anti
d80e6aa6d1
Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1): - Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced. - Change-password now requires min_length=12. - SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream. Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper. Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3): - Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/ metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE. - UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now defaults True. Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2): - Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter. - Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy trust. Correctness (BUG-7..11): - BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling); BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities; BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC. Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review.
57 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
57 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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"""Shared state-modulation helpers for rule consumers.
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Both :class:`~decnet.ttp.impl.rule_engine.RuleEngine` and the per-source
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lifters (E.3.9 onward) read :class:`~decnet.ttp.store.base.RuleState`
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the same way: skip on ``disabled``, defense-in-depth re-check
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``expires_at``, clamp confidence on ``clipped``. Single source of truth
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so a future change to the state contract lands in one place.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from decnet.ttp.store.base import RuleState
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def is_active(state: "RuleState") -> bool:
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"""Return ``True`` iff a rule with this state is allowed to fire.
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``disabled`` rules never fire. ``clipped`` rules still fire — the
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clip caps emitted confidence, doesn't suppress the emit. Expired
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states act as ``disabled`` even though the store auto-reverts; the
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re-check here is defense-in-depth against a racing read between
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expiry and the store's revert pass.
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"""
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if state.state == "disabled":
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return False
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if state.expires_at is not None:
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expires = state.expires_at
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if expires.tzinfo is None:
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expires = expires.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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if expires < datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc):
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return False
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return True
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def apply_ceiling(base: float, state: "RuleState") -> float:
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"""Apply the operator's confidence ceiling, downward only.
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A ``clipped`` state with ``confidence_max < 1.0`` clamps the emitted
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confidence to ``min(base, ceiling)``. Any other state is a
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no-op. The clamp is downward by construction — operator clips can
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never raise a rule's confidence above its YAML-declared base, per
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TTP_TAGGING.md §"Confidence model".
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"""
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if state.state != "clipped":
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return base
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ceiling = state.confidence_max
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if ceiling is None or ceiling >= 1.0:
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return base
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return min(base, ceiling)
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__all__ = ["is_active", "apply_ceiling"]
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