", "greynoise_name",
# Feodo
"feodo_listed", "feodo_malware_family", "first_seen_feodo", "malware_family",
# ThreatFox
"threatfox_threat_types", "threatfox_ioc_types", "threatfox_malware_families",
"threat_types", "malware_families", "ioc_types",
# Aggregate meta-rule
"aggregate_verdict", "bumped_rule_ids",
}
def test_canary_fingerprint_evidence_keys() -> None:
keys = (
CanaryFingerprintEvidence.__required_keys__
| CanaryFingerprintEvidence.__optional_keys__
)
assert keys == {"metric", "matched_signature"}
def test_http_fingerprint_evidence_keys() -> None:
keys = (
HttpFingerprintEvidence.__required_keys__
| HttpFingerprintEvidence.__optional_keys__
)
assert keys == {"kind", "hash", "protocol", "client_ip", "seen_at", "raw"}
def test_ipv6_link_local_leak_evidence_keys() -> None:
keys = (
Ipv6LinkLocalLeakEvidence.__required_keys__
| Ipv6LinkLocalLeakEvidence.__optional_keys__
)
assert keys == {
"addr", "mac_oui", "iid_kind", "vector",
"on_iface", "attacker_v4", "observed_at",
}
# ── Per-lifter parametrized positive case ───────────────────────────
def _ev(source_kind: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> TaggerEvent:
return TaggerEvent(
source_kind=source_kind,
source_id="src1",
attacker_uuid="att_1",
identity_uuid="id_1",
session_id="sess_1",
decky_id="decky_1",
payload=payload,
)
def _compile_yaml(rule_id: str) -> CompiledRule:
return _parse_and_compile(_RULES_DIR / f"{rule_id}.yaml", RuleState())
def _hfp_rule() -> CompiledRule:
"""HFP-0001 has no backing YAML — construct it directly."""
return CompiledRule(
rule_id="HFP-0001",
rule_version=1,
name="scanner_ja4h",
applies_to=frozenset({"http_fingerprint"}),
match_spec={},
emits=(("T1592.002", "T1592", "TA0043", 0.7),),
evidence_fields=("kind", "hash", "protocol", "client_ip", "seen_at", "raw"),
state=RuleState(),
)
_LIFTER_CASES: list[tuple[str, Any, Any, Any, dict[str, Any]]] = [
(
"http_fingerprint",
HttpFingerprintLifter,
HttpFingerprintEvidence,
_hfp_rule,
{"ja4h": "GE11nn0000_cafebabe", "protocol": "h1",
"client_ip": "10.0.0.1", "seen_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"},
),
(
"intel",
IntelLifter,
IntelEvidence,
lambda: _compile_yaml("R0054"),
{"abuseipdb_score": 90.0, "abuseipdb_categories": [18, 22]},
),
(
"email",
EmailLifter,
EmailEvidence,
lambda: _compile_yaml("R0042"),
{"rcpt_count": 30, "body_simhash": "abc123sha256"},
),
(
"canary_fingerprint",
CanaryFingerprintLifter,
CanaryFingerprintEvidence,
lambda: _compile_yaml("R0049"),
{"navigator_webdriver": True},
),
(
"ipv6_leak",
Ipv6LeakLifter,
Ipv6LinkLocalLeakEvidence,
lambda: _compile_yaml("R0059"),
{
"addr": "fe80::aabb:ccff:fedd:eeff",
"mac_oui": "a8:bb:cc",
"iid_kind": "eui64",
"vector": "passive_ndp",
"on_iface": "eth0",
"attacker_v4": "10.0.0.9",
"observed_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
},
),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"source_kind, lifter_cls, td_cls, rule_factory, payload",
_LIFTER_CASES,
ids=["http_fingerprint", "intel", "email", "canary_fingerprint", "ipv6_leak"],
)
def test_lifter_emits_evidence_matching_typeddict(
source_kind: str,
lifter_cls: type[TolerantTagger],
td_cls: Any,
rule_factory: Any,
payload: dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
"""Each lifter's emitted ``evidence`` dict structurally matches
its ``TypedDict``: keys are a subset of the declared keys and
runtime types of the present values agree with the hints.
"""
rule = rule_factory()
lifter = lifter_cls(StubRuleStore(compiled=[rule]))
lifter._index.install(rule)
out = asyncio.run(lifter.tag(_ev(source_kind, payload)))
assert out, "lifter emitted no tags — cannot verify evidence shape"
tag = out[0]
declared = td_cls.__required_keys__ | td_cls.__optional_keys__
hints = typing.get_type_hints(td_cls)
for key, value in tag.evidence.items():
assert key in declared, f"evidence key {key!r} not in {td_cls.__name__}"
hint = hints.get(key)
if hint in (str, int, float, bool, list, dict):
assert isinstance(value, hint)
# ── Negative case: shape violation propagates (impl phase) ──────────
def test_evidence_shape_violation_propagates_as_typeerror() -> None:
"""A lifter that emits an evidence dict with a key not in its
``TypedDict`` is a programmer error — it MUST propagate past the
``TolerantTagger`` boundary as ``TypeError``, not silently land
among "absence is normal" swallowed exceptions.
"""
class BadShapeLifter(TolerantTagger):
name = "bad_shape"
HANDLES = frozenset({"command"})
async def _tag_impl(self, event: TaggerEvent) -> list[TTPTag]:
# ``not_in_typeddict`` is not a CommandEvidence key — the
# tolerant boundary must let this through.
return [
TTPTag(
uuid=compute_tag_uuid(
"command", "src1", "R0001", 1, "T1083", None,
),
source_kind="command",
source_id="src1",
attacker_uuid="att_1",
identity_uuid="id_1",
tactic="TA0007",
technique_id="T1083",
confidence=0.5,
rule_id="R0001",
rule_version=1,
evidence={"not_in_typeddict": True},
attack_release="enterprise-v15.1",
)
]
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
asyncio.run(BadShapeLifter().tag(_ev("command")))