ActiveProbe.run/syslog_fields/publish_payload now accept port=None so
non-port-iterating probes can live in the registry. Ipv6LeakProbe replaces
the hand-rolled _ipv6_leak_phase special case in worker.py; it runs last
via priority=999. _probe_cycle no longer has an ad-hoc phase call.
Fixes three stale test files (test_prober_bus, test_prober_rotation,
test_prober_worker) that were broken since the 916b21b6 registry refactor.
_route_info() calls _ip_route_get once and returns (on_link, iface);
worker._ipv6_leak_phase now calls it instead of the two separate helpers.
Bare except clauses at _ip_route_get and response parse now log at debug.
Replace _jarm_phase / _hassh_phase / _tcpfp_phase boilerplate (3×~50
lines of identical port-iteration logic) with a metaclass-registered ABC.
Adding a new port-iterating active probe is now one class + three methods.
- decnet/prober/base.py: ActiveProbeMeta auto-registers subclasses by
probe_name; ActiveProbe ABC enforces run/syslog_fields/publish_payload
with env-driven DECNET_PROBE_PORTS_<NAME> port override.
- decnet/prober/probes/{jarm,hassh,tcpfp}.py: concrete probe classes.
- decnet/prober/worker.py: single _run_probe driver replaces the three
phase functions; _probe_cycle iterates ActiveProbeMeta.all(); drops
the ports=/ssh_ports=/tcpfp_ports= kwargs from prober_worker.
- IPv6 leak and TLS cert capture stay as special cases (different call
shapes; intentionally outside the registry).
- tests/prober/test_active_probe_registry.py: registry contents, sort
order, priority-10 override, ABC contract per probe class.
- tests/prober/test_run_probe_driver.py: dedup, success, None-skip,
exception, rotation, publish paths for _run_probe.
- tests/prober/test_prober_worker.py: updated patch targets and
_probe_cycle call sites; port control via monkeypatch.setattr.
Add ipv6_leak.py with solicit_ipv6_leak() — sends ICMPv6 Echo to
ff02::1 on the attacker's iface and returns fe80:: evidence when a
link-local response arrives. Gated on _is_on_link(): skips when
attacker is behind a router (no L2 adjacency).
Add _ipv6_leak_phase() to worker.py (Phase 4 in _probe_cycle).
Phase runs once per attacker IP per cycle (sentinel at port 0 in
ip_probed["ipv6_leak"]) and publishes kind="ipv6_leak" via publish_fn.
Add list_v6_addrs(iface) to network.py: returns [(addr, scope)] for
all IPv6 addresses on an interface, required for source-routing ICMPv6
from the correct link-local address.
When the prober observes a NEW hash for an
(attacker_uuid, port, probe_type) triple it has seen before — VPS
rotation, SSH server rebuild, TLS cert swap — emit a derived
attacker.fingerprint_rotated event carrying both old and new hash.
Detection is a small library (decnet.correlation.fingerprint_rotation)
called inline from the prober at each of the three emit sites
(JARM/HASSH/TCPFP). No new daemon. New AttackerFingerprintState table
holds per-triple last-hash state; Attacker.rotation_count and
Attacker.last_rotation_at are stamped on every diff. Library is sync,
fully unit-tested via injected publish_fn / syslog_fn callbacks.
JARM probes are crafted ClientHellos with weird ciphers — they never
complete a real handshake, so the peer cert isn't reachable from
those sockets. After a non-empty JARM hash proves the port speaks
TLS, do a separate ssl.wrap_socket() against the same (ip, port) to
fetch and parse the leaf cert.
- decnet/prober/tlscert.py: fetch + parse via cryptography lib;
swallows all connect/handshake/parse failures (returns None).
- decnet/prober/worker.py::_capture_tls_cert: emits a tls_certificate
event with subject_cn / issuer / SANs / validity / SHA-256 +
publishes on the bus. Wired from _jarm_phase only when JARM
succeeds, so non-TLS ports never trigger a second connect.
- Tests cover happy path, cert-fetch failure, defense-in-depth crash,
empty-JARM skip, publish_fn, and parser edge cases (garbage DER,
empty bytes, missing SAN extension, non-self-signed).
Mirrors the IP-ID classifier for TCP ISN values: per-source-IP rolling
deque (maxlen=8) populated from each inbound SYN's tcp.seq, classified
on every emission. A 'random' verdict is the modern norm; 'incremental',
'zero', or 'constant' indicates legacy stacks or hand-rolled raw-socket
tooling — a strong fingerprint signal.
Active prober now also captures server_isn (single sample, not classified
in-flight; downstream consumers correlating multi-probe results can apply
seq_class.classify_sequence themselves).
Profiler rollup carries the latest non-'unknown' label into
attacker.tcp_fingerprint. Dedup key already covers isn_class from
the previous commit, so transitions emit cleanly.
UI surfaces ISN class as a colour-coded tag with a ⚠ glyph for
non-random verdicts, since they're the genuinely interesting case.
Active prober now reads ip.tos from the SYN-ACK and emits tos/dscp/ecn
alongside the existing TTL/window/options fields. dscp is folded into the
fingerprint hash so different DSCP markings produce distinct signatures.
Passive sniffer logs the same three fields on tcp_syn_fingerprint events;
profiler rollup carries them into the attacker tcp_fingerprint snapshot;
AttackerDetail's TCP STACK panel now surfaces DSCP and ECN cells.
Ships the backend half of Config → Workers:
* Worker registry aggregates `system.*.health` + `system.bus.health`
heartbeats into a last-seen dict; OK / STALE / UNKNOWN tiers drop
out of a 90s window (3× the 30s heartbeat interval).
* `GET /api/v1/workers` returns the snapshot plus `bus_connected`
(so the UI can explain "all UNKNOWN" when the bus socket is down)
and a per-row `installed` flag populated from
`systemctl list-unit-files decnet-*.service` (cached 30s).
* `POST /api/v1/workers/{name}/stop` publishes a stop intent on
`system.<name>.control`; workers listen via the shared control
listener in `bus/publish.py`.
* Heartbeat + control listener wired into collector / profiler /
sniffer / prober / mutator worker loops. API self-heartbeats too
so the panel always has one ground-truth row.
* Topic helper `system_control(name)` + tests covering builder
validation, control listener shutdown path, and the API surface
(auth gating, bus-connected field, unknown-name 404).
Adds `StartFailure` / `StartAllResponse` models in anticipation of
the upcoming start endpoints (DEBT-034).
Each successful JARM / HASSH / TCPfp probe fans out an
attacker.fingerprinted event; the probe family goes in event.type so a
single subscription covers all three. Payload carries the attacker IP,
port, and probe-specific hash — enough for the MazeNET live map to
render fingerprint info on observed attackers.
Lifts the thread-safe publisher helper out of the sniffer worker into
decnet/bus/publish.py so the prober (and every future worker with a
to_thread hot path) can reuse it without copy-pasting the
run_coroutine_threadsafe dance. Sniffer rewires onto the shared helper
in passing.
Adds ATTACKER_FINGERPRINTED as a new leaf — distinct from
ATTACKER_OBSERVED (correlator's first-sight signal) because an active
probe result is additional evidence about an already-observed attacker.
Note: the plan's decky.{id}.state realism-probe publish path is
deferred — the current prober fingerprints attackers, not decky
realism. Will revisit when realism probes exist.
Rename the container-side logging module decnet_logging → syslog_bridge
(canonical at templates/syslog_bridge.py, synced into each template by
the deployer). Drop the stale per-template copies; setuptools find was
picking them up anyway. Swap useradd/USER/chown "decnet" for "logrelay"
so no obvious token appears in the rendered container image.
Apply the same cloaking pattern to the telnet template that SSH got:
syslog pipe moves to /run/systemd/journal/syslog-relay and the relay
is cat'd via exec -a "systemd-journal-fwd". rsyslog.d conf rename
99-decnet.conf → 50-journal-forward.conf. SSH capture script:
/var/decnet/captured → /var/lib/systemd/coredump (real systemd path),
logger tag decnet-capture → systemd-journal. Compose volume updated
to match the new in-container quarantine path.
SD element ID shifts decnet@55555 → relay@55555; synced across
collector, parser, sniffer, prober, formatter, tests, and docs so the
host-side pipeline still matches what containers emit.
Extends tracing to every remaining module: all 23 API route handlers,
correlation engine, sniffer (fingerprint/p0f/syslog), prober (jarm/hassh/tcpfp),
profiler behavioral analysis, logging subsystem, engine, and mutator.
Bridges the ingester→SSE trace gap by persisting trace_id/span_id columns on
the logs table and creating OTEL span links in the SSE endpoint. Adds log-trace
correlation via _TraceContextFilter injecting otel_trace_id into Python LogRecords.
Includes development/docs/TRACING.md with full span reference (76 spans),
pipeline propagation architecture, quick start guide, and troubleshooting.
Gated by DECNET_DEVELOPER_TRACING env var (default off, zero overhead).
When enabled, traces flow through FastAPI routes, background workers
(collector, ingester, profiler, sniffer, prober), engine/mutator
operations, and all DB calls via TracedRepository proxy.
Includes Jaeger docker-compose for local dev and 18 unit tests.
The active prober emits tcpfp_fingerprint events with TTL, window, MSS etc.
from the attacker's SYN-ACK. These were invisible to the behavioral profiler
for two reasons:
1. target_ip (prober's field name for attacker IP) was not in _IP_FIELDS in
collector/worker.py or correlation/parser.py, so the profiler re-parsed
raw_lines and got attacker_ip=None, never attributing prober events to
the attacker profile.
2. sniffer_rollup only handled tcp_syn_fingerprint (passive sniffer) and
ignored tcpfp_fingerprint (active prober). Prober events use different
field names: window_size/window_scale/sack_ok vs window/wscale/has_sack.
Changes:
- Add target_ip to _IP_FIELDS in collector and parser
- Add _PROBER_TCPFP_EVENT and _INITIAL_TTL table to behavioral.py
- sniffer_rollup now processes tcpfp_fingerprint: maps field names, derives
OS from TTL via _os_from_ttl, computes hop_distance = initial_ttl - observed
- Expand prober DEFAULT_TCPFP_PORTS to [22,80,443,8080,8443,445,3389] for
better SYN-ACK coverage on attacker machines
- Add 4 tests covering prober OS detection, hop distance, and field mapping
Extends the prober with two new active probe types alongside JARM:
- HASSHServer: SSH server fingerprinting via KEX_INIT algorithm ordering
(MD5 hash of kex;enc_s2c;mac_s2c;comp_s2c, pure stdlib)
- TCP/IP stack: OS/tool fingerprinting via SYN-ACK analysis using scapy
(TTL, window size, DF bit, MSS, TCP options ordering, SHA256 hash)
Worker probe cycle now runs three phases per IP with independent
per-type port tracking. Ingester extracts bounties for all three
fingerprint types.
