A stolen JWT used to survive a password reset for its full 24h. Now every
session-invalidating change moves the user's tokens_valid_from cutoff to
'now', so all of that user's prior tokens 401 on next use:
- self change-password, admin reset-password, role change all bump the
cutoff (delete needs no bump: the row is gone, so the user lookup 401s).
- Cutoff is compared against the token's iat floored to whole seconds, so a
re-login in the same second as the change isn't caught by its own
revocation (the cost is a <=1s grey zone on same-second-old tokens).
- Per-user: changing one user never revokes another.
POST /auth/logout adds the caller's jti to the denylist and drops the
local negative-cache entry, so the token 401s on its very next use.
Single-session semantics: only this token dies, other sessions for the
same user keep working. Reachable for must_change_password users (it
runs the revocation checks but skips the must_change gate via
get_token_claims) so a session can always be ended; an already-revoked
token is rejected.
Stateless JWTs had no revocation path: a stolen token stayed valid for
its full 24h even after the victim changed their password, and there was
no logout. This lays the foundation for revoking them.
- User.tokens_valid_from: per-user bulk-revocation cutoff (compared against
the token's iat). RevokedToken(jti PK, exp): single-token denylist, pruned
opportunistically on insert so it never outgrows live-but-revoked tokens.
- login() now mints a jti; create_access_token already stamps iat/exp.
- repo.revoke_token / is_token_revoked / set_tokens_valid_from (abstract +
shared sqlmodel impl + DummyRepo coverage stubs).
- Centralized validate path in dependencies.py: every auth dependency now
resolves the user and fails closed on (1) missing jti (legacy/pre-deploy
token -> one forced re-login), (2) iat before the cutoff, (3) a denylisted
jti. Denylist lookups ride a 10s membership cache mirroring the user cache.
- Contract/fuzz harness seeds its fixed-uuid principal under
DECNET_CONTRACT_TEST so its minted token resolves to a live admin user.
Replaces LICENSE (GPLv3 -> AGPLv3) and prepends
`SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later` to every source file
across decnet/, decnet_web/, tests/, scripts/, and tools/.
Rationale: closes the GPLv3 ASP loophole so any party operating a
modified DECNET as a network service must offer their modified
source. Personal copyright (Samuel Paschuan) + inbound=outbound
contributions make a future unilateral relicense infeasible.
- LICENSE: full AGPL-3.0 text (gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.txt)
- COPYRIGHT: project copyright notice
- tools/add_spdx_headers.py: idempotent header injector
(shebang- and PEP 263-aware)
Touches 1565 source files (.py, .ts, .tsx, .js, .jsx, .css, .sh).
No behavior change; comments only.
