templates/ssh/Dockerfile

@@ -34,13 +34,15 @@ RUN sed -i \
     -e 's|^#\?LogLevel.*|LogLevel VERBOSE|' \
     /etc/ssh/sshd_config
 
-# rsyslog: forward auth.* and user.* to named pipe in RFC 5424 format.
-# The entrypoint relays the pipe to stdout for Docker log capture.
+# rsyslog: forward auth.* and user.* to PID 1's stdout in RFC 5424 format.
+# /proc/1/fd/1 is the container-stdout fd Docker attached — writing there
+# surfaces lines in `docker logs` without needing a named pipe + relay cat
+# (which would be readable AND writable by any root-in-container process).
 RUN printf '%s\n' \
-    '# syslog-relay log bridge — auth + user events → named pipe as RFC 5424' \
+    '# auth + user events → container stdout as RFC 5424' \
     '$template RFC5424fmt,"<%PRI%>1 %TIMESTAMP:::date-rfc3339% %HOSTNAME% %APP-NAME% %PROCID% %MSGID% %STRUCTURED-DATA% %msg%\n"' \
-    'auth,authpriv.*  |/run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay;RFC5424fmt' \
-    'user.*           |/run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay;RFC5424fmt' \
+    'auth,authpriv.*  /proc/1/fd/1;RFC5424fmt' \
+    'user.*           /proc/1/fd/1;RFC5424fmt' \
     > /etc/rsyslog.d/50-journal-forward.conf
 
 # Silence default catch-all rules so we own auth/user routing exclusively

templates/ssh/entrypoint.sh

@@ -31,15 +31,10 @@ ls /var/www/html
 HIST
 fi
 
-# Logging pipeline: named pipe → rsyslogd (RFC 5424) → stdout → Docker log capture.
-# Pipe lives under /run/systemd/journal/ and the relay process is cloaked via
-# exec -a so `ps aux` shows "systemd-journal-fwd" instead of a raw `cat`.
-mkdir -p /run/systemd/journal
-mkfifo /run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay
-
-bash -c 'exec -a "systemd-journal-fwd" cat /run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay' &
-
-# Start rsyslog (reads /etc/rsyslog.d/50-journal-forward.conf, writes to the pipe above)
+# Logging pipeline: rsyslogd (RFC 5424) → /proc/1/fd/1 → Docker log capture.
+# No intermediate pipe/relay — a named FIFO would be readable AND writable
+# by any root-in-container process, letting an attacker either eavesdrop on
+# the SIEM feed or inject forged log lines.
 rsyslogd
 
 # File-catcher: mirror attacker drops into host-mounted quarantine with attribution.

tests/test_ssh.py

@@ -144,27 +144,25 @@ def test_dockerfile_prompt_command_logger():
     assert "logger" in df
 
 
-def test_entrypoint_creates_named_pipe():
-    assert "mkfifo" in _entrypoint_text()
-
-
-def test_entrypoint_relay_pipe_path_is_disguised():
+def test_entrypoint_has_no_named_pipe():
+    # Named pipes in the container are a liability — readable and writable
+    # by any root process. The log bridge must not rely on one.
     ep = _entrypoint_text()
-    # Pipe lives under /run/systemd/journal/, not the obvious /var/run/decnet-logs.
-    assert "/run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay" in ep
-    assert "decnet-logs" not in ep
+    assert "mkfifo" not in ep
+    assert "syslog-relay" not in ep
 
 
-def test_entrypoint_cat_relay_is_cloaked():
+def test_entrypoint_has_no_relay_cat():
+    # No intermediate cat relay either (removed together with the pipe).
     ep = _entrypoint_text()
-    # `cat` is invoked via exec -a so ps shows systemd-journal-fwd.
-    assert "systemd-journal-fwd" in ep
-    assert "exec -a" in ep
+    assert "systemd-journal-fwd" not in ep
 
 
-def test_dockerfile_rsyslog_uses_disguised_pipe():
+def test_dockerfile_rsyslog_targets_pid1_stdout():
     df = _dockerfile_text()
-    assert "/run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay" in df
+    # rsyslog writes straight to /proc/1/fd/1 — no pipe file on disk.
+    assert "/proc/1/fd/1" in df
+    assert "syslog-relay" not in df
     assert "decnet-logs" not in df