Replaces the opaque Bounty.bounty_type='credential' path with a
dedicated `credentials` table whose schema is forward-compatible
across every auth-bearing service in the fleet. Hoisted indexed
columns (secret_sha256, principal, service, attacker_ip) carry the
universal reuse-analytics signal; service-specific JSON keys ride
in `fields`. Cross-service reuse queries become an indexed lookup
on secret_sha256 instead of JSON_EXTRACT scans.
Schema decisions baked in (per ANTI):
- New `Credential` table, not extension to Bounty
- Hoisted `principal` column for cross-service principal-reuse
- Standardized JSON keys: every payload carries secret_b64 +
secret_printable + principal universally; service-specific extras
(user, domain, dn, mech, …) ride alongside
The auth-helper SD-block emits the new shape natively. The ingester
forks at _extract_bounty:
- Native shape (SSH/Telnet, future emitters): secret_b64 present →
direct upsert_credential
- Legacy shape (FTP/POP3/IMAP/SMTP today): username + password →
adapter synthesizes secret_{b64,sha256,printable} on the fly,
upserts into the same Credential table. Tracked as DEBT-039;
one-shot bridge until those service templates migrate.
Defense-in-depth across five layers (input validation):
- C helper: bytes outside [0x20, 0x7f) collapse to '?', RFC 5424
escape rules for \\, ", ]; b64 preserves exact bytes
- Ingester native branch: rejects malformed secret_b64 (regex), drops
the credential row but keeps the underlying Log
- Ingester legacy adapter: same printable-ASCII filter as the C
code; sha256 + b64 over the original utf-8 bytes (lossless, even
when secret_printable is sanitized)
- DB column caps with truncation warning; sha256 always over the
full pre-truncation bytes so reuse queries match across truncation
- JSON serialized with ensure_ascii=True so utf8mb4 columns stay
safe even with non-ASCII service-specific keys
Bounty.bounty_type='credential' is no longer written. Pre-v1: no
historical backfill; existing rows stay untouched but unused.
595 tests pass; new tests cover the model + repo (upsert dedup,
null-principal independence, cross-service reuse, filters), both
ingester branches, b64 validation, sanitization preserving the
fingerprinting signal in b64.
Adds asn (int), as_name (varchar 128), asn_source (varchar 16) to
the Attacker SQLModel — direct columns, no _migrate_* helper per
feedback_no_new_migrations_prev1.
Profiler worker now calls decnet.asn.enrich_ip alongside the existing
geoip enrich_ip; both feed the upsert payload. Failure is total — if
either lookup throws or the IP is private/unannounced, the field stays
None and the row still writes.
Both lookups are independent: a CGNAT address can have a country (RIR
allocation) but no ASN (no BGP origin), and vice-versa for unrouted
RIR-allocated space. Storing them separately preserves that signal.
Adds nullable LAN.host_uuid (FK swarm_hosts.uuid). Resolution order
when deploying a LAN: lan.host_uuid → topology.target_host_uuid →
master. A LAN is one Docker bridge so the bridge cannot span hosts;
this pin forces every decky in the LAN onto the named host.
LANCreateRequest / LANUpdateRequest accept host_uuid; both validate
that the host exists, returning 400 on unknown UUIDs. PATCH still
gated by the existing pending-only guard, so reassignment of a live
LAN is not yet possible (deferred to mutator support).
LANRow surfaces the field so the frontend can render per-host badges.
Resolve each attacker IP's rDNS name once at first sighting, store on
Attacker.ptr_record, render on AttackerDetail under ORIGIN. Many
attackers run infrastructure with forgotten rDNS that instantly
identifies them once surfaced: scan-node-42.shodan.io,
shady-vps.leasecloud.net, etc.
Resolver lives in decnet/geoip/ptr.py — colocated with enrich_ip
because the shape matches (take an IP, return supplementary
metadata, never raise). Uses the OS resolver via socket.gethostbyaddr
offloaded to the default executor, wrapped with asyncio.wait_for
timeout=2s so a slow authoritative NS can't stall the profiler tick.
Profiler side: _WorkerState grows a ptr_attempted: set[str] bounding
resolution to once per worker lifetime. Cold-start batches resolve
concurrently (Semaphore(_PTR_CONCURRENCY=10)) so a backlog doesn't
serialize 2s ceilings. _build_record gains a keyword-only ptr_record
parameter that, when _UNSET, omits the key from the record dict —
upsert_attacker's attribute-merge loop then preserves whatever's
stored on the row. Explicit None is a "fresh failed attempt" signal
and gets written through.
Env kill-switch DECNET_PTR_ENABLED=false for locked-down deploys
where egress DNS is forbidden. Private / loopback / link-local /
multicast / reserved addresses short-circuit before any DNS call.
IPv6 reverse DNS works transparently through the stdlib resolver.
Schema change — run once on upgrade:
ALTER TABLE attackers
ADD COLUMN ptr_record VARCHAR(256) NULL DEFAULT NULL;
Or drop-and-recreate on dev boxes (db-reset's SQLModel.metadata-driven
table discovery now picks it up automatically since ba155b7).
tests/conftest.py disables DECNET_PTR_ENABLED globally for the same
reason it disables DECNET_GEOIP_ENABLED — unit tests must never hit
the network. tests/geoip/test_ptr.py re-enables explicitly via an
autouse fixture.
After DECNET_WEBHOOK_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD (default 5) consecutive failed
deliveries, the worker calls trip_webhook_circuit(uuid, ts) which
flips enabled=False and stamps auto_disabled_at. The worker sets its
reload flag so the next dispatch epoch stops consuming events for the
tripped sub entirely — one dead receiver can't poison the shared
egress pool anymore.
Operator clears the trip via PATCH — setting enabled=True when the
sub was previously disabled clears auto_disabled_at, zeros
consecutive_failures, and clears last_error. Admin-pause → re-enable
hits the same path harmlessly.
Three observable states now distinguishable in the UI:
- Active enabled=True, auto_disabled_at=NULL
- Admin-paused enabled=False, auto_disabled_at=NULL
- Tripped enabled=False, auto_disabled_at=<ts>
UI surfaces a TRIPPED · <ts> chip on the row (red, alert-styled) and
a "N TRIPPED" count in the page header. Hover tooltip tells the
operator how to reset ("Re-enable via Edit").
record_webhook_failure now returns the new consecutive_failures count
so the worker can compare against the threshold without a second
roundtrip. trip_webhook_circuit is idempotent — re-tripping just
re-stamps auto_disabled_at.
Closes THREAT_MODEL WH-02 and DEBT-037 §1.
WebhookResponse now carries a `warnings: list[str]` field. When the
subscription's URL starts with http://, an `insecure_url` advisory is
surfaced on every GET/CREATE without blocking the request. HMAC still
detects tampering regardless of transport — only read-confidentiality
is lost over plaintext — and test/dev environments without TLS stay
usable.
Matches the operator-trust posture already established by DA-06
(admin-on-admin protection is out of scope). The alternative — hard
rejection at admin time — was considered and declined; warning-plus-
visibility is the right shape.
THREAT_MODEL WH-03 accepted risk registered; revisit triggers are
multi-admin delegation, a regulated customer, or an operator ticket
asking for a DECNET_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_HTTPS enforcement knob.
Introduces the webhook egress foundation — a new WebhookSubscription
table, admin-gated CRUD under /api/v1/webhooks, and the shared
delivery client that both the test-ping route and the upcoming worker
will use. No worker yet; this commit is API + model + client only.
Simple-mode enum (AttackerDetail / DeckyStatus / SystemStatus) expands
to bus-topic patterns at the router layer; storage is always the raw
pattern list. Advanced mode lets admins supply raw NATS-style patterns
directly. Filter-at-subscribe: the worker (next commit) will subscribe
to the union of patterns across enabled subscriptions.
Delivery client handles HMAC-SHA256 signing (X-DECNET-Signature),
retry on 429/5xx/network errors with jittered backoff, no-retry on
4xx. Secrets never leave the server on GET/LIST — only the create
response carries the secret for copy-out.
CRUD routes publish WEBHOOK_SUBSCRIPTIONS_CHANGED on the bus after
every mutation so the (future) worker can hot-reload.
Opens DEBT-037 for the deferred items (circuit breaker, dead-letter,
batch delivery, payload templates, secret-at-rest).
Every mutation route that returned an untyped dict now declares
response_model at the decorator. MessageResponse covers the eight
{"message": ...} envelopes (change-password, mutate-decky, mutate-
interval, update-deployment-limit, update-global-mutation-interval,
delete-user, update-user-role, reset-user-password). Purpose-built
models cover the richer shapes (DeployResponse for /deckies/deploy,
PurgeResponse for /config/reinit, ReapReportResponse for /reap-orphans,
UserResponse for /config/users). 204-No-Content and Response/
ORJSONResponse routes stay as-is.
The wire shape for clients is unchanged — the envelopes already only
shipped a message field. What changes is that a handler which
accidentally returns a richer dict (e.g. a full user row including
password_hash) would be silently stripped to the declared fields at
serialization time.
Also flips F4/D "expensive LIKE" to accepted (new DA-09) — the /logs
and /attackers search routes LIKE-scan unbounded columns, but both are
admin-gated, limit-capped, and operator rate-limit scope per DA-04.
FTS5 stays a performance TODO, not a security blocker.
Follow-ups on 9232031 per review:
- Module-level constants KD_PAUSE_BURST_MAX_S (0.2s),
KD_PAUSE_THINK_MAX_S (1.5s), KD_START_OF_ACTION_IDLE_S (2.0s).
Docstrings reference them by name; future calibration against real
session data only has to touch one place. Threshold for "started
a new action" raised from 1s → 2s — 1s catches too much
mid-command hesitation to be empirically bimodal.
- New column kd_max_pause_gap (seconds). The distracted bucket count
alone can't distinguish one 3s pause from three 60s pauses;
max-gap carries that signal in one cheap scalar (vs widening the
histogram to a fourth bucket).
- Scope-framing docstring above the whole kd_* section: intended
use is session clustering / tooling attribution, explicitly NOT
biometric identity, admission decisions, or ML-driven user ID.
Keeps a future well-intentioned contributor from walking the
project into legal/ethics territory by accident.
- TODO comment on kd_top_bigrams: v1's JSON-in-TEXT is fine for
"show the top digraphs on the attacker page". If bigram-similarity
queries become hot, promote to a session_bigram_stats(sid, bigram,
count, mean_iat_s) table or Postgres JSONB + GIN. Neither changes
the write-side ingester materially.
No new migration helper — pre-v1 schema additions go through
create_all on fresh DBs; the existing _migrate_session_profile_table
stays but does not get extended. Alembic lands at v1 and sweeps all
the ad-hoc migrations at once.
Adds the three signal columns motivated by the manual keystroke
analysis in DEBT-036 directly to the SessionProfile table. Pre-v1 so
we modify the schema in place — Alembic arrives at v1.
Columns:
- kd_top_bigrams (TEXT) — JSON of top-N most-common digraphs with
mean IAT per bigram. Complements kd_digraph_simhash ("same typist?")
with "same typist in same mental state?" (tired / rested / distracted
shifts bigram-specific IATs measurably).
- kd_start_of_action_latency (REAL/DOUBLE) — median IAT of the first
keystroke after an idle gap > 1s. Separates "initiating a command"
from "executing a remembered one"; real humans have measurable
start-of-action latency, bots don't.
- kd_pause_hist_burst / _think / _distracted (INT) — three-bucket
histogram (counts, <0.2s / 0.2-1.5s / >1.5s). More discriminating
than the existing flat burst_ratio / think_ratio pair: C2 operators
concentrate in burst with a thin tail; opportunistic humans have a
fat think bucket and a long distracted tail.
Both backends get an idempotent ADD COLUMN migration
(_migrate_session_profile_table) wired into initialize() alongside
the existing _migrate_attackers_table path — guards on PRAGMA
table_info (SQLite) / information_schema.COLUMNS (MySQL) so reruns
are safe.
PII discipline comment on kd_digraph_simhash and kd_top_bigrams:
both operate on bigram CHARACTERS, never on raw input stream content.
Attacker passwords typed over SSH must not land here.
Test updated for the MySQL initialize() migration-order contract.
MySQL can't index a BLOB/TEXT column without a prefix length, so
create_all() on a fresh MySQL schema blew up with "BLOB/TEXT column
'kd_digraph_simhash' used in key specification without a key length".
SimHashes are a fixed 8 bytes — the variable-length type was a
SQLAlchemy-side auto-mapping from 'Optional[bytes]', not an actual
schema requirement. Switch to BINARY(8), which is portable: MySQL gets
a fixed-width indexable BINARY, SQLite treats it as BLOB and doesn't
care about key length.
Populates Attacker.country_code + country_source (MVP) using the five
RIR delegated-stats files (ARIN/RIPE/APNIC/LACNIC/AFRINIC). Offline,
license-free, no outbound traffic that could burn honeypot stealth.
- decnet.geoip package with factory/base/lookup + rir/ subpackage
(fetch/parse/provider) mirroring the db + bus factory convention
- Profiler._build_record calls enrich_ip on every upsert
- Idempotent ALTER TABLE migrations for both SQLite and MySQL
- decnet geoip refresh/lookup CLI (master-only)
- /var/lib/decnet/geoip seeded by decnet init
- DECNET_GEOIP_ENABLED=false kill-switch; set in tests/conftest.py so
unit tests never trigger the first-access fetch
New SmtpTarget table records each (attacker, domain) pair observed via
the SMTP honeypots. Only the domain is stored — local-parts are dropped
at ingestion, so this table holds no user-identifying data beyond the
target organisation's identity.
The profiler worker extracts domains from rcpt_to / rcpt_denied /
message_accepted events, normalizes them (lowercase, strip local-part,
drop blocked TLDs), and upserts one row per pair with a running count +
first_seen / last_seen.
Three repo methods shipped:
* increment_smtp_target(attacker, domain) — upsert + bump
* list_smtp_targets(attacker) — per-attacker view
* smtp_target_seen(domain) — cross-attacker aggregate, shaped as the
federation-gossip RPC that V2 will expose.
The gossip-query shape is load-bearing: each operator can answer
"have any of your attackers targeted corp1.com?" without leaking
which attackers or when — the aggregate returns a bool + total count
+ first/last seen, nothing else.
decnet/web/db/models.py was approaching 1000 lines across User/Log/
Attacker/Swarm/Topology/Workers/Updater/Health domains. Split into a
package with one module per domain; __init__.py re-exports every symbol
so all 52 call sites keep importing from decnet.web.db.models
unchanged.
