anti
245975a6dd
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5): - env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env; gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest). - must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint. - GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size). - CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating. Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16): - Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed, ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'. - Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError). Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2): - Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop, blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0. Correctness (BUG-12..16): - BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry, consistent principal_key canonicalization). - BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop). - BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick). - BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise. - BUG-16 see above. Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk + documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
72 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
72 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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import asyncio
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from typing import Optional, Any
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import jwt
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import bcrypt
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from decnet.env import DECNET_JWT_SECRET, DECNET_JWT_EXP_MINUTES
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SECRET_KEY: str = DECNET_JWT_SECRET
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ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
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# Live constant — sourced from env DECNET_JWT_EXP_MINUTES (default 240 / 4 h).
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# Idle/inactivity timeout is intentionally not implemented: jti denylist covers
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# explicit logout and the 4 h absolute TTL bounds the worst-case exposure window.
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# Accept-risk: LOW / pre-v1 — revisit at v1 when user-facing session UX lands.
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ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = DECNET_JWT_EXP_MINUTES
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# Pinned issuer/audience/type so a token signed with DECNET_JWT_SECRET for any
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# OTHER purpose (or by a future co-tenant of the secret) is not accepted by the
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# dashboard verifier. Issuance stamps these; _decode_payload requires + verifies
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# them. Keep these two modules in lockstep — they are a single trust contract.
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JWT_ISSUER: str = "decnet"
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JWT_AUDIENCE: str = "decnet-dashboard"
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JWT_TYPE: str = "access"
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def verify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
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# [:72] is a defensive safety-net against bcrypt silent truncation.
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# Validated callers already reject >72-byte passwords via field_validator,
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# so this slice is unreachable for well-formed input.
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return bcrypt.checkpw(
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plain_password.encode("utf-8")[:72],
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hashed_password.encode("utf-8")
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)
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def get_password_hash(password: str) -> str:
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# Use a cost factor of 12 (default for passlib/bcrypt).
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# [:72] is a defensive safety-net; field_validator rejects >72-byte input
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# before it reaches this function.
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_salt: bytes = bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12)
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_hashed: bytes = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode("utf-8")[:72], _salt)
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return _hashed.decode("utf-8")
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async def averify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
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# bcrypt is CPU-bound and ~250ms/call; keep it off the event loop.
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return await asyncio.to_thread(verify_password, plain_password, hashed_password)
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async def ahash_password(password: str) -> str:
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return await asyncio.to_thread(get_password_hash, password)
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def create_access_token(data: dict[str, Any], expires_delta: Optional[timedelta] = None) -> str:
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_to_encode: dict[str, Any] = data.copy()
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_expire: datetime
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if expires_delta:
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_expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + expires_delta
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else:
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_expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=15)
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_to_encode.update({"exp": _expire})
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_to_encode.update({"iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc)})
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# Pin issuer / audience / token-type so the verifier can reject tokens
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# minted for any other purpose with the same shared secret.
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_to_encode.setdefault("iss", JWT_ISSUER)
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_to_encode.setdefault("aud", JWT_AUDIENCE)
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_to_encode.setdefault("typ", JWT_TYPE)
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_encoded_jwt: str = jwt.encode(_to_encode, SECRET_KEY, algorithm=ALGORITHM)
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return _encoded_jwt
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