Commit Graph

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
245975a6dd fix(security): close LOW ASVS findings — env bypass, SSE/deployment authz, CN fail-close, password byte-limit, exception leaks, BUG-12..16
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5):
- env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env;
  gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest).
- must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint.
- GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size).
- CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected
  explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating.

Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16):
- Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed,
  ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'.
- Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError).

Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2):
- Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop,
  blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged
  server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0.

Correctness (BUG-12..16):
- BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry,
  consistent principal_key canonicalization).
- BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop).
- BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick).
- BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise.
- BUG-16 see above.

Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk +
documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix;
unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
2026-06-10 13:27:14 -04:00
d80e6aa6d1 fix(security): close MEDIUM ASVS findings — JWT pinning, SSE tickets, SSRF, mTLS pin, rate limits + correctness bugs
Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1):
- Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation
  (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced.
- Change-password now requires min_length=12.
- SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket
  (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream.
  Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper.

Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3):
- Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/
  metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the
  vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE.
- UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host
  fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now
  defaults True.

Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2):
- Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create
  (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter.
- Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy
  trust.

Correctness (BUG-7..11):
- BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling);
  BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities;
  BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC.

Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for
every fix; unanimous adversarial review.
2026-06-10 12:32:15 -04:00
ae16c4437b feat(auth): make access-token TTL configurable, default 4h
Replace the hardcoded 1440-minute (24h) JWT lifetime with
DECNET_JWT_EXP_MINUTES (validated positive int, default 240 = 4h).
Shrinks the passive window of a stolen token; active revocation is
unchanged (immediate->=<10s).
2026-05-30 23:05:05 -04:00
f2b3393669 chore: relicense to AGPL-3.0-or-later and add SPDX headers
Replaces LICENSE (GPLv3 -> AGPLv3) and prepends
`SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later` to every source file
across decnet/, decnet_web/, tests/, scripts/, and tools/.

Rationale: closes the GPLv3 ASP loophole so any party operating a
modified DECNET as a network service must offer their modified
source. Personal copyright (Samuel Paschuan) + inbound=outbound
contributions make a future unilateral relicense infeasible.

- LICENSE: full AGPL-3.0 text (gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.txt)
- COPYRIGHT: project copyright notice
- tools/add_spdx_headers.py: idempotent header injector
  (shebang- and PEP 263-aware)

Touches 1565 source files (.py, .ts, .tsx, .js, .jsx, .css, .sh).
No behavior change; comments only.
2026-05-22 21:04:16 -04:00
3945e72e11 perf: run bcrypt on a thread so it doesn't block the event loop
verify_password / get_password_hash are CPU-bound and take ~250ms each
at rounds=12. Called directly from async endpoints, they stall every
other coroutine for that window — the single biggest single-worker
bottleneck on the login path.

Adds averify_password / ahash_password that wrap the sync versions in
asyncio.to_thread. Sync versions stay put because _ensure_admin_user and
tests still use them.

5 call sites updated: login, change-password, create-user, reset-password.
tests/test_auth_async.py asserts parallel averify runs concurrently (~1x
of a single verify, not 2x).
2026-04-17 14:52:22 -04:00
b2e4706a14 Refactor: implemented Repository Factory and Async Mutator Engine. Decoupled storage logic and enforced Dependency Injection across CLI and Web API. Updated documentation.
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2026-04-12 07:48:17 -04:00
8c7ec2953e fix: handle bcrypt 72-byte limit and increase JWT secret length 2026-04-09 01:11:32 -04:00
32b06afef6 feat: add .env based configuration for API, Web, and Auth options 2026-04-08 01:27:11 -04:00
ba2faba5d5 chore: enforce strict typing and internal naming conventions across web components 2026-04-07 19:56:15 -04:00
81135cb861 fix: switch to direct bcrypt usage for Python 3.14 compatibility 2026-04-07 15:07:46 -04:00
5b990743db feat: implement Auth endpoints for web dashboard 2026-04-07 14:54:36 -04:00