Files
DECNET/decnet/updater/app.py
anti 337520c7ad fix(security): close INFO ASVS findings — secret echo, TLS floor, mandatory tarball SHA, CORS/Content-Type guards, BUG-17
- V7.1.3: env known-insecure-default error no longer echoes the rejected secret value.
- V9.1.4: syslog-over-TLS forwarder + listener pin minimum_version=TLSv1_2.
- V12.1.2: updater tarball SHA-256 verification is now mandatory and fail-closed —
  /update and /update-self reject a missing digest (400), the executor rejects
  missing/mismatched digests before extract/apply. Every push path supplies it.
- V13.1.4: reject a wildcard '*' in DECNET_CORS_ORIGINS at startup.
- V13.1.5: enforce application/json on JSON write endpoints (415 otherwise),
  exempting multipart upload routes.
- BUG-17: SSE error log records the user uuid, not the resume cursor.

Also completes V2.1.7 consistently: the attacker-injectable PYTEST* env bypass is
replaced with explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 in the three remaining sites
(env.validate_public_binding, config logging, mysql url builder).

Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review (no update-outage risk —
all push paths verified to send the digest).
2026-06-10 13:50:06 -04:00

220 lines
7.4 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
"""Updater FastAPI app — mTLS-protected endpoints for self-update.
Mirrors the shape of ``decnet/agent/app.py``: bare FastAPI, docs disabled,
handlers delegate to ``decnet.updater.executor``.
Mounted by uvicorn via ``decnet.updater.server`` with ``--ssl-cert-reqs 2``,
so every caller already presents a CA-signed cert. On top of that transport
guarantee, the mutating endpoints app-gate the *client* CN to the master
(``decnet-master``, the identity ``UpdaterClient`` presents via
``ensure_master_identity``): a compromised worker/agent cert must never be
able to pip-install and re-exec arbitrary code on a peer worker.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import os as _os
import pathlib
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
from typing import Optional
# Importing this shim patches uvicorn so the TLS peer cert lands in the ASGI
# scope, where require_master_cert can read it. Must import before serving.
from decnet.web import _uvicorn_tls_scope # noqa: F401
from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile
from pydantic import BaseModel
from decnet.bus.factory import get_bus
from decnet.bus.publish import run_health_heartbeat
from decnet.logging import get_logger
from decnet.swarm import pki
from decnet.updater import executor as _exec
from decnet.web._mtls import extract_peer_cert
log = get_logger("updater.app")
# Only the master may push code to a worker's updater. UpdaterClient presents
# the master identity (CN=decnet-master); worker/agent certs are rejected.
_PUSHER_CN = "decnet-master"
def require_master_cert(request: Request) -> None:
"""Reject any caller whose client-cert CN is not the master's.
Transport mTLS has proven the cert is CA-signed; this stops a non-master
CA-signed cert (e.g. a worker agent's) from driving an update/rollback.
Fails closed when no cert is present.
"""
peer = extract_peer_cert(request.scope)
if peer is None or peer.cn != _PUSHER_CN:
log.warning("updater: rejected push from cn=%r", peer.cn if peer else None)
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="master certificate required")
_bus_heartbeat_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
@asynccontextmanager
async def _lifespan(_app: FastAPI):
# Host-local bus heartbeat (system.updater.health). Lets the agent
# and dashboard tell "updater's up" without hitting the HTTPS port.
# Bus-disabled path is a no-op loop; the updater serves requests
# either way.
bus = None
try:
bus = get_bus(client_name="updater")
await bus.connect()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
log.warning("updater: bus unavailable, skipping heartbeat: %s", exc)
bus = None
global _bus_heartbeat_task
_bus_heartbeat_task = asyncio.create_task(
run_health_heartbeat(bus, "updater"),
name="updater-bus-heartbeat",
)
try:
yield
finally:
if _bus_heartbeat_task is not None:
_bus_heartbeat_task.cancel()
with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
await _bus_heartbeat_task
_bus_heartbeat_task = None
if bus is not None:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await bus.close()
app = FastAPI(
title="DECNET Self-Updater",
version="0.1.0",
docs_url=None,
redoc_url=None,
openapi_url=None,
lifespan=_lifespan,
)
class _Config:
install_dir: pathlib.Path = pathlib.Path(
_os.environ.get("DECNET_UPDATER_INSTALL_DIR") or str(_exec.DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR)
)
updater_install_dir: pathlib.Path = pathlib.Path(
_os.environ.get("DECNET_UPDATER_UPDATER_DIR")
or str(_exec.DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR / "updater")
)
agent_dir: pathlib.Path = pathlib.Path(
_os.environ.get("DECNET_UPDATER_AGENT_DIR") or str(pki.DEFAULT_AGENT_DIR)
)
def configure(
install_dir: pathlib.Path,
updater_install_dir: pathlib.Path,
agent_dir: pathlib.Path,
) -> None:
"""Inject paths from the server launcher; must be called before serving."""
_Config.install_dir = install_dir
_Config.updater_install_dir = updater_install_dir
_Config.agent_dir = agent_dir
# ------------------------------------------------------------------- schemas
class RollbackResult(BaseModel):
status: str
release: dict
probe: str
class ReleasesResponse(BaseModel):
releases: list[dict]
# -------------------------------------------------------------------- routes
@app.get("/health")
async def health() -> dict:
return {
"status": "ok",
"role": "updater",
"releases": [r.to_dict() for r in _exec.list_releases(_Config.install_dir)],
}
@app.get("/releases")
async def releases(_pusher: None = Depends(require_master_cert)) -> dict:
return {"releases": [r.to_dict() for r in _exec.list_releases(_Config.install_dir)]}
@app.post("/update")
async def update(
tarball: UploadFile = File(..., description="tar.gz of the working tree"),
sha: str = Form("", description="git SHA of the tree for provenance"),
sha256: str = Form("", description="hex SHA-256 of the tarball bytes; verified before extract"),
_pusher: None = Depends(require_master_cert),
) -> dict:
if not sha256:
# Mandatory: guarantees _verify_tarball_sha256 runs before we extract +
# pip-install. An update with no integrity check is refused outright.
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="sha256 of the tarball is required")
body = await tarball.read()
try:
return _exec.run_update(
body, sha=sha or None,
expected_sha256=sha256,
install_dir=_Config.install_dir, agent_dir=_Config.agent_dir,
)
except _exec.UpdateError as exc:
status = 409 if exc.rolled_back else 500
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status,
detail={"error": str(exc), "stderr": exc.stderr, "rolled_back": exc.rolled_back},
) from exc
@app.post("/update-self")
async def update_self(
tarball: UploadFile = File(...),
sha: str = Form(""),
sha256: str = Form("", description="hex SHA-256 of the tarball bytes; verified before extract"),
confirm_self: str = Form("", description="Must be 'true' to proceed"),
_pusher: None = Depends(require_master_cert),
) -> dict:
if confirm_self.lower() != "true":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="self-update requires confirm_self=true (no auto-rollback)",
)
if not sha256:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="sha256 of the tarball is required")
body = await tarball.read()
try:
return _exec.run_update_self(
body, sha=sha or None,
updater_install_dir=_Config.updater_install_dir,
expected_sha256=sha256,
)
except _exec.UpdateError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail={"error": str(exc), "stderr": exc.stderr},
) from exc
@app.post("/rollback")
async def rollback(_pusher: None = Depends(require_master_cert)) -> dict:
try:
return _exec.run_rollback(
install_dir=_Config.install_dir, agent_dir=_Config.agent_dir,
)
except _exec.UpdateError as exc:
status = 404 if "no previous" in str(exc) else 500
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status,
detail={"error": str(exc), "stderr": exc.stderr},
) from exc