Relay-test scripts send minimal DATA with no headers. Without a From:
header the mail client falls back to displaying the envelope sender
(upstream_sender). Inject From: <attacker MAIL FROM> before forwarding
when the message has no existing From: header.
bus.subscribe() is sync and returns an async iterator, not a coroutine.
Awaiting it caused an immediate crash at startup; bus.next_message() does
not exist either. Rewrote _run_smtp_probe_listener to use the standard
pattern: sub = bus.subscribe(...) / async with sub / async for event in sub.
SERVICE_NAME was hardcoded to 'smtp' in server.py; the ingester's probe
publish guard checked service == 'smtp_relay' and never matched.
Read SMTP_SERVICE_NAME from env (default 'smtp'); smtp_relay compose
fragment sets it to 'smtp_relay' so the two services are distinguishable.
The bind-mounted quarantine dir is owned by the host decnet user; the
logrelay process had no write access because the Dockerfile USER directive
pre-applied before the entrypoint could fix permissions.
Run entrypoint as root, chmod 0777 the quarantine dir, then exec the
server under logrelay via su.
Attacker probe emails are now forwarded by the master (realism worker)
rather than inside the MACVLAN container, which has no internet gateway.
- New smtp.probe.pending bus topic: ingester publishes when smtp_relay
message_stored fires; worker subscribes and does the actual delivery
- decnet/orchestrator/drivers/smtp_relay.py: pure-sync forward_probe()
reads the .eml from disk and sends via smtplib on a thread executor
- worker.py: _run_smtp_probe_listener + _handle_probe_pending subtask;
limit enforced via count_probe_relays() (DB-backed, restart-safe)
- bounties.py: count_probe_relays() query on probe_relay bounty type
- fleet.py: get_fleet_decky_by_name() to pull service config from DB
- services/smtp_relay.py: upstream_* and probe_limit fields defined in
config_schema but NOT injected into container env (credentials stay
out of docker env vars)
- ingester.py: stripped of smtplib; publishes probe.pending and exits
- tests: assert upstream keys absent from container environment
forwarded=0 was silent — now fwd_error carries the exception string so
you can see exactly why the upstream refused (auth failure, connection
refused, timeout, etc).
Docker Compose tracks the previous container by internal ID. When that
container was already removed or renamed, --force-recreate fails with
"No such container". Remove by name first so Compose always starts clean.
Override the envelope MAIL FROM with a domain we own when talking to the
upstream relay. SPF passes at the recipient; the attacker's From: header
inside the message body is untouched so they see their own address in their
inbox and believe the relay is real.
Adds probe_forwarded to meaningful event kinds and stores it in the
bounty table as bounty_type=probe_relay with forwarded=true/false, so
the dashboard shows whether the upstream actually accepted the test email.
First SMTP_PROBE_LIMIT messages per source IP are forwarded via a real
upstream relay (SMTP_UPSTREAM_HOST/PORT/USER/PASS) so the attacker's
test email actually lands in their inbox. All subsequent messages from
the same IP get 250 Ok but only hit the quarantine — campaign content
captured, nothing delivered.
The Dockerfile PROMPT_COMMAND logger uses --msgid command, so the MSGID
field arrives as 'command' not '-'. The CMD rewrite block was guarded by
event_type == '-' so it never fired, leaving fields['command'] unpopulated
and cmd_text=None for every SSH session command.
Broaden the guard to also match event_type == 'command' with no existing
'command' field, which covers both the intended (MSGID=NIL) and actual
(MSGID=command) wire formats.
Once a fingerprint canary's HTTP beacon passes all 4 validation layers
and the trigger row lands, the token is immediately set to state=revoked
and canary.<id>.revoked is published on the bus. The slug lookup is
tightened to only return planted tokens, so subsequent requests to the
same URL silently return the transparent GIF without persisting anything
(stealth posture preserved). Plain http/dns canaries with no
fingerprint_nonce are not affected.
Changes:
- sqlmodel_repo/canary.py: add state == "planted" filter to
get_canary_token_by_slug so revoked slugs resolve to None
- worker.py: after record_canary_trigger, if parsed_fp survived all
layers and token has a fingerprint_nonce, call
update_canary_token_state("revoked") + publish CANARY_REVOKED; errors
are best-effort (trigger row already landed)
- test_worker_http.py: assert state=revoked in test_fp_valid_nonce_persists;
new test_fp_deregisters_slug_after_valid_hit (second hit records nothing);
new test_plain_http_canary_not_deregistered (env_file stays planted)
Adds per-mint nonce gating, structural shape validation, mint UUID
consistency checks, and a per-(token, IP) rate limiter to the canary
worker so attackers who extract a canary from a decky filesystem cannot
poison fingerprint forensics by replaying or forging ?d= submissions.
Changes:
base.py
fingerprint_nonce: Optional[str] added to CanaryArtifact so generators
can surface the nonce to the cultivator without coupling the generator
directly to DB code.
obfuscator.py
nonce_for(callback_token, mint_uuid): HMAC-SHA256 keyed on
DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET, truncated to 16 hex chars.
FingerprintSecretMissing raised at mint time if env var is unset.
render_fingerprint_js() now accepts nonce= and substitutes MINT_NONCE.
fingerprint_payload.js
New MINT_NONCE placeholder. Appended as &k= on all beacon URLs (bare-open,
single-shot, chunked). Using &k= avoids colliding with &n= (chunk total).
fingerprint_html.py / fingerprint_svg.py
Derive nonce via nonce_for() and pass to render_fingerprint_js(). Set
artifact.fingerprint_nonce so the cultivator can persist it.
cultivator.py
Passes fingerprint_nonce into create_canary_token() when present on the
artifact; NULL for all non-fingerprint generators.
canary.py (model)
fingerprint_nonce: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, max_length=16)
added to CanaryToken. None for non-fingerprint tokens.
worker.py
_extract_fingerprint now returns (meta_dict, parsed_fp) tuple.
_record_hit accepts parsed_fp + raw_nonce and runs 4 layers after
token lookup: nonce match, shape check, mint UUID consistency, rate limit.
Each failure sets _fp_invalid_* flag and drops structured _fp.
Trigger row always lands regardless.
tests/canary/conftest.py
Session-scoped autouse fixture sets DECNET_CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SECRET so
fingerprint generator and worker tests work offline.
tests
5 new worker HTTP tests and 2 new generator tests covering each
validation layer.
The fingerprint canaries' obfuscator shells out to a Node helper that
require()s javascript-obfuscator. Without this commit, a fresh
pip install decnet would land the .py modules but not the .js helper /
package.json, and there'd be no documented way to provision Node side.
* pyproject.toml - extend tool.setuptools.package-data to ship
canary/_obfuscate_helper.js, canary/fingerprint_payload.js, and
canary/package.json with the wheel.
* decnet/cli/canary.py - new "decnet canary-install-toolchain"
subcommand. Resolves decnet.canary.__file__'s dir, runs
npm install --omit=dev there, exits non-zero with a clear message
if npm is missing or install fails. Idempotent - safe to call
every API service start.
* deploy/decnet-api.service.j2 - non-fatal ExecStartPre that calls
the new subcommand. Leading '-' so a missing Node toolchain only
degrades fingerprint canaries (loud at mint time) without keeping
the API from booting.
* tests/canary/test_cli.py - registration smoke test, missing-npm
exit path, and a mocked-subprocess test asserting the right argv
and cwd land on npm.
Realism cultivator already has a broad except Exception around
cultivate() in scheduler.py:195-211, so a missing toolchain on a
host running the realism tick degrades to an inert noise file with
no extra plumbing.
The two new fingerprint canary generators existed at the API level
since f64e78f but weren't visible to the realism engine or the
operator-facing dashboard. Threads them through every place that
enumerates canary content classes.
Backend:
* realism/taxonomy.py - two new ContentClass members
(CANARY_FINGERPRINT_HTML, CANARY_FINGERPRINT_SVG); enum is
wire-visible (synthetic_files.content_class column + bus discrim)
so we add at the bottom, never reorder.
* canary/cultivator.py - class-to-generator dispatch, kind mapping
(both http), and default placement paths
(~/Documents/asset_directory.html and network_topology.svg).
* realism/naming.py + bodies.py - _name_canary / _body_canary entries.
* realism/planner.py - added to _DEFAULT_CANARY_CLASS_WEIGHTS and
the _CANARY_CLASSES classification set.
Frontend:
* decnet_web/src/realism/labels.ts - display labels.
* decnet_web/src/components/RealismConfig/RealismConfig.tsx - default
canary weight rows so operators see them in the realism config UI.
* decnet_web/src/components/SyntheticFiles/SyntheticFiles.tsx - added
to the CONTENT_CLASSES allow-list so filter dropdowns show them.
Also: re-applied the nosec B404/B603 markers on canary/obfuscator.py;
the first commit's pre-commit autoformatter stripped them.
Tests: extended tests/realism/test_taxonomy.py's stability assertion
to include the two new values. Full canary + realism suites pass
(362 / 2 skipped).
The fingerprint payload beacons fingerprint data as base64url JSON in
GET query params: ?o=1 for the bare-open beacon, ?d=<blob> for a
single-shot dump, or ?s/i/n/d=<chunk> for chunked dumps. Until now
those params were buried inside request_path; consumers had to parse
the URL themselves.
Worker now extracts them in _extract_fingerprint and merges into
raw_headers under reserved _fp* keys:
* _fp_open — bare-open marker
* _fp — decoded fingerprint dict (single-shot path)
* _fp_sid/idx/total/chunk — chunked metadata + raw base64 (reassembly
is a downstream concern, not the worker's job)
* _fp_decode_error / _fp_oversize — failure markers for trash dumps
Per-chunk size capped at 8KB so an attacker spamming /c/<known_slug>
can't inflate trigger rows indefinitely. Decode failures degrade
gracefully — the trigger row still records the hit, just with a
_fp_decode_error flag instead of structured fingerprint data.
Tests cover the single-shot decode, bare-open flag, chunked metadata,
malformed input, and oversize drop paths.
Two new synthesised-artifact generators that bake the obfuscated
fingerprint payload into plausible-looking decoy files:
* fingerprint_html — a mundane "Internal Asset Directory" page with a
small table of fake hosts; the obfuscated payload is inlined at the
bottom of <body>. Visible content (row pool slice, sync timestamp)
also varies per mint via SHA-256-derived stable ints, so two
extracted canaries don't diff to zero even on the rendered surface.
* fingerprint_svg — standalone SVG with an embedded <script> CDATA
block. SVG <script> only fires for top-level loads / <object> /
<iframe>; <img>-referenced renders are safely inert.
Both derive the mint UUID via uuid.uuid5 from the callback token, so
re-mints are byte-identical (preserving the generator determinism
contract) AND the same token produces the same mint UUID across HTML
and SVG variants — the worker can correlate beacons across artifact
shapes.
Wired into the factory + KNOWN_GENERATORS, default placement paths
under ~/Documents/asset_directory.html and ~/Documents/network_topology.svg
for both linux and windows personas. Tests cover determinism, per-token
divergence, structural validity (DOCTYPE/SVG headers), and that the
beacon URL stays inside the obfuscated string array (not in plaintext).
The two new entries skip in test_generators.py when Node toolchain is
absent so bare CI checkouts still pass.
Adds the load-bearing primitives for obfuscated browser-fingerprinting
canaries. Step 3 (HTML/SVG generators) and step 4 (worker-side
fingerprint ingestion) build on top of these.
* decnet/canary/obfuscator.py - javascript-obfuscator wrapper. Seed
and polymorphic config bits both derive from the callback token, so
output is byte-identical for the same mint (preserving the generator
determinism contract from base.py) and structurally distinct across
mints.
* decnet/canary/fingerprint_payload.js - port of canary-self-test.html
with the rendering UI stripped. Two placeholders (BEACON_URL,
MINT_UUID) substituted before obfuscation. MVP beacon strategy:
bare-open GET pixel first, then base64url-encoded fingerprint as
query params on subsequent GETs (chunked above ~6KB) so the existing
worker records hits before step-4 lands.
* decnet/canary/_obfuscate_helper.js - Node subprocess helper that
reads code+options JSON from stdin and writes obfuscated JS to
stdout. Vendored javascript-obfuscator under decnet/canary/.
* tests/canary/test_obfuscator.py - determinism, per-mint divergence,
template substitution, Node syntax check, error path.
Add/remove/update_config on a fleet decky living on a swarm worker — and on
an agent-pinned topology — used to run the master's local docker-compose only,
which has no containers for the remote decky. The mutation persisted on master
and silently no-op'd on the worker.
- Fleet swarm: lookup DeckyShard.host_uuid; if found, rebuild a single-host
shard from master state and call dispatch_decnet_config — same proven path
as POST /swarm/deploy. Skip local _compose (no containers to touch).
- Topology agent-pinned: call decnet.engine.deployer.resync_agent_topology
(existing helper) to push the latest hydrated blob to the worker.
- Local-only deckies: behaviour unchanged.
- Tests: 5 new in tests/engine/test_services_live_swarm.py covering all
three mutations on a swarm fleet decky (no local _compose, dispatch fires
with the right host's deckies), plus apply=False save-only path (no
dispatch), plus regression that local-only fleet add still runs local compose.
Bus signal `decky.{name}.service_config_changed` keeps publishing as an
audit trail; it is not the propagation trigger.
- DeckyServiceAddRequest gains an optional `config: dict` field, validated
against the service's config_schema before any state mutation (400 on
bad type, no half-written rows).
- Engine: add_service threads `config` into _add_topology_service /
_add_fleet_service, persisting validated cfg to decky_config.service_config
BEFORE compose regen so the first `up -d --build` materialises the env on
the new container. No follow-up apply needed.
- Frontend: shared AddServiceConfigModal — same wizard accordion shape, used by:
* DeckyCard's ADD SERVICE picker (Fleet & MazeNET inspectors via shared component)
* MazeNET Inspector's ADD SERVICE picker
* MazeNET palette drag-drop onto a deployed decky
Empty-schema services short-circuit to a one-click add (no modal flash).
Operator can cancel; errors surface in the modal.
- Tests: add_service config plumbing — persist, drop unknown keys, 400-equivalent
on bad types, back-compat empty-config.
- Drive-by: fix stale repo-method names in test_services_live.py
(create_topology_decky → add_topology_decky, get_topology_decky → list+pick helper,
service.added → service_added topic).
- Declarative config_schema on RDP, Telnet, MySQL, Redis, SMTP, SMTP_Relay
matching the keys each service already reads at compose time.
- TODO marker on the 19 services that accept service_cfg but never read it,
so future contributors know where to plug schemas in.
- Wizard base64-wraps all textarea values at INI emit (DeckyFleet
buildIni); validate_cfg detects the b64: sentinel and decodes back to
UTF-8. Plain raw strings still pass through for direct API submitters.
- HTTPS image entrypoint accepts PEM content or path in TLS_CERT/TLS_KEY:
detects a BEGIN header, writes content to /opt/tls/, and re-exports
the on-disk path so server.py keeps reading paths.
- Tests cover schema/compose alignment for each new service plus
textarea base64 round-trip (incl. UTF-8) and HTTPS PEM end-to-end.
The systemd unit grants AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN so the API
service can program host-side macvlan/ipvlan interfaces without
running as root, but setup_host_macvlan/_ipvlan rejected with euid!=0
before even trying — making web-driven 'decnet deploy' impossible
under the privilege model the unit advertises.
Replace _require_root with _require_net_admin, which reads CapEff
from /proc/self/status and accepts the cap (bit 12) as well as
euid==0. No libcap dep — pure /proc parse.
- GET /topologies/services/{name}/schema serves the declared ServiceConfigField
metadata so the Inspector can auto-render forms.
- PUT /(topologies/{id}/)deckies/{decky}/services/{svc}/config persists the
validated dict (DB + compose); container untouched (Save).
- POST /(topologies/{id}/)deckies/{decky}/services/{svc}/apply persists then
force-recreates <decky>-<svc> so the new env takes effect (Apply, destructive).
- New engine helper update_service_config wires both fleet and topology paths
through the existing _persist_fleet_change / _rerender_topology_compose
machinery; emits decky.<name>.service_config_changed on the bus.
ServiceConfigField dataclass + BaseService.validate_cfg coerce/drop submitted
service_cfg dicts against per-service typed schemas. SSH/HTTP/HTTPS now declare
the keys they already read in compose_fragment, so the upcoming Inspector form
has metadata to render from instead of hardcoded inputs per service.
Dashboard's ACTIVE DECKIES (active_deckies in get_stats_summary) counts
TopologyDecky rows where state='running'. No code path was flipping
that state away from the default 'pending', so the count read 0/N
even when every container was running fine — the dashboard was lying.
Two complementary fixes:
1. deploy_topology — after the post-deploy compose ps verification,
reconcile each TopologyDecky.state from the corresponding base
container's docker state. running → 'running'; anything else →
'failed'. Reuses the ps_rows already gathered for the
ACTIVE-vs-DEGRADED status decision; no extra docker hit.
2. apply_add_decky — _materialise_decky_spawn now returns True/False;
on True the row is updated to state='running' before
_assert_valid_after. Catches the case where a decky added via the
live mutator queue stays at 'pending' indefinitely (the deployer's
reconcile only runs on a fresh deploy_topology pass).
Existing topology deckies in active topologies will still read as
'pending' until the next deploy_topology runs, since this is
forward-only. An operator-side fix is to teardown + redeploy or run
the (forthcoming) reconcile-on-startup pass.
apply_add_decky's compose-up was hard-failing whenever the operator's
~/.docker/buildx/activity/ landed on a read-only mount — the wedge
detection in _compose_with_retry correctly refuses to retry (would
just leak more mounts), but for live materialisation we don't want a
wedged buildx state to abort an admin's mutation. ANTI hit it on
adding decky-a977: 'failed to update builder last activity time: ...
read-only file system → buildx wedge detected → returned non-zero'.
_compose_up_with_buildkit_fallback wraps _compose_with_retry: on a
CalledProcessError whose stderr matches both wedge signatures
(_BUILDX_WEDGE_SIGNATURE + _BUILDX_EROFS_SIGNATURE), it logs a
warning with the manual recovery steps + retries once with
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 set. The legacy non-buildx builder doesn't use
the activity dir and isn't affected.
Wired into the two paths that pass --build:
* _materialise_decky_spawn (apply_add_decky)
* _materialise_decky_services_diff (apply_update_decky service add)
_materialise_decky_recreate_base doesn't build — it just recreates a
container from an existing image — so it's not affected.
Operator-facing log message points at the manual fix
(rm -rf ~/.docker/buildx/activity + docker buildx create) so they
can recover at their leisure; we don't ATTEMPT the recovery because
the activity dir might be RO for a reason (zfs/btrfs snapshot, etc.)
that an automated rm would be wrong to fight.
apply_update_decky's flip path now refuses to promote a decky to
gateway unless its home LAN is a DMZ. The compose generator publishes
host ports for forwards_l3=True; a non-DMZ gateway would shadow the
host's port space without anything legitimately able to reach the
service. Same posture as the existing 'forwards_l3 flip on live
requires force=true' guard — refused before any DB write so a bad
mutation leaves zero side-effects.
The check is intentionally NOT a standing _RULES invariant — the
codebase uses forwards_l3 for two semantics:
1. Generic L3 forwarding (internal bridge deckies routing between
their multi-home LANs). The generator writes this on internal
bridges via bridge_forward_probability; legitimately non-DMZ.
2. DMZ gateway (host-port publisher). Only meaningful on DMZ.
Standing validation can't enforce DMZ-homing without breaking case 1.
The guard fires only on the explicit user-driven flip path where the
operator's intent is unambiguously case 2. Generator output and
internal-bridge attachments bypass the check.
check_gateway_homed_in_dmz lives in validate.py for callers that want
the explicit form (and for the test surface), but is not a standing
rule — comment in _RULES explains the asymmetry.
Two related fixes that came out of running the W5 tests locally:
1. tests/__init__.py — empty file, makes 'tests/' a package so pytest
stops inserting it into sys.path. Without it, 'tests/docker/'
(the docker-image test category) shadowed the installed docker SDK
on every engine-touching test in the repo:
module 'docker' has no attribute 'DockerClient'
Pytest's default --import-mode=prepend was the culprit; making
tests/ a package is the cheapest fix and doesn't change
--import-mode for the whole tree.
2. delete_topology_decky / delete_topology_edge / delete_lan grow an
'enforce_pending: bool = True' kwarg. Default preserves the HTTP
CRUD guard (api_decky_crud / api_edge_crud / api_lan_crud get the
409 for free). apply_remove_decky / apply_detach_decky /
apply_remove_lan now pass enforce_pending=False — the mutator
queue is the live-editing surface and has its own active-topology
gating; the repo's pending-only guard was for design-time CRUD
that mustn't bypass it. Without this, apply_remove_decky was
silently broken on active topologies pre-W5; W5's new test
surfaced it on first run.
10/10 new W5 tests pass; 58/58 across mutator + topology suites.
apply_update_decky now discriminates three sub-cases:
* services list changed → diff old vs new and call
_materialise_decky_services_diff (compose up -d for added,
stop + rm -f for removed). Mirrors services_live's pattern but
doesn't import it — mutator-routed mutations carry a different bus
surface (mutation.applied) than the direct API path
(decky.<name>.service_added).
* forwards_l3 flipped → port publishing changes, which docker can
only apply at container-create time. Gated on payload['force'] is
true; default raises MutationError so a half-thinking operator
can't stomp a live decky. When force=true,
_materialise_decky_recreate_base does compose up -d --no-deps
--force-recreate. Pre-checked BEFORE the DB write so a refused
mutation leaves zero side-effects.
* coord-only (x/y) → DB only, no docker work.
Ships tests/mutator/test_ops_materialisation.py with focused coverage
for every new helper: add_decky/remove_decky/attach_decky/
detach_decky/update_decky/update_lan paths against an active
topology, with compose primitives + docker SDK mocked at the source
modules so the helpers' lazy imports pick up the stubs. Also covers
the pending-topology skip and the force-flag gating.
Symmetric to apply_attach_decky — after deleting the multi-home edge
from the DB, calls the docker SDK to drop the base container's
interface in the now-detached LAN. Service containers lose
visibility automatically (they share the base's netns).
Idempotency: 'not connected' / 'no such' APIError is logged at info
and treated as success.
After the DB writes that record the multi-home edge, calls the docker
SDK directly to add an interface to the base container's netns:
client.networks.get(<topology bridge>).connect(<base>, ipv4_address=ip)
Non-destructive — the base keeps running, no recreate. Service
containers automatically see the new interface because they share
the base's netns via network_mode: service:<base>.
Idempotency: docker APIError with 'already' / 'endpoint exists' is
logged at info and treated as success. Other errors log + leave the
DB row in place; an operator retry will hit the same path.
Captures the decky's name and services list before delete_topology_decky
runs (the helper needs both as compose targets even though the DB row
is gone), then calls _materialise_decky_remove which stops + rm -f's
the base + per-service containers via 'docker compose stop / rm -f'.
Re-renders the per-topology compose AFTER the stop/rm so a future
'compose up -d' on the file doesn't try to bring the decky back.
Adds _materialise_decky_{spawn,remove,connect,disconnect,services_diff,recreate_base}
helpers alongside the existing _materialise_lan_change. Each follows
the same skip rules: bail when topology is not active/degraded, when
agent-pinned, or when docker calls fail (logged, not re-raised — DB
remains source of truth).
apply_add_decky now calls _materialise_decky_spawn after the DB writes.
The helper:
* re-renders the per-topology compose so it lists the new decky;
* runs 'compose up -d --no-deps --build <decky_base> <decky>-<svc>...'
in a worker thread (matches engine/services_live's pattern).
Service container targets are filtered through get_service() so
fleet_singleton services are skipped — they don't have per-decky
compose entries. Gateway (forwards_l3=True) deckies need no
special-case here; the compose generator already emits the host
'ports:' block for them.
Subsequent commits wire the other apply_* ops to the matching
helpers. Tests for the full set ship in the workstream's last
commit.
subnet and is_dmz are pinned at deploy time — live deckies bind to
the bridge with IPs allocated from the old subnet, and is_dmz flips
the docker network's internal flag which can't be changed while
containers are attached. Today the op happily wrote the new value
into the DB and left docker on the old one, drifting the two surfaces.
apply_update_lan now raises MutationError when topology status is
active or degraded and the patch touches subnet or is_dmz. Coord
(x/y) and rename updates still pass through; renames don't currently
have a live caller and the bridge's docker name keys off the lan name
in the renderer, so the next deploy will reconcile.
This matches the posture taken by _materialise_lan_change for live
LAN add/remove (commit 472c84b).
apply_add_lan and apply_remove_lan were DB-only — they wrote/deleted
the topology_lans row but never created or destroyed the docker bridge
network. Adding a LAN to a deployed topology silently did nothing on
the substrate side; any decky later attached to it had nowhere to bind.
Both ops now call a shared _materialise_lan_change helper after the DB
write. When the topology is active/degraded and not pinned to a swarm
agent, the helper:
* creates / removes the docker bridge network (internal=True for
non-DMZ LANs, mirroring engine/deployer.deploy_topology),
* re-renders the per-topology compose file so future redeploys reflect
the change.
Failures are logged, not re-raised — the DB row stays as source of
truth so an operator can retry without leaking inconsistent state.
Agent-pinned topologies are skipped; the next agent push reconciles.
apply_add_decky / apply_attach_decky have the same gap and are not
fixed here — multi-homing a running container needs careful
recreate-vs-network-connect handling and is its own commit. Without
those, dropping a decky into a freshly-added LAN still won't spawn a
container; only the LAN itself is now live.
Bus topic segments are NATS-style tokens and the validator at
bus/topics.py:402 rejects '.', '*', '>', whitespace. My W3 constants
'service.added' / 'service.removed' tripped this on every live
add/remove call:
ValueError: topic segment 'service.added' may not contain '.', ...
Renamed both to underscore form: DECKY_SERVICE_ADDED = 'service_added'.
Aligned the SSE forwarder's name mapping (decky.<name>.service_added →
SSE event 'decky.service_added') and the frontend's
useTopologyStream listener + MazeNET.tsx event handler. Also updated
the wiki entry with a note about the underscore.
deploy_topology was flipping to ACTIVE the moment 'compose up -d'
returned 0, but compose returns 0 as soon as containers are *started*.
A service that crashes on boot (port bind failure, bad image, missing
entrypoint) left the topology row sitting at ACTIVE indefinitely while
half the substrate was dead.
After compose returns, we now run 'compose ps --all --format json',
parse the newline-delimited per-container rows, and downgrade to
DEGRADED with a reason listing the first eight unhealthy containers if
anything isn't in state='running'. Operators see real state on the
topology page instead of an optimistic flag.
_compose_ps swallows compose-level errors (returns []) so an unrelated
docker hiccup doesn't gate the success path — the existing in-flight
exception path still catches genuine deploy failures with FAILED.
The /topologies/{id}/events SSE proxy now subscribes to two bus
patterns concurrently and merges them through a bounded asyncio.Queue:
* topology.{id}.> — lifecycle (status, mutation.*) — unchanged.
* decky.> — per-decky events, filtered by payload.topology_id
so a fleet decky sharing a name with a topology
decky doesn't leak across.
_sse_name_for routes 'decky.<name>.service.added' to the SSE event
name 'decky.service.added' (kept the prefix so the frontend doesn't
collide with topology lifecycle events that share leaf names like
'status').
useTopologyStream surfaces the two new event names; MazeNET.tsx's
onStreamEvent optimistically patches the matching node's services
list so a second tab reflects shape changes without a refetch.
Adds a fleet_singletons array to ServiceCatalogResponse so per-decky
add UIs can filter out services like LLMNR that run once fleet-wide
(and would 422 server-side at the live add endpoint).
The existing 'services: list[str]' field is unchanged for back-compat
with MazeNET/useMazeApi.ts:257; the new field is additive.
decnet_web/src/hooks/useServiceRegistry.ts wraps the endpoint with a
module-scoped cache (registry only changes on BYOS install / plugin
drop, neither of which happens mid-session) and exposes a precomputed
.perDecky list so consumers don't need to re-derive the diff.
decnet.engine.services_live exposes add_service / remove_service for
both fleet and topology decky scopes. The host's _compose() wrapper
already supported per-service targeting (up --no-deps -d <svc>,
stop, rm -f); what was missing was the orchestration around it:
* add: validate against decnet.services.registry (rejects unknown +
fleet_singleton); persist the new services list; re-render the
per-scope compose file (so future redeploys reflect the change);
run docker compose up -d --no-deps --build <decky>-<svc>.
* remove: stop + rm -f the service container; persist; re-render
compose so a future up -d doesn't bring it back.
Both publish decky.<name>.service.added / .removed on the bus, with
the post-mutation services list. Topic constants added to
decnet.bus.topics; the matching wiki entry in wiki-checkout/Service-Bus.md
ships in a separate commit on the wiki repo (wiki-checkout/ is gitignored).
Four new admin endpoints:
* POST/DELETE /api/v1/deckies/{name}/services{,/svc}
* POST/DELETE /api/v1/topologies/{id}/deckies/{name}/services{,/svc}
ServiceMutationError messages are mapped at the API boundary to 404
(decky/topology missing), 409 (idempotency violation), 422 (unknown
or fleet_singleton service).
Extracts the docker-exec-with-base64-stdin pattern out of canary/planter
and orchestrator/drivers/ssh into a shared decnet.decky_io package.
Both consumers now delegate; the canary planter test still proves the
contract end-to-end.
Adds POST/DELETE /api/v1/deckies/files for arbitrary file drops.
Container resolution is shared with the canary path: topology_id absent
means fleet (<name>-ssh), present routes through resolve_decky_container
which picks <name>-ssh when the topology decky exposes ssh, else the
topology base container decnet_t_<id8>_<name>.
Path validation rejects relative paths and '..' traversal at the request
model layer. Bad base64 → 400; unknown topology → 404; decky not in
topology → 422; docker exec failure → 409.
POST /api/v1/canary/tokens grows an optional topology_id field. When
present, the server hydrates the topology, validates the named decky is
in it, and resolves the docker container via
planter.resolve_topology_container — <name>-ssh if the decky exposes ssh,
else the topology base container. Absent ⇒ fleet semantics, unchanged.
The token row gets a nullable topology_id column (no migration helper
per pre-v1 policy). GET /api/v1/canary/tokens accepts ?topology_id= as
a filter. DELETE re-resolves the container at revoke time so a
redeployed topology is still reachable.
422 when the named decky isn't in the topology; 404 when the topology
itself doesn't exist.
Topology deploys now plant the configured canary baseline set on every
decky in the topology, mirroring the fleet-deploy hook. Containers are
resolved via resolve_topology_container — <decky>-ssh when the decky
exposes an ssh service, else the topology base container
decnet_t_<id8>_<decky>.
The planter's plant/revoke/seed_baseline grow an optional container=
kwarg; default preserves the fleet <name>-ssh resolution.
The Bounty Vault page only read from the Bounty table, but
inotifywait-captured file drops (event_type=file_captured) and SMTP
quarantined messages (event_type=message_stored) were only landing in
the Logs table. AttackerDetail's tabs queried logs directly, so they
showed up per-attacker but were invisible on the global Vault page.
Mirror both events into Bounty as bounty_type=artifact with
payload.kind ∈ {file, mail} so the existing dedup
(bounty_type, attacker_ip, payload) collapses repeats by sha256. Add an
ARTIFACTS segment to the Vault filter row, plus dedicated render
branches: file drops show orig_path + size + writer attribution; mail
shows subject + From + attachment count + size, with the Mail icon
distinguishing them from FileText for file drops.
Forward-only — existing logs stay where they are. A backfill pass would
be straightforward (read Log WHERE event_type IN ('file_captured',
'message_stored') and feed each row through _extract_bounty) but is out
of scope here.
