fix(security): close LOW ASVS findings — env bypass, SSE/deployment authz, CN fail-close, password byte-limit, exception leaks, BUG-12..16
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5):
- env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env;
gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest).
- must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint.
- GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size).
- CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected
explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating.
Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16):
- Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed,
ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'.
- Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError).
Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2):
- Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop,
blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged
server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0.
Correctness (BUG-12..16):
- BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry,
consistent principal_key canonicalization).
- BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop).
- BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick).
- BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise.
- BUG-16 see above.
Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk +
documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix;
unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
anti
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