#!/usr/bin/env python3 """ MySQLserver. Sends a realistic MySQL 5.7 server handshake, reads the client login packet, extracts username, then closes with Access Denied. Logs auth attempts as JSON. """ import asyncio import base64 import itertools import os import struct from typing import cast import instance_seed as _seed from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "dbserver") SERVICE_NAME = "mysql" LOG_TARGET = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "") PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "3306")) # Per-instance version. Real fleets never run one identical point release # across every host — weighted mix of still-in-the-wild 5.7/8.0 builds. _MYSQL_VER = os.environ.get("MYSQL_VERSION") or _seed.pick_weighted([ ("5.7.38-log", 1), ("5.7.43-log", 2), ("5.7.44-log", 2), ("8.0.32", 2), ("8.0.35", 3), ("8.0.36", 3), ("8.0.39", 2), ("8.0.40", 1), ]) # Monotonic per-process counter for connection IDs. Seeded with a # per-instance base so two deckies never hand out id=1 to the same scanner. _CONN_ID_SEQ = itertools.count(_seed.rng.randint(17, 65_000)) def _build_greeting(conn_id: int, salt: bytes) -> bytes: """MySQL protocol v10 Initial Handshake Packet. salt is 20 bytes (8 + 12 split across two sections) and must be freshly random per connection — it's the challenge the client hashes its password against.""" assert len(salt) == 20 return ( b"\x0a" + _MYSQL_VER.encode() + b"\x00" + struct.pack(" bytes: length = len(payload) return struct.pack(" None: line = syslog_line(SERVICE_NAME, NODE_NAME, event_type, severity, **kwargs) write_syslog_file(line) forward_syslog(line, LOG_TARGET) class MySQLProtocol(asyncio.Protocol): _transport: asyncio.Transport | None = None _peer: tuple[str, int] | None = None def __init__(self): self._transport = None self._peer = None self._buf = b"" self._greeted = False self._conn_id = next(_CONN_ID_SEQ) & 0xFFFFFFFF # 20-byte scramble; fresh per connection so two handshakes to the # same decky never present identical auth challenges. self._salt = _seed.fresh_bytes(20) def connection_made(self, transport: asyncio.BaseTransport) -> None: self._transport = cast(asyncio.Transport, transport) self._peer = cast(tuple[str, int], self._transport.get_extra_info("peername", ("?", 0))) _log("connect", src=self._peer[0], src_port=self._peer[1], connection_id=self._conn_id) self._transport.write(_make_packet(_build_greeting(self._conn_id, self._salt), seq=0)) self._greeted = True def data_received(self, data: bytes) -> None: assert self._transport is not None self._buf += data # MySQL packets: 3-byte length + 1-byte seq + payload while len(self._buf) >= 4: length = struct.unpack(" 1024 * 1024: self._transport.close() self._buf = b"" return if len(self._buf) < 4 + length: break payload = self._buf[4:4 + length] self._buf = self._buf[4 + length:] self._handle_packet(payload) def _handle_packet(self, payload: bytes) -> None: assert self._peer is not None if not payload: return # Login packet: capability flags (4), max_packet (4), charset (1), # reserved (23), username (NUL-terminated), auth-response. # mysql_native_password puts a 1-byte length followed by exactly # 20 bytes: SHA1(password) XOR SHA1(salt + SHA1(SHA1(password))) — # plaintext is unrecoverable but the 20 bytes ARE a credential the # attacker knew, so they land as secret_kind="mysql_native_password". username = "" auth_response = b"" if len(payload) > 32: try: username_start = 32 nul = payload.index(b"\x00", username_start) username = payload[username_start:nul].decode(errors="replace") # auth-response length byte + bytes if len(payload) > nul + 1: resp_len = payload[nul + 1] if resp_len and len(payload) >= nul + 2 + resp_len: auth_response = payload[nul + 2:nul + 2 + resp_len] except (ValueError, IndexError): username = "" extra: dict = {} if auth_response: _b64 = base64.b64encode(auth_response).decode("ascii") extra = { "principal": username, "secret_kind": "mysql_native_password", "secret_printable": auth_response.hex(), "secret_b64": _b64, } _log("auth", src=self._peer[0], username=username, connection_id=self._conn_id, **extra) # Real mysqld includes client IP in the error text. src_ip = self._peer[0] if self._peer else "?" msg = f"Access denied for user '{username}'@'{src_ip}' (using password: YES)" err = b"\xff" + struct.pack("