anti
245975a6dd
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5): - env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env; gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest). - must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint. - GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size). - CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating. Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16): - Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed, ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'. - Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError). Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2): - Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop, blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0. Correctness (BUG-12..16): - BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry, consistent principal_key canonicalization). - BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop). - BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick). - BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise. - BUG-16 see above. Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk + documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
88 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
88 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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"""Fail-closed validation of security-sensitive env secrets (env._require_env).
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DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD must never silently default to "admin": it is resolved
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lazily and validated like DECNET_JWT_SECRET. These tests drive _require_env
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against a controlled environ so the production raise paths (which are bypassed
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under live pytest) are actually exercised.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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import decnet.env as envmod
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def _require(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, environ: dict[str, str]) -> str:
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# Replace the whole environ for the call so the PYTEST_* short-circuit in
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# _require_env doesn't fire — we want the real production behaviour.
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monkeypatch.setattr(envmod.os, "environ", dict(environ))
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return envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
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def test_admin_password_unset_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not set"):
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_require(monkeypatch, {})
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def test_admin_password_known_bad_default_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="insecure default"):
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_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin"})
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["secret", "password", "changeme", "ADMIN"])
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def test_admin_password_other_known_bad_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, bad: str) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="insecure default"):
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_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": bad})
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def test_admin_password_too_short_raises_in_production(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too short"):
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_require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "short1"})
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def test_admin_password_short_allowed_in_developer_mode(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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val = _require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "short1", "DECNET_DEVELOPER": "true"})
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assert val == "short1"
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def test_admin_password_strong_value_passes(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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val = _require(monkeypatch, {"DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "a-strong-unique-password"})
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assert val == "a-strong-unique-password"
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def test_testing_flag_short_circuit_returns_value_unchecked() -> None:
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# Under the test harness (DECNET_TESTING=1, set in conftest), _require_env
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# returns the configured value without the production checks — documents
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# why the dev loop is safe. conftest sets a strong value, so this also
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# proves lazy resolution works.
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assert envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD") == "test-password-123"
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def test_pytest_var_leak_does_not_bypass_validation(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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# V2.1.7 regression: a leaked PYTEST_* env var must NOT disable strength
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# validation. With DECNET_TESTING unset, a known-bad / short secret is
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# still rejected even though a PYTEST_* var is present.
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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envmod.os,
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"environ",
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{"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": "x", "DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "admin"},
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)
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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envmod.os,
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"environ",
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{"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": "x", "DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "short1"},
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)
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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envmod._require_env("DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
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def test_lazy_getattr_resolves_admin_password() -> None:
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# Accessing the attribute (not a module global anymore) routes through
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# __getattr__ -> _require_env.
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assert envmod.DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD == "test-password-123"
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with pytest.raises(AttributeError):
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envmod.NOT_A_REAL_SECRET # noqa: B018
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