fix(security): close MEDIUM ASVS findings — JWT pinning, SSE tickets, SSRF, mTLS pin, rate limits + correctness bugs

Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1):
- Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation
  (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced.
- Change-password now requires min_length=12.
- SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket
  (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream.
  Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper.

Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3):
- Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/
  metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the
  vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE.
- UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host
  fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now
  defaults True.

Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2):
- Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create
  (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter.
- Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy
  trust.

Correctness (BUG-7..11):
- BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling);
  BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities;
  BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC.

Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for
every fix; unanimous adversarial review.

tests/correlation/attribution/test_multi_actor_correlator.py

@@ -223,3 +223,62 @@ async def test_independent_dedup_per_identity(
     seen = {c["payload"]["identity_uuid"] for c in captured}
     assert seen == {iuid_a, iuid_b}
     await bus.close()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.anyio
+async def test_rearms_for_sub_threshold_identity_in_candidates(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    """BUG-10 regression: seen_now.add() must run AFTER the threshold guard.
+
+    If an identity is returned by the repo with < MULTI_ACTOR_MIN_PRIMITIVES
+    (defensive path) it must NOT be added to seen_now.  That means it stays
+    absent from seen_now → gets removed from last_fired on the stale-rearm
+    sweep → re-fires when primitives climb back above threshold.
+
+    Before fix: seen_now.add() ran before the continue, so the identity
+    was treated as present-and-seen even though it was below threshold,
+    and last_fired was never cleared → no rearm.
+    """
+    bus = FakeBus()
+    await bus.connect()
+    captured: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    async def cap(_b, t, p, *, event_type=""):
+        captured.append({"topic": t, "payload": p})
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(_aw, "publish_safely", cap)
+
+    iuid = "test-rearm-uuid"
+
+    class _StubRepo:
+        def __init__(self, entries: list[dict]) -> None:
+            self._entries = entries
+
+        async def list_multi_actor_identities(self) -> list[dict]:
+            return list(self._entries)
+
+    # First tick: identity fires with 2 primitives.
+    repo_above = _StubRepo([
+        {"identity_uuid": iuid, "primitives": ["prim.a", "prim.b"]},
+    ])
+    last_fired: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    await _aw.tick_multi_actor(bus, repo_above, last_fired)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    assert len(captured) == 1
+    assert iuid in last_fired
+
+    # Second tick: identity returned by repo but with only 1 primitive
+    # (sub-threshold defensive path).  last_fired[iuid] must be cleared.
+    repo_below = _StubRepo([
+        {"identity_uuid": iuid, "primitives": ["prim.a"]},
+    ])
+    await _aw.tick_multi_actor(bus, repo_below, last_fired)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    assert iuid not in last_fired, (
+        "sub-threshold identity must be removed from last_fired so it re-arms"
+    )
+
+    # Third tick: identity climbs back above threshold — must re-fire.
+    await _aw.tick_multi_actor(bus, repo_above, last_fired)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    assert len(captured) == 2, "identity must re-fire after rearm"
+
+    await bus.close()

tests/correlation/test_fingerprint_rotation.py

@@ -235,3 +235,69 @@ def test_multiple_rotations_increment_counter(engine, now):
         row = session.exec(select(AttackerFingerprintState)).one()
         assert row.rotation_count == 2
         assert row.last_hash == "h3"
+
+
+def test_emit_after_commit_raising_publish_does_not_lose_row(engine, now) -> None:
+    """BUG-9 regression: publish_fn is called AFTER session.commit().
+
+    A raising publish_fn must not roll back / lose the committed rotation
+    row.  Before fix, publish was called before commit so a raise in
+    publish_fn left the session without a commit and the state row was lost.
+    """
+    later = now + timedelta(hours=1)
+
+    call_order: list[str] = []
+
+    class _OrderRecorder:
+        def __call__(self, event_type: str, payload: dict) -> None:
+            call_order.append("emit")
+            raise RuntimeError("downstream unavailable")
+
+    publish = _OrderRecorder()
+
+    with Session(engine) as session:
+        # Patch session.commit to record ordering.
+        original_commit = session.commit
+
+        def _recording_commit() -> None:
+            call_order.append("commit")
+            original_commit()
+
+        session.commit = _recording_commit  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+        _seed_attacker(session)
+
+    with Session(engine) as session:
+        original_commit2 = session.commit
+
+        def _recording_commit2() -> None:
+            call_order.append("commit")
+            original_commit2()
+
+        session.commit = _recording_commit2  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+        # first_sighting — no publish yet
+        record_fingerprint(
+            session,
+            attacker_ip="1.2.3.4", port=22, probe_type="hassh",
+            new_hash="h1", ts=now,
+        )
+        call_order.clear()
+
+        # rotation — publish_fn raises after commit
+        outcome = record_fingerprint(
+            session,
+            attacker_ip="1.2.3.4", port=22, probe_type="hassh",
+            new_hash="h2", ts=later,
+            publish_fn=publish,
+        )
+
+    assert outcome.kind == "rotated"
+    # commit must come before emit
+    assert call_order.index("commit") < call_order.index("emit")
+
+    # The rotation row must be persisted despite publish raising
+    with Session(engine) as session:
+        row = session.exec(select(AttackerFingerprintState)).one()
+        assert row.last_hash == "h2"
+        assert row.rotation_count == 1

tests/correlation/test_parser_double_wrap.py

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ must agree with the collector's ``parse_rfc5424`` so that
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+from datetime import timezone
+
 from decnet.correlation.parser import parse_line
 
 
@@ -71,3 +73,41 @@ def test_outer_msgid_set_does_not_recurse() -> None:
     assert e.event_type == "auth_attempt"
     assert e.decky == "omega-decky"
     assert e.service == "auth-helper"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# BUG-11 regression: naive datetime normalization
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_NAIVE_TS_LINE = (
+    "<14>1 2026-05-02T06:22:48.089309 omega-decky smtp - disconnect "
+    "[relay@55555 src_ip=\"10.0.0.1\"]"
+)
+
+_AWARE_TS_LINE = (
+    "<14>1 2026-05-02T06:22:48.089309+00:00 omega-decky smtp - disconnect "
+    "[relay@55555 src_ip=\"10.0.0.2\"]"
+)
+
+
+def test_naive_timestamp_normalized_to_utc() -> None:
+    """BUG-11 regression: a log line with a naïve ISO timestamp (no tz offset)
+    must parse to a tz-aware UTC datetime so it sorts alongside aware ones
+    without TypeError.  Before fix, fromisoformat returned a naïve datetime
+    which crashed min/max/sort with aware datetimes downstream."""
+    e = parse_line(_NAIVE_TS_LINE)
+    assert e is not None
+    assert e.timestamp.tzinfo is not None
+    assert e.timestamp.tzinfo == timezone.utc
+
+
+def test_naive_and_aware_timestamps_sortable_together() -> None:
+    """A naïve-source entry and an aware-source entry must compare
+    without raising TypeError."""
+    naive_entry = parse_line(_NAIVE_TS_LINE)
+    aware_entry = parse_line(_AWARE_TS_LINE)
+    assert naive_entry is not None
+    assert aware_entry is not None
+    # min/max would raise TypeError pre-fix
+    earliest = min(naive_entry.timestamp, aware_entry.timestamp)
+    assert earliest is not None