Files
DECNET/rules/ttp/R0001.yaml
anti 322fd44d72 feat(ttp): E.3.13 IdentityLifter + CredentialLifter (R0001-R0006)
IdentityLifter owns lifter:identity_* — currently R0003 (password
spraying). CredentialLifter owns lifter:credential_* — R0001 generic
auth brute, R0002 password guessing, R0004 credential reuse, R0005
valid-account use, R0006 default credentials.

YAMLs R0001/R0002/R0003/R0005/R0006 had their match.kind normalised
to fit the lifter prefix scheme — the design doc's promised "YAMLs
normalised in a separate refactor commit" lands here.

Identity-rollup tags null out attacker_uuid on emit so the worked-
example invariant holds (the tag belongs to the Identity, never to
one member IP).

Tests: test_identity_lifter.py + test_credential_lifter.py cover
each predicate's positive/negative path, state modulation
(disabled/clipped/expired), source-kind gating, and idempotent
replay. test_lifter_absence and test_lifters updated for the new
ctor signature.
2026-05-01 20:52:56 -04:00

21 lines
446 B
YAML

rule_id: R0001
rule_version: 1
name: generic_auth_brute
description: |
Repeated failed auth across services/accounts. Cross-event;
emitted by the CredentialLifter (E.3.13) — v0 RuleEngine cannot
count.
applies_to:
- auth_attempt
match:
kind: lifter:credential_auth_brute_generic
fail_threshold: 5
window_minutes: 5
emits:
- tactic: TA0006
technique_id: T1110
confidence: 0.85
evidence_fields:
- fail_count
- service