Files
DECNET/tests/conftest.py
anti 245975a6dd fix(security): close LOW ASVS findings — env bypass, SSE/deployment authz, CN fail-close, password byte-limit, exception leaks, BUG-12..16
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5):
- env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env;
  gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest).
- must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint.
- GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size).
- CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected
  explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating.

Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16):
- Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed,
  ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'.
- Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError).

Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2):
- Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop,
  blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged
  server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0.

Correctness (BUG-12..16):
- BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry,
  consistent principal_key canonicalization).
- BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop).
- BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick).
- BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise.
- BUG-16 see above.

Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk +
documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix;
unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
2026-06-10 13:27:14 -04:00

48 lines
2.1 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
"""
Shared pytest configuration.
Env vars required by decnet.env must be set here, at module level, before
any test file imports decnet.* — pytest loads conftest.py first.
"""
import os
import tempfile
# Redirect log paths to a user-writable tempdir so unprivileged test runs
# (CI, local sans-sudo) don't try to mkdir /var/log/decnet.
_TEST_LOG_DIR = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "decnet-tests-logs")
os.makedirs(_TEST_LOG_DIR, exist_ok=True)
os.environ.setdefault("DECNET_LOG_FILE", os.path.join(_TEST_LOG_DIR, "decnet.log"))
os.environ.setdefault("DECNET_INGEST_LOG_FILE", os.path.join(_TEST_LOG_DIR, "decnet.log"))
os.environ.setdefault("DECNET_AGENT_LOG_FILE", os.path.join(_TEST_LOG_DIR, "agent.log"))
# Explicit test-harness flag: tells env._require_env to skip secret-strength
# validation so the suite can run with weak/short secrets. This is the ONLY
# bypass — it replaced the old "any PYTEST* var present" fail-open check (V2.1.7).
os.environ["DECNET_TESTING"] = "1"
os.environ["DECNET_JWT_SECRET"] = "stable-test-secret-key-at-least-32-chars-long"
os.environ["DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD"] = "test-password-123"
os.environ["DECNET_DEVELOPER"] = "true"
os.environ["DECNET_DEVELOPER_TRACING"] = "false"
os.environ["DECNET_DB_TYPE"] = "sqlite"
# GeoIP enrichment is offline-by-design (RIR delegated-stats) but the
# first access triggers a background file fetch. Unit tests must never
# hit the network and don't care about country codes — disable
# enrichment globally. The geoip-specific tests re-enable it via
# monkeypatch + a temp DECNET_GEOIP_ROOT.
os.environ["DECNET_GEOIP_ENABLED"] = "false"
# Same posture for PTR resolution — tests that cover the resolver
# re-enable it explicitly via monkeypatch; everyone else gets the
# short-circuit (returns None without touching socket.gethostbyaddr).
os.environ["DECNET_PTR_ENABLED"] = "false"
import pytest
from typing import Any
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def standardize_auth_secret(monkeypatch: Any) -> None:
import decnet.web.auth
monkeypatch.setattr(decnet.web.auth, "SECRET_KEY", os.environ["DECNET_JWT_SECRET"])