Schemathesis fires up to 3000 examples per endpoint. POST /auth/login
caps at 10/5min per IP, so the second example onward returns 429 and
the positive_data_acceptance check flags it as RejectedPositiveData
(its allowed-status list is hardcoded in schemathesis to
2xx/401/403/404/409/5xx, so OpenAPI tweaks can't fix it).
DECNET_LIMITER_ENABLED=false exists for exactly this case (see
limiter.py docstring on stress/load testing).
Reverts the custom_openapi shim from 5d88346 / 9b1168c — the endpoint
already declares 429 in its responses= map (api_login.py:38), and the
shim turned out to address a problem that wasn't there. Drop the
companion test along with it.
Previous commit advertised 429 on every operation. Only routes
decorated with @limiter.limit can actually return slowapi's 429 —
currently just POST /api/v1/auth/login. Documenting it elsewhere is
dishonest and would mislead clients into expecting a response the
server cannot produce.
Walk slowapi's _route_limits / _dynamic_route_limits registries to
identify decorated endpoints, match them to FastAPI routes by
{module}.{name}, and only inject 429 on those.
Existing per-route 429 declarations (e.g. SSE connection-cap on
events streams via sse_limits) are untouched.
SlowAPI middleware can short-circuit any request with 429 once a
per-route or per-IP rate limit fires (e.g. POST /api/v1/auth/login is
capped at 10/5min). The OpenAPI spec did not declare 429 on any
operation, so schemathesis flagged legitimate rate-limit responses as
RejectedPositiveData / status-code-nonconformance failures.
Override app.openapi to inject a generic 429 response object on every
HTTP operation in the generated schema. Add a contract test that fails
if any operation drops the 429 advertisement.
Refuse to start decnet.web.api when DECNET_MODE=agent (unless the
operator explicitly opts into dual-role with DECNET_DISALLOW_MASTER=
false). The Typer CLI already hides master-only commands on agents,
but a misconfigured systemd unit or a direct uvicorn invocation
would bypass that — now the lifespan itself refuses, before any
worker, DB or bus comes up.
Resolve DECNET_JWT_SECRET eagerly at startup so a missing or known-
bad value fails at boot rather than on the first auth-gated request.
The lazy-load shape stays useful for non-master CLIs.
Add validate_public_binding() called from the master API lifespan: when
DECNET_API_HOST is non-loopback, refuse to start if DECNET_CORS_ORIGINS
still contains a loopback origin (catches the "operator flipped to
0.0.0.0 to make it work and forgot to update CORS" footgun) or if
DECNET_CANARY_HTTP_BASE is plaintext http:// to a non-loopback host.
Log CRITICAL when DECNET_LIMITER_ENABLED=false on a public binding.
The validator no-ops under pytest so unrelated suites don't trip on it.
Add DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME env knob; AgentClient and UpdaterClient
consult it when verify_hostname is None, giving production deploys
TLS hostname verification on top of the existing CA + fingerprint pin.
Default off so dev enrollments with mismatched SANs keep working.
API: /api/v1/campaigns (paginated list), /api/v1/campaigns/{uuid}
(soft-merge chain follow), /api/v1/campaigns/{uuid}/identities
(member identities), and /api/v1/campaigns/events (SSE under
campaign.> + JWT-via-?token=, snapshot-on-connect). Mirror of the
identity router; same auth, same shape, same OpenAPI tags pattern.
Frontend: CampaignDetail.tsx page (same visual vocabulary as
IdentityDetail), useCampaignStream hook (mirror of
useIdentityStream), /campaigns/:id route, IdentityDetail's
CAMPAIGN badge becomes clickable and navigates to the campaign.
useIdentityStream now listens for identity.campaign.assigned so
the badge appears live without a manual refresh.
Second of the five-step identity-resolution substrate. Ships the API
surface against the empty AttackerIdentity table from commit 1 — every
endpoint returns empty/404 cleanly until the clusterer populates rows.
Routes (auth-gated, viewer role):
* GET /api/v1/identities — paginated list, excludes merged-out rows
* GET /api/v1/identities/{uuid} — detail; transparently follows
merged_into_uuid to surface the canonical winner
* GET /api/v1/identities/{uuid}/observations — Attacker rows FK'd
to the (resolved) identity uuid
Repository (BaseRepository abstract + SQLModelRepository concrete):
* get_identity_by_uuid (with merge-chain following, hop-bounded)
* list_identities / count_identities (excluding merged-out)
* list_observations_for_identity / count_observations_for_identity
Tests: 12 new (empty-table behavior, seeded data, merge-chain
resolution, repo-level smoke against real SQLite). Also fixes the
pre-existing test_base_repo_coverage failure (DEBT-041 added abstract
methods without updating the DummyRepo stub) — included here because
this PR adds 5 more abstract methods, fixing it as a bonus.
474 db/web/profiler/correlation tests green.
The threat-intel surface was IP-keyed on day one as an expedient — the
worker is woken by IP-bearing bus events. ANTI's call: don't carry that
debt. NO IPs as primary keys anywhere on the attacker-intel surface.
Schema:
- attacker_uuid is now the canonical key — UNIQUE + FK to attackers.uuid.
- attacker_ip stays as a denormalised, indexed, NON-UNIQUE value column.
Updated on every upsert; useful for SIEM payloads and audit lookups,
but explicitly NOT a key. Model docstring says so.
- Pre-v1, no Alembic migration needed. SQLModel.metadata.create_all()
builds the new shape on fresh DBs.
Repo:
- upsert_attacker_intel now keys on attacker_uuid.
- get_attacker_intel_by_ip → get_attacker_intel_by_uuid.
- get_unenriched_attacker_ips → get_unenriched_attackers, returning
[{uuid, ip}] tuples so the worker writes by UUID and dispatches
provider calls by IP without a second round-trip.
Worker:
- _enrich_one(uuid, ip, ...) — UUID lands on the row, IP rides for
provider egress.
- attacker.intel.enriched bus payload gains attacker_uuid alongside
attacker_ip — webhook → SIEM consumers benefit; no removal.
API:
- GET /api/v1/attackers/{ip}/intel deleted outright (rip-and-replace,
never deployed beyond dev).
- GET /api/v1/attackers/{uuid}/intel is the only public route, matching
every other /attackers/* route.
Frontend:
- <IntelPanel uuid={id!} /> uses the URL param directly, fetches in
parallel with the rest of AttackerDetail rather than waiting on
attacker.ip.
Tests: re-keyed in place, 39 passed (same coverage as before the
refactor). Provider-impl tests untouched.
DEBT-041: closed in DEBT.md (entry preserved as historical rationale,
summary table flipped to ✅, remaining-open list shortened by one).
CLI command mirrors the reuse-correlate shape (--poll-interval, --ttl-hours,
--daemon). Run it under systemd as a sibling worker.
The API endpoint returns the most recent cached row for an attacker IP
or 404. Auth-gated via require_viewer like every other attacker route.
Also extends the worker test with a real FakeBus so the
attacker.intel.enriched publish path is exercised end-to-end (no longer
a no-op against NullBus).
Adds CorrelationEngine.correlate_credential_reuse + the
`decnet reuse-correlate` long-running worker. The worker mirrors the
mutator's bus-wake + slow-tick pattern: wakes on credential.captured
and attacker.observed for sub-second latency, falls back to a 60s
poll if the bus is unavailable, and publishes
credential.reuse.detected once per new or grown CredentialReuse row
(group-deduped so a 5-cred reuse doesn't emit 5 partial events).
The web ingester now publishes credential.captured after every
successful Credential upsert; bus + new repo helper
find_credential_reuse_candidates feed the engine pass.
Phase 3/3 of DEBT-039. Now that all six cred-emitting services
(SSH, Telnet, FTP, POP3, IMAP, SMTP, Redis, LDAP) emit the universal
`secret_b64`-bearing SD shape, the ingester's legacy fork has no
live emitters to handle. Deletes:
- `_ingest_credential_legacy()` — synthesized native fields from
username+password
- The `elif _fields.get("username") and _fields.get("password")`
branch in `_extract_bounty`
- `_printable_filter()` — only the legacy adapter called it; the
native branch trusts the emitter (encode_secret() in Python or
sd_escape() in C) to have already sanitized
- The legacy-adapter test cases in tests/web/test_ingester.py;
their coverage moved to tests/services/test_cred_emitters.py
per-service in Phase 2
The cred path is now single-shape end-to-end. A pre-migration log
row carrying only username+password silently produces no Credential
write — by design, since no current emitter writes that shape and
keeping a code path alive for theoretical legacy data risks masking
emitter regressions. Pre-v1: any historical Bounty cred rows from
before commit 2f47f67 stay untouched.
DEBT-039 marked resolved with summary of the three commits and the
silent-loss bug fix for Redis + LDAP that fell out of execution.
Replaces the opaque Bounty.bounty_type='credential' path with a
dedicated `credentials` table whose schema is forward-compatible
across every auth-bearing service in the fleet. Hoisted indexed
columns (secret_sha256, principal, service, attacker_ip) carry the
universal reuse-analytics signal; service-specific JSON keys ride
in `fields`. Cross-service reuse queries become an indexed lookup
on secret_sha256 instead of JSON_EXTRACT scans.
Schema decisions baked in (per ANTI):
- New `Credential` table, not extension to Bounty
- Hoisted `principal` column for cross-service principal-reuse
- Standardized JSON keys: every payload carries secret_b64 +
secret_printable + principal universally; service-specific extras
(user, domain, dn, mech, …) ride alongside
The auth-helper SD-block emits the new shape natively. The ingester
forks at _extract_bounty:
- Native shape (SSH/Telnet, future emitters): secret_b64 present →
direct upsert_credential
- Legacy shape (FTP/POP3/IMAP/SMTP today): username + password →
adapter synthesizes secret_{b64,sha256,printable} on the fly,
upserts into the same Credential table. Tracked as DEBT-039;
one-shot bridge until those service templates migrate.
Defense-in-depth across five layers (input validation):
- C helper: bytes outside [0x20, 0x7f) collapse to '?', RFC 5424
escape rules for \\, ", ]; b64 preserves exact bytes
- Ingester native branch: rejects malformed secret_b64 (regex), drops
the credential row but keeps the underlying Log
- Ingester legacy adapter: same printable-ASCII filter as the C
code; sha256 + b64 over the original utf-8 bytes (lossless, even
when secret_printable is sanitized)
- DB column caps with truncation warning; sha256 always over the
full pre-truncation bytes so reuse queries match across truncation
- JSON serialized with ensure_ascii=True so utf8mb4 columns stay
safe even with non-ASCII service-specific keys
Bounty.bounty_type='credential' is no longer written. Pre-v1: no
historical backfill; existing rows stay untouched but unused.
595 tests pass; new tests cover the model + repo (upsert dedup,
null-principal independence, cross-service reuse, filters), both
ingester branches, b64 validation, sanitization preserving the
fingerprinting signal in b64.
`for i in $(seq 1 100); do curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 191.100.20.$i" ...`
was dumping 100 distinct IPs into AttackerDetail's LEAKED IPs row,
drowning the rest of the ORIGIN section. The 100-IP wall is itself a
signal (WAF-bypass-list probing) that deserves a short badge, not a
flood.
Backend:
- get_attacker_ip_leaks gains `limit: int = 10` parameter — caller
only ever needs a sample, not the full set.
- New count_attacker_ip_leaks() returns the unbounded COUNT(*) via
one cheap SQL aggregate.
- Detail endpoint returns {ip_leaks: [first 10], ip_leaks_total: N}
so the UI can render a rotation badge independent of list length.
UI:
- New LeakedIPsRow component. First 5 distinct IPs rendered inline
with hover tooltips (unchanged). When > 5, a `+ N more` expand
button reveals the rest of the sample; when total exceeds the
10-row cap, a subtle `(+M beyond sample)` note appears.
- When total ≥ 20, a red `ROTATION · N` tag renders leading the
row with a tooltip explaining the semantic: "almost certainly
XFF-rotation / WAF-bypass probing, not a real attribution leak."
DB churn is deliberately not capped — 100k rows × ~500 B is tolerable.
If it becomes a problem we can add an ingester-side count-and-skip;
for now the UX fix is the whole story.
Added test_ip_leaks_total_reported_separately_from_list asserting
the endpoint shape matches what the UI consumes.
Every http_useragent bounty now carries a `category` label plus an
optional tool name and a signals list. The main analytic win is the
`nonstandard` bucket — UAs like "FUCKYOU/1.0" or custom one-off
scanner labels that don't match any known pattern, which today
silently blend into the generic fingerprint list.
Buckets (priority order):
- scanner: nmap, nuclei, sqlmap, gobuster, nikto, masscan, zgrab,
ffuf, wpscan, katana, burp, acunetix, nessus, openvas, arachni,
whatweb, wappalyzer, etc.
- cli: curl, wget, httpie, xh, fetch.
- library: python-requests, aiohttp, httpx, urllib, Go stdlib, Java,
okhttp, Apache HttpClient, axios, node-fetch, got, undici, PHP,
Guzzle, Ruby stdlib, Faraday, .NET, PostmanRuntime, Insomnia, etc.
- bot: anything containing bot / crawler / spider / slurp / monitor
(catches Googlebot, bingbot, Baiduspider — many of which ship a
Mozilla/5.0 prefix, so the bot check runs BEFORE the browser
regex).
- browser: Mozilla/5.0-prefixed UAs that aren't bots.
- nonstandard: anything else. The interesting bucket.
- empty: literal empty User-Agent header.
Side signals computed regardless of category: suspicious_short (<8
chars), suspicious_long (>512 chars), nonprintable (control chars),
injection_like (SQLi / XSS / path-traversal / Log4Shell markers).
A sqlmap UA with a literal SQL-injection payload embedded fires
category=scanner + injection_like — the combination tells the
analyst the tool is being operated manually vs. on default config.
Classification is deterministic (same UA string → same tuple) so
add_bounty's payload-hash dedup continues to collapse repeat rows.
UI renderer upgraded from FpGeneric to a dedicated FpUserAgent that
colours the category tag by risk (scanner=alert-red,
nonstandard=warn-yellow, browser=accent-green, etc.) and renders
each signal as its own chip. Makes the interesting rows pop in the
fingerprints panel.
Also fixed: the ingester was using `_headers.get("User-Agent") or
_headers.get("user-agent")`, which short-circuits away empty-string
UAs. An explicit empty UA is itself a signal (real clients always
send something) — now captured.
An attacker hitting /admin with `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` was
previously flagged as an IP leak. It isn't — that's the classic
IP-allowlist / WAF-bypass payload ("treat me as localhost and skip
your auth checks"). Misclassifying it as "LEAKED IPs" in the UI
confuses analysts and burns trust in the signal.
Split by claim category. After pulling the left-most claimed IP
from the proxy header, classify:
- public (routable) → bounty_type=ip_leak (real attribution leak;
the attacker's upstream proxy forwarded their real IP).
- loopback / private / link-local / multicast / reserved /
unspecified → bounty_type=fingerprint, fingerprint_type=
spoofed_source (WAF-bypass / allowlist-probing attempt; the
attacker is telling us they know what XFF does).
- unparseable → dropped.
Same extraction pipeline; diverges only at the last step. A new
shared _classify_proxy_header_claim returns (kind, payload);
_detect_ip_leak keeps its public-only contract for backward-
compat; _detect_spoofed_source is the new sibling.
UI renderer FpSpoofedSource shows the claimed IP in warn color with
the claim_category tag (LOOPBACK / PRIVATE / ...) and a WAF-BYPASS
ATTEMPT badge — distinct visual from the "LEAKED IPs" row which
stays reserved for genuine public-IP leaks.
Test addresses updated: RFC 5737 doc ranges (198.51.100.0/24,
203.0.113.0/24) are flagged `is_reserved` in Python's ipaddress
module, so they now correctly belong to the spoof bucket — tests
that meant to exercise real public IPs now use 8.8.8.8 / 1.1.1.1 /
Cloudflare DNS. Added eleven new tests locking the classifier +
the two detectors' mutual exclusion.
add_bounty dedups on (attacker_ip, bounty_type, full payload JSON).
Three fingerprint-family bounties (http_useragent, ip_leak,
http_quirks) were including method/path / header_count in their
payloads — fields that vary per request — so a scanner hitting 100
paths produced 100 rows instead of 1, which is what was swelling
AttackerDetail.
Payloads now carry identity-only fields:
- http_useragent: {fingerprint_type, value}. UA + path combinations
no longer collide; one row per distinct User-Agent string.
- ip_leak: {source_ip, real_ip_claim, source_header, headers_seen}.
One row per distinct (proxy source, leaked IP, leaking header)
triple; repeat hits with the same header on different paths dedup.
- http_quirks: {fingerprint_type, order_hash, order, casing_hash,
casing_category, stable_count, tool_guess}. No more header_count
(included volatile headers; Cookie-presence variance broke dedup).
Per-request context (path, method, etc.) was never load-bearing for
analysts — the logs table already answers "when + where" at
per-event resolution. The bounty table is for stable identity.
UI:
- FpHttpQuirks renderer drops the method/path footer line and the
header_count/duplicates tags; shows stable_count instead.
- LEAKED-IPs tooltip on AttackerDetail swaps "X on GET /path" for
"Leaked via X; source 203.0.113.42" — same information, stable.
Tests add a "payload stable across paths and methods" assertion on
http_quirks — locks the contract so a future regression that sneaks
a per-request field back in fails loudly.
Existing duplicate bounty rows don't retroactively collapse.
Dev: `decnet db-reset --i-know-what-im-doing drop-tables` and
restart. Prod: one SQL pass to dedup by (attacker_ip, bounty_type,
payload) — trivial but not automated.
Per-request HTTP fingerprint derived from the header dict we already
log. Captures:
- order_hash: SHA-256 prefix (16 hex) over the lowercased header-name
sequence, minus volatile/per-request headers (Content-Length,
Cookie, Authorization, XFF family, trace IDs). Stable identity for
a given client stack regardless of which target / path is hit.
- casing_hash: same shape but over the per-header casing category
(Title-Case / lower / UPPER / mixed). Attackers frequently spoof
User-Agent but forget their stack sends `user-agent` while browsers
send `User-Agent`.
- tool_guess: prefix match against curl / python-requests /
Go-http-client / nmap-nse signatures. Cheap, best-effort — the
hash is the hard signal.
- duplicates: reserved for when the HTTP template switches from
dict(request.headers) to a list form; today it always fires empty
because dict() collapses duplicates.
Payload is a fingerprint bounty (bounty_type="fingerprint",
fingerprint_type="http_quirks"). Bounty dedup collapses identical
hashes per attacker — one row per distinct fingerprint — so a chatty
scanner doesn't spam the vault, but a tool-chain change from the
same IP surfaces as a new row.
UI renderer (FpHttpQuirks) shows the two hashes, tool guess badge in
violet, casing/count tags, and a collapsible header-order list.
Added to the passiveTypes group so it nests with JA3/JA4L/etc. in
the AttackerDetail fingerprints panel.
One library note: the naive "title-case" classifier failed on tokens
like `X-Forwarded-For` because Python's "".islower() returns False
so `p[1:].islower()` rejects single-letter tokens like the `X`.
Fix: explicitly accept single-char tokens when uppercase.
Attackers routinely front their scanners with VPNs/proxies, so the
TCP source we log is the proxy egress, not the real host. But a
surprising number of attacker setups are misconfigured: the proxy
forwards the real IP in an X-Forwarded-For (or Forwarded / X-Real-IP
/ CDN-variant) header. From our side that's a free attribution leak.
New _detect_ip_leak extractor in decnet/web/ingester.py fires at
ingest time per HTTP request. Logic:
1. Require service=http, source_ip present, headers present.
2. If source_ip ∈ DECNET_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated IPs or
CIDRs) → legitimate reverse-proxy forwarding, skip.
3. Walk proxy-family headers in priority order: Forwarded (RFC 7239)
→ X-Forwarded-For → X-Real-IP → True-Client-IP → CF-Connecting-IP.
4. Extract the left-most parseable IP from the winning header.
5. If that IP differs from the TCP source → emit a bounty with
bounty_type="ip_leak" carrying {source_ip, real_ip_claim,
source_header, headers_seen, path, method}.
Storage is the existing Bounty table — no schema change; de-dup is
handled by Bounty's (attacker_ip, bounty_type, payload_hash) key, so
repeat requests with the same leaked IP don't spam.
AttackerDetail renders a warn-accent "LEAKED IPs:" row under ORIGIN
listing distinct real_ip_claim values; hover tooltip shows the source
header + path of the most recent leak. Only shown when at least one
ip_leak bounty exists.
RFC 7239 Forwarded parser handles the full vocabulary — bare IPv4,
IPv4:port, quoted, IPv6 in brackets, IPv6 with port — returning only
IPs that actually parse.
Closes DEVELOPMENT.md "Network Topology Leakage → X-Forwarded-For
mismatches". Phase 3 of the three-phase Attacker Intelligence series
(phases 1: scanned-vs-interacted, 2: PTR records already shipped).
DECNET_TRUSTED_PROXIES env shape matches THREAT_MODEL DA-08's
"revisit when verified-proxy config lands" note — same token set
future rate-limit work will consume.
Adds a new card on AttackerDetail: SCANNED · N services | INTERACTED
WITH · M services. Distinguishes port-scanners (N high, M=0) from
actual engagement (M>0) at a glance — the analyst's first question
when triaging a new attacker row.
Classifier lives in decnet/correlation/event_kinds.py, a single
source of truth for the event-type vocabulary:
- INTERACTION_EVENT_TYPES — command-family (command/exec/query/...),
SMTP engagement (mail_from/rcpt_to/message_accepted), file/payload
activity (file_captured/upload/download_attempt/retr), pub/sub
(publish/subscribe), recorded TTY sessions.
- NOISE_EVENT_TYPES — DECNET-internal (startup/shutdown/parse_error/
unknown_*).
- Everything else defaults to scan. Conservative by design: new
template verbs show up as "scanned" until explicitly promoted.
Bucket logic: a service is "interacted" if ≥1 of its events
classifies as interaction; otherwise "scanned" if ≥1 scan event;
noise-only services drop. Disjoint by construction.
Deliberate no-schema path: compute on-the-fly in the detail endpoint
via SELECT DISTINCT service, event_type FROM logs. Small result set
(tens of pairs per attacker), cost is trivial vs. the existing
behavior/commands queries. Trade-off: one more DB round-trip per
detail view in exchange for zero ALTER TABLE migration pain and
immediate classifier-change feedback loop.
Profiler's _COMMAND_EVENT_TYPES stays as-is (strict subset of
interactions that carry executable text), with a comment pointing at
the new canonical module.
Closes DEVELOPMENT.md "Attacker Intelligence §Service-Level Behavioral
Profiling — Services actively interacted with".
test_lifespan_db_retry patched decnet.web.api.asyncio.sleep to skip the
DB-retry backoff. Problem: asyncio is a shared module — the patch leaks
to every caller that looked up asyncio.sleep via `import asyncio`,
including run_health_heartbeat's own sleep loop. That heartbeat task
spawns inside the same lifespan; with its sleep mocked, the while-loop
spins tight, starves cancellation, and leaves an orphan task that
pytest-timeout eventually signals — surfacing as the 'Task exception
was never retrieved' warnings the user saw when running the suite.
Fix: give decnet.web.api a local binding `_retry_sleep = asyncio.sleep`
for the DB-retry wait, and have the test patch that instead. Narrowly
scoped, no impact on asyncio.sleep callers elsewhere.
Test timing before: 12s with --timeout=10 (interrupted by signal).
Test timing after: 0.58s. Full tests/web slice: 27s → 7.1s with the
spurious warnings gone.
Groups every flat test_*.py under the module it exercises, matching the
existing tests/{profiler,sniffer,prober,collector,correlation,cli,web,
topology,swarm,bus,updater,api,docker,geoip,...} layout. New folders:
services/, fleet/, config/, logging/, db/ (+ db/mysql/), telemetry/,
mutator/, core/.
Path-dependent __file__ references bumped an extra .parent in three
files that moved one level deeper:
- tests/sniffer/test_sniffer_ja3.py (template path)
- tests/services/test_ssh_capture_emit.py (template path)
- tests/cli/test_mode_gating.py (REPO root)
- tests/web/test_env_lazy_jwt.py (repo var)
Also drops two SQLite runtime artifacts (test_decnet.db-{shm,wal}) that
were leaking into the repo from a previous test run.
Fixes two test_service_isolation cases that patched asyncio.sleep (no
longer on the profiler main-loop hot path — same pre-existing bug I
fixed earlier in test_attacker_worker.py) by patching asyncio.wait_for
and passing interval=0.
Thin async wrapper over `systemctl` — never shell=True, always
create_subprocess_exec. Unit names are built from
`decnet-<validated-name>.service`; the regex check is defence in depth
on top of the router-level KNOWN_WORKERS validation.
Exposes start / stop / is_active / list_installed; last is cached for
30s to keep the Workers panel cheap under REFRESH spam. On non-systemd
hosts list_installed returns an empty set, so the UI renders with
every row marked not-installed instead of 500-ing.
Ingester connects the bus at startup, emits a batch-committed summary
(component/flushed/position) after each successful _flush_batch. Zero-
row flushes are suppressed so the topic stays meaningful.
Complements the collector's per-line system.log publishes: collector
signals ingress, ingester signals DB-persisted progress. Federation
forwarder (worker 8) will subscribe to the batch-committed leaf to
trigger its upstream push.
Bus stays optional: publish_safely swallows failures, get_bus() can
return None, DECNET_BUS_ENABLED=false leaves the ingestion loop fully
functional.
